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Abstract in English 
This cumulative dissertation presents five contributions that attempt to shed light on the issues 
regarding food consumption, income inequality and health in China. 
Given the fact that income disparity has become extremely serious in China, chapter 2 and 3 
investigate food consumption and the impact of education on income differentials between ethnic 
minorities and Han. In particular, after estimating a two-stage demand model for different income 
classes, our empirical results in chapter 2 indicate that there exist substantial differences in food 
consumption across various income classes, meanwhile, the projected food consumption under 
different income distribution patterns shows that changes in income distribution have significant 
influences on food consumption. Thus, we conclude that a more equal income distribution would 
associate with a higher food demand in rural China. By using an instrumental variable approach to 
account for the endogeneity of education in income equations, chapter 3 reveals that there exists 
significant income inequality to the disadvantage of ethnic minorities for the full, female, and urban 
samples, and depending on the instrument also for the rural sample. Nevertheless, our results for 
these samples show specific returns to education for ethnic minorities, which implies that a portion 
of the income gap can be overcome with additional education. It is well-known that alcohol and 
cigarette consumption can lead to harmful health outcomes and have been increasingly recognized 
as serious public health concerns worldwide. To implement the most efficient public health policy 
to control alcohol and cigarette consumption, it is particularly important to understand the 
relationship between the two goods and the role of education in their consumption. Therefore, 
chapter 4 and 5 mainly focus on the interdependence between alcohol and cigarette consumption 
and the impact of education on these unhealthy consumption behaviors and their intergenerational 
persistence. A structural equation model is applied as an alternative to estimate the interdependence 
between alcohol and cigarette consumption in case of the absence of price variation. The empirical 
results indicate that alcohol and cigarettes are complementary goods for men in China; when the 
demand for alcohol (cigarettes) increases, the demand for cigarettes (alcohol) will also increase, 
ceteris paribus. From a public health perspective this implies that measures for reducing alcohol or 
cigarette consumption might have a double dividend effect on health. Moreover, we find that 
education exerts a negative impact on unhealthy consumption like smoking and binge drinking, 
when accounting for the endogeneity of education in unhealthy consumption equations. 
Specifically, an additional year of education decreases the probability of smoking, drinking, and 
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binge drinking by 3.4%, 2.8%, and 1.8%, respectively. We also find that an additional year of 
education can counteract intergenerational persistence of smoking and binge drinking from the 
father, but that it has no significant impact on intergenerational persistence from the mother. In 
addition, we observe no impact of education on the intergenerational persistence of drinking from 
both parents. Following our research topic, chapter 6 tends to shed light on the relationship between 
income and overweight regarded as a consequence of unhealthy food consumption. By using an 
extended life-course utility model where income serves as a budget constraint and as a source of 
future health utility, the empirical estimations are conducted for overweight initiation and cessation, 
as well as participation reflecting a decision to start and previous decisions to not stop. The results 
suggest that body weight and the probability of overweight initiation increase with income but at a 
decreasing rate, which indicates an inverted U-shape relationship; while the probability of 
overweight cessation decreases with income but at an increasing rate, which indicates a U-shape 
relationship. Our findings conclude that in contrast to developed countries, low-income individuals 
are less likely to be overweight in a transition country like China. The major reason is probably 
because of an income constraint for unhealthy food consumption; however, when income exceeds 
the critical value of the inverted U-shape curve, it reverses because low-income individuals seem 
to profit less from future health. In particular, this change appears to happen earlier with increasing 
income for women and urban residents. 
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Abstract in German 
Diese kumulative Dissertation besteht aus fünf Beiträgen, die sich mit den Themen 
Lebensmittelkonsum, Einkommensungleichheit und Gesundheitsaspekte in China befassen.  
Vor dem Hintergrund, dass sich die Einkommensungleichheit in China dramatisch entwickelt hat, 
werden in den Kapiteln 2 und 3 vor allem der Lebensmittelkonsum und der Einfluss von Bildung 
auf die Einkommensungleichheit bei ethnischen Minderheiten und Han-Chinesen untersucht. Nach 
dem Schätzen eines zweistufigen Nachfragemodells für verschiedene Einkommensklassen weisen 
insbesondere unsere empirischen Resultate in Kapitel 2 daraufhin, dass es über verschiedene 
Einkommensklassen substantielle Unterschiede beim Lebensmittelkonsum gibt; darüber hinaus 
zeigt der projizierte Lebensmittelkonsum unter Verwendung verschiedener Verteilungsmuster, 
dass Veränderungen in der Einkommensverteilung signifikanten Einfluss auf den 
Lebensmittelkonsum haben. Daraus schließen wir, dass eine höhere Einkommensgleichheit mit 
einer höheren Lebensmittelnachfrage im ländlichen China einhergehen würde. Unter Verwendung 
eines Instrumentalvariablenansatzes zur Berücksichtigung der Endogenität von Bildung in 
Einkommensgleichungen weisen die Ergebnisse in Kapitel 3 darauf hin, dass eine bedeutende 
Einkommensungleichheit zum Nachteil von ethnischen Minderheiten für die gesamte, die 
weibliche und die urbane Bevölkerung existiert. Abhängig vom angewandten Verfahren gilt dies 
auch für die ländliche Bevölkerung. Nichtsdestotrotz zeigen unsere Ergebnisse für diese Gruppen 
einen besonderen Nutzen der Bildung für ethnische Minderheiten, was darauf hinweist, dass ein 
Teil der Einkommenslücke mit zusätzlicher Bildung überwunden werden kann. Wie bekannt ist, 
können Alkohol- und Zigarettenkonsum zu Gesundheitsschäden führen und werden zunehmend 
als ernste Probleme für die Volksgesundheit weltweit erkannt. Um die effizienteste 
Gesundheitspolitik zur Kontrolle von Alkohol- und Zigarettenkonsum zu implementieren, ist es 
besonders wichtig, das Verhältnis zwischen den beiden Gütern und die Rolle der Bildung bei ihrem 
Konsum zu verstehen. Daher konzentrieren sich Kapitel 4 und 5 hauptsächlich auf die 
Wechselbeziehung zwischen Alkohol- und Zigarettenkonsum und auf den Einfluss der Bildung in 
Bezug auf diese ungesunden Konsumgewohnheiten sowie auf ihre Tradierung von Generation zu 
Generation. Alternativ wird ein strukturelles Gleichungsmodell angewandt, um die 
Wechselwirkung von Alkohol- und Zigarettenkonsum zu schätzen. Wenn keine Preisänderungen 
vorliegen, zeigen die empirischen Ergebnisse, dass Alkohol und Zigaretten für Männer in China 
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komplementäre Güter darstellen. Wenn die Nachfrage nach Alkohol (Zigaretten) steigt, steigt auch 
die Nachfrage nach Zigaretten (Alkohol), ceteris paribus. Aus der Sicht des öffentlichen 
Gesundheitswesens bedeutet dies, dass Maßnahmen zur Eindämmung des Alkohol- oder des 
Zigarettenkonsums möglicherweise einen doppelt positiven Effekt auf die Gesundheit haben. Mehr 
noch, wir stellen fest, dass Bildung ungesunden Konsum wie Rauchen und Komatrinken bremst, 
wenn wir Endogenität von Bildung bei den Gleichungen in Bezug auf den ungesunden Konsum 
begründen. Insbesondere minimiert ein weiteres Bildungsjahr die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Rauchen, 
Trinken und Komatrinken um 3,4 %, 2,8 % beziehungsweise um1,8%. Wir stellen außerdem fest, 
dass ein zusätzliches Bildungsjahr die Tradierung von Rauchen und Komatrinken von einer 
Generation zur nächsten bei väterlichem, nicht aber bei mütterlichem Konsum verhindern kann. 
Außerdem ist kein Zusammenhang zwischen Bildung und Tradierung bei Konsum durch beide 
Elternteile feststellbar. Unserem Forschungsgebiet folgend untersuchen wir in Kapitel 6 das 
Verhältnis von Einkommen und Übergewicht als Folge von ungesundem Lebensmittelkonsum. 
Unter Anwendung eines erweiterten Lebenszyklus-Nutzwert Modells, in dem das Einkommen als 
Budgetbegrenzung dient und als eine Quelle des künftigen Gesundheitsnutzens, werden die 
empirischen Schätzungen für Beginn und Ende von Übergewicht durchgeführt wie auch für die 
Teilnahme unter Berücksichtigung der  Entscheidung zu beginnen und einer früheren Entscheidung 
nicht aufzuhören. Die Ergebnisse weisen darauf hin, dass Körpergewicht und die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit von beginnendem Übergewicht mit dem Einkommen zunehmen aber mit 
abnehmender Geschwindigkeit, was auf eine umgekehrte U-Form-Beziehung hinweist; während 
die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Beendigung des Übergewichts mit dem Einkommen abnimmt, aber 
mit zunehmender Geschwindigkeit, was auf eine U-Form-Beziehung deutet. Aus unseren 
Resultaten ist zu schließen, dass im Gegensatz zu entwickelten Ländern, Individuen mit einem 
niedrigen Einkommen in einem Schwellenland wie China mit geringerer Wahrscheinlichkeit 
übergewichtig sind. Der Hauptgrund dafür ist wahrscheinlich ein geringes Einkommen, das 
ungesunden Lebensmittelkonsum beschränkt. Wenn aber das Einkommen einen kritischen Wert 
auf der umgekehrten U-Form Kurve überschreitet, verkehrt sich dieses, da Individuen mit 
niedrigerem Einkommen weniger von künftiger Gesundheit zu profitieren scheinen. Dieser 
Wechsel scheint sogar früher einzutreten, wenn das Einkommen von Frauen und der städtischen 
Bevölkerung steigt.  
Chapter 1 Introduction and Summary 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction and Summary 
 
Since China has implemented its Reform and Opening up policy to liberalize its markets and trade, 
the economy has experienced sustained growth, especially after becoming a member of the WTO. 
Chinese agriculture has witnessed drastic and rapid transformation over the past decades. The fast-
changing process is expected to continue in the near future. Especially, in recent years the 
government has increasingly invested in improving the infrastructure and living standards in rural 
areas, which has driven a strong increase in farmers’ household income. In 2015 farms’ household 
average net income reached 11,422 Yuan, with a nominal growth rate of 8.9% and an actual growth 
rate of 7.5% compared to 2014, both of which tend to increase gradually1. 
However, as income increases, income disparity has become more serious in recent decades. 
According to the World Bank, the Gini coefficient increased from 0.26 in 1984 to 0.47 in 2004 in 
China and has approached 0.5 in recent years, which is almost the same as that of relatively high-
inequality Latin American countries. Specifically, the rural Gini coefficient increased from 0.21 to 
0.37 between 1978 and 2006 showing an unambiguous upward trend (Sutherland and Yao 2011), 
and is reported to have been 0.60 in 2012.2 In terms of the distribution of disposable income among 
rural household, the share of the bottom 20% is about 6.3%, whereas the share of the top 20% 
                                                 
1
 The data are taken from National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). 
2
 This is according to The Report of Income Gap in China, China Household Finance Survey. 
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accounts for about 43.5% in 2004 (Zheng and Henneberry 2010a). Although the government has 
taken measures to alleviate inequality and poverty, the poorest are not correctly targeted in many 
cases; this leads to even higher poverty and inequality levels in rural China (Wu et al. 2015). As 
seen in the above discussion, to a large extent, economic development in China has generally 
favored the wealthier members of society, especially in rural areas. 
Some studies (Park et al. 1996; Pinstrup-Andersen and Caicedo 1978; Raunikar et al. 1985), and 
specifically one study by Zheng and Henneberry (2010) in urban China have revealed that different 
income distribution may cause a varying demand system. Thus, in the first contribution, we 
hypothesize that in societies such as China, where visible changes have occurred in income 
distribution, food demand projections should take into account the expected changes in income 
distribution, rather than using average estimates of price and income elasticities for the whole 
population. 
Meanwhile, income inequality is also pronounced along racial and ethnic lines in many countries, 
as well as in China. With the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the government 
started to reclassify ethnic groups and autonomous areas and progressively set up a preferential 
policy framework. Fifty-five ethnic minorities alongside the Han-majority have been classified 
since 1949. Regarding income differentials between ethnic minorities and Han, the literature 
suggests differences in human capital, household and regional characteristics as the major 
determinants. For instance, comparing differences in occupational attainment between ethnic 
minorities and Han in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), Hannum and Xie (1998) 
find an increasing gap in occupational attainment between ethnic minorities and Han over time. 
Gustafsson and Li (2003) indicate an increasing income gap of 19.2% in 1988 to 35.9% in 1995, 
indicating lower income levels for ethnic minorities. Similarly, Johnson and Chow (1997) find that 
ethnic minorities in rural and urban areas earn approximately 19% and 4.5% less than Han, 
respectively. Li (2003) discovers that ethnic minorities earn 9% less than Han. Actually China has 
implemented a very advanced preferential policy framework to tackle labor market discrimination 
and ethnic inequalities, but one look into the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and 
the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) tells us how poorly these policies have been enforced (Gilley 
2001, Yee 2003, Hillman 2008). 
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Since education as a crucial human capital determinant in income equations (Mincer 1974),4 more 
education is generally regarded as a major factor for finding “better jobs” and earning higher 
incomes. Income gaps between ethnic groups can largely be attributed to in-between-group 
differentials and labor market discrimination in job access and wages. The major in-between-group 
differential is educational attainment. In the second contribution, the main hypothesis of our study 
is that returns to education might be higher for ethnic minorities with more education because of 
the scarcity of ethnic minorities with higher educational attainments in the Chinese labor market 
(Ding 2006, Hannum 1999, 2002); this means that one additional year of education for ethnic 
minorities will lead to more additional income increase for ethnic minorities in comparison to Han 
with the same years of education.  
Moreover, the overall health risk behavior is more prevalent for low-income individuals than for 
other socioeconomic groups (see Lantz et al., 1998) in developed countries. It is claimed that 
income generally has a positive correlation with health-related behaviors (Benzeval et al. 2000; 
Binkley 2010; Jolliffe 2011); thus, individuals with lower income tend to make less healthy 
consumption choices. As a consequence, they are more likely to suffer from nutrition-related health 
problems such as overweight and obesity (Ball and Crawford 2005; Sobal and Stunkard 1989). 
However, the opposite is true for developing countries. For example, a number of studies shows 
that overweight is relatively more widespread among high-income individuals (Popkin (1999); 
Monteiro et al. (2004), as well as Fernald (2007).  
With the development of the economy and increasing incomes, calorie consumption has been 
enhanced (Ogundari and Abdulai 2013); consequently, overweight and obesity have risen and 
become major health challenges in many developing countries (B. M. Popkin 1999; B. Popkin and 
Ng 2007). In China the diet has been shifting away from high-carbohydrate food towards high-
energy density food (Batis et al. 2014; Du et al. 2004), which is an important cause of overweight. 
One recent study by Tafreschi (2015) shows that approximately 30% of individuals in China are 
overweight or obese in recent years. Thus, in the last contribution, we argue that in a transition 
economy like China the relationship between the consequences of unhealthy food consumption and 
income might be mixed with the situation in developing and developed societies. 
Besides concerning the food consumption, the health-related consumption behaviors such as 
smoking and drinking are increasingly recognized as serious public health concerns worldwide. In 
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specific, there are over 300 million cigarette smokers in China who consume roughly one-third of 
the world’s cigarettes (WHO, 2015); 1.4 million people in China die annually from smoking-
related diseases, and this number is expected to rise to over 3 million by 2050 if current smoking 
rates will continue (Yang et al. 2015). In term of alcohol consumption, according to the WHO the 
total recorded alcohol per capita (15+ years) consumption of pure alcohol is increasing from 3.31 
liters in 2000 to 5.75 liters in 2010. Specifically, the consumption on spirit is still the leading 
alcohol consumption type taking up about 69% among the different type of the alcohol 
consumption in 2010 (beer, 28%; wine, 3%). 
As the harmful health outcomes from alcohol and cigarette consumption have been well 
documented (Bazzano et al. 2007; Cochrane et al. 2003; Deng et al. 2006; Hao et al. 2004; 
Ruitenberg et al. 2002), a number of policies have been introduced to restrict alcohol and cigarette 
consumption, particularly in developed countries. Policies aimed at reducing alcohol-related 
problems include taxation, consumption restriction for the underage and limited availability of 
alcoholic beverages. National legislators have begun to actively consider national bans on smoking 
in public and work places as well as on cigarette advertising.  
Nevertheless, tobacco control in China has remained particularly cumbersome because of the 
tobacco industry. There is, however, no comprehensive public health policy in China for reducing 
alcohol-consumption (Hao et al. 2005); for example, there is no official age-limit for purchasing 
or consuming alcohol. Alcohol use is, thus, also prevalent among adolescents in China (X. Li et al. 
1996). An efficient public health policy that seeks to minimize citizens’ burden and to maximize 
welfare gains should consider the relationship between alcohol and cigarette consumption. Due to 
insufficient price variation, the approach starting with a structural equation model that was 
introduced by Tauchmann et al. (2013) is used in the third contribution to better understand the 
relation between alcohol and cigarette consumption in China. 
Given the limited empirical research into the situation in China, this cumulative dissertation 
consists of five independent contributions that empirically analyze food consumption, income 
inequality, as well as health-related issues such as alcohol and cigarette consumption, as well as 
overweight. The first study (Chapter 2) is devoted to examine heterogeneity in food consumption 
among various income classes and to investigate the impact that changes in income distribution 
patterns have on food demand in rural China. The second study (Chapter 3) investigates the impact 
Chapter 1 Introduction and Summary 
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of education on income inequality between ethnic minorities and Han in China by using an 
instrumental variable approach to account for the endogeneity of education in income equations. 
The third study (Chapter 4) attempts to shed light on the relationship between cigarette and alcohol 
consumption using a structural equation model. The fourth study (Chapter 5) addresses how 
education impacts the unhealthy consumption behaviors and their intergenerational persistence. 
The last study (Chapter 6) provides a theoretic model and empirical estimation to detect how 
income affects overweight regarded as a consequence of unhealthy food consumption. 
Each study is summarized below. The summary includes the aim of the contribution, the data, the 
methods applied, and the main results. The main conclusions, policy implications, and limitations 
of each contribution are presented in Chapter 7. 
Heterogeneity in food consumption among income classes in rural China 
Given the fact that income disparity has become extremely serious in rural China, the primary 
objectives of this study are to examine heterogeneity in food consumption among various income 
classes and to investigate the impact that changes in income distribution patterns have on food 
demand in rural China.  
We partition the households into five income classes according to the distribution of household per 
capita net income. Using household data drawn from the China Health and Nutrition Survey 
(CHNS) in 2011, a two-stage demand model is applied to estimate a food demand system for each 
of the income classes. After obtaining the estimated income elasticities of eight studied food groups 
for each income class, we then examine the responsiveness of food demand to the changes in 
income distribution.  
Our empirical results indicate that there exist substantial differences in food consumption across 
various income classes. Specifically, the lowest-income households are more sensitive to price and 
income changes than the highest-income households for all the studied food groups. In general, 
income responsiveness is higher for meats, aquatic products, and particularly for dairy products. 
Based on estimated income elasticities, the projected food consumption under different income 
distribution patterns shows that changes in income distribution have significant influences on food 
consumption. In addition, we conclude that more equal distribution in income would associate with 
higher demand for food in rural China. 
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The impact of education on income inequality between ethnic minorities and Han in China 
This article analyzes the impact of education on income inequality between ethnic minorities and 
Han in China by using the data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) over the 
period 1993-2011. An instrumental variable approach using two institutional changes is applied to 
address the endogeneity of education in income equations for various subsamples. To investigate 
the impact of education on income inequality between ethnic minorities and Han, we introduce an 
interaction term between the ethnic minority status and years of education.  
Our results suggest that there exists significant income inequality to the disadvantage of ethnic 
minorities for the full, female, and urban samples, and depending on the instrument also for the 
rural sample. Nevertheless, our results for these samples show specific returns to education for 
ethnic minorities, which implies that a portion of the income gap can be overcome with additional 
education. We find that in general one additional year of education will increase earned incomes 
of ethnic minorities by 26.3-28% and in particular by 13.5-14.4% for women from an ethnic 
minority group, by 10.4-14% for ethnic minorities with urban household registration, and by 10.8% 
for ethnic minorities with rural household registration. However, we cannot obtain conclusive 
results for the male sample due to weak instruments. 
Drink and smoke; drink or smoke? – The interdependence between alcohol and cigarette 
consumption for men in China 
The interdependence between alcohol and cigarette consumption has received little attention in the 
literature on consumer behavior, particularly in transition economies such as China. The available 
literature generally addresses the interdependence between alcohol and cigarette consumption by 
estimating demand systems; however, in our case data on price variation and price information for 
a specific consumer are limited. A structural equation model is applied as an alternative to estimate 
the interdependence between alcohol and cigarette consumption with absence of price variation, 
using parental consumption patterns as instrumental variables for offspring’s consumption. The 
empirical investigation is conducted by using the data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey 
(CHNS) over the period from 1993 to 2011.  
The results indicate that alcohol and cigarettes are complementary goods for men in China. When 
the demand for alcohol (cigarettes) increases, the demand for cigarettes (alcohol) will also increase, 
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ceteris paribus. From a public health perspective this implies that measures for reducing alcohol 
or cigarette consumption might have a double dividend effect on health.  
Unhealthy consumption behaviors and their intergenerational persistence: the role of 
education 
This paper investigates the impact of education on unhealthy consumption behaviors and their 
intergenerational transmissions, using data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). 
After identifying a statistically significant positive correlation between filial and parental unhealthy 
consumption behaviors, an instrumental model is employed to account for the endogeneity of 
education in unhealthy consumption equations.  
We find that education has a negative impact on unhealthy consumption for all individuals 
considered in the sample. Specifically, an additional year of education decreases the probability of 
smoking, drinking, and binge drinking by 3.4%, 2.8%, and 1.8%, respectively. We also find that 
an additional year of education can counteract intergenerational persistence of smoking and binge 
drinking from the father, but that it has no impact on intergenerational persistence from the mother. 
In addition, we observe no impact of education on the intergenerational persistence of drinking 
from both parents. 
Low-Income and Overweight in the Transition Economy of China? 
Evidence from a Life-Course Utility Model 
Previous literature has shown that low-income individuals are more likely to make poor health 
choices in developed countries. From an extended life-course utility model where income serves 
as a budget constraint and as a source of future health utility, we attempt to investigate the 
relationship between income and overweight.  
The empirical estimations are conducted for overweight initiation and cessation, as well as 
participation reflecting a decision to start and a previous decision to not stop. The data used for this 
research is from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). The results suggest that body 
weight and the probability of overweight initiation increase with income but at a decreasing rate, 
which indicates an inverted U-shape relationship; while the probability of overweight cessation 
decreases with income but at an increasing rate, which indicates a U-shape relationship.  
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Our findings conclude that in contrast to developed countries, low-income individuals are less 
likely to be overweight in a transition country like China. The major reason is probably because of 
an income constraint for unhealthy food consumption; however, when income exceeds the critical 
value of the inverted U-shape curve, it reverses because low-income individuals seem to have less 
utility from future health. In particular, this change appears to happen earlier with increasing 
income for women and urban residents.  
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Abstract 
Given the fact that income disparity has become extremely serious in rural China, the primary 
objectives of this study are to examine heterogeneity in food consumption among various income 
classes and to investigate the impact that changes in income distribution patterns have on food 
demand in rural China. In this study, we partition the households into five income classes according 
to the distribution of household per capita net income. Using household data drawn from the China 
Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) in 2011, a two-stage demand model is applied to estimate a 
food demand system for each of the income classes. After obtaining the estimated income 
elasticities of eight studied food groups for each income class, we then examine the responsiveness 
of food demand to the changes in income distribution. Our empirical results indicate that there exist 
substantial differences in food consumption across various income classes. Specifically, the lowest-
income households are more sensitive to price and income changes than the highest-income 
households for all the studied food groups. In general, income responsiveness is higher for meats, 
aquatic products, and particularly for dairy products. Based on estimated income elasticities, the 
projected food consumption under different income distribution patterns shows that changes in 
income distribution have significant influences on food consumption. In addition, we conclude that 
more equal distribution in income would associate with higher demand for food in rural China. 
Keywords: Income distribution, food demand, expenditure elasticity, price elasticity, rural China. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Since China has implemented its Reform and Opening up policy to liberalize its markets and trade, 
the economy has experienced sustained growth, especially after becoming a member of the WTO. 
In recent years the government has increasingly invested in improving the infrastructure and living 
standards in rural areas, which has driven a strong increase in farmers’ household income. In 2015 
farms’ household average net income reached 11,422 Yuan, with a nominal growth rate of 8.9% 
and an actual growth rate of 7.5% compared to 2014, both of which tend to increase gradually3. J. 
Huang, Yang, and Rozelle (2011) concluded that rising income, urbanization, and market 
liberalization has significantly changed the Chinese diet and consumption patterns. As Zhang et al. 
(2012) reported, these notable changes include a greater demand for food, a demand for a more 
diverse range of food, and a demand for higher-quality food. This is supported by other studies, 
which have found that households in rural China tend to consume more meats (Halbrendt et al. 
1994; Fan et al. 1995) and other higher-quality foods (Yu and Abler 2009) as incomes increase.  
However, as income increases, income disparity has become more serious in recent decades. 
According to the World Bank, the Gini coefficient increased from 0.26 in 1984 to 0.47 in 2004 in 
China and has approached 0.5 in recent years, which is almost the same as that of relatively high-
inequality Latin American countries. Specifically, the rural Gini coefficient has increased from 
0.21 to 0.37 between 1978 and 2006 showing an unambiguous upward trend (Sutherland and Yao 
2011), and is reported to have been 0.60 in 2012.4 In terms of the distribution of disposable income 
among rural households, the share of the bottom 20% is about 6.3%, whereas the share of the top 
20% accounts for about 43.5% in 2004 (Zheng and Henneberry 2010). Although the government 
has taken measures to alleviate inequality and poverty, the poorest are not correctly targeted in 
many cases; this leads to even higher poverty and inequality levels in rural China (Wu et al. 2015). 
As seen in the above discussion, to a large extent, economic development in China has generally 
favored the wealthier members of society, especially in rural areas. 
Given the high level of income inequality in rural China, research has attempted to answer the 
following question: Are there any differences in food consumption for various income classes that 
can help us to understand the structure of food consumption and that provides policy implications 
                                                 
3
 The data are taken from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). 
4
 This is according to The Report of Income Gap in China, China Household Finance Survey. 
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to improve the welfare of rural households, especially for the lowest-income households? However, 
the evidence from previous studies is mixed from this perspective. For instance, Han, Cramer, and 
Wahl (1997) found that households in different income groups share an identical food demand 
system. Similar results can be found in Han and Wahl (1998), who showed that different income 
groups share a common demand function for fruit and vegetables. Contrary to the aforementioned 
empirical work, Zhou, Wu, and Tian (2003) declared that the consumption level of animal products 
by higher-income groups is substantially higher than that of lower-income groups, and Huang and 
Gale (2009) also showed that the demand for animal products in China is strongly related to income 
in low-income classes, while the relationship tends to weaken as income grows; these results are 
similar to a study carried out by Zheng and Henneberry (2011) in urban China. Although extensive 
research has been done on food demand in China, to the best of our knowledge, no existing study 
attempts to investigate the food demand for different income classes according to income 
distribution in rural China.  
Using a data set drawn from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) in 2011, we partition 
the sample into five income classes according to household per capita disposal income. We apply 
a two-stage demand model to estimate a demand system for five income classes. A Working–Leser 
model is employed in the first stage to obtain the income and price elasticity for the studied food; 
in the second stage, a quadratic almost-demand system (QUAIDS) is used to estimate expenditure 
and price elasticities for each food group. Afterwards, unconditional price and income elasticities 
for each food group are calculated and discussed.  
Some studies (Park et al. 1996; Pinstrup-Andersen and Caicedo 1978; Raunikar et al. 1985), and 
specifically one study by Zheng and Henneberry (2010) in urban China have revealed that different 
income distribution may cause a varying demand system; thus, the second objective of this study 
is to investigate the responsiveness of food demand to the changes in income distribution in rural 
China. We hypothesize that in societies such as China, where visible changes have occurred in 
income distribution, food demand projections should take account the expected changes in income 
distribution, rather than using average estimates of price and income elasticities for the whole 
population. Finally, as a comparison, we also provide the demand projections for studied food 
groups in the next decades when maintaining current income distribution and growth. 
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This study is organized as follows. In the next section, we will provide a brief introduction about 
the two-stage demand model and the estimation procedures. Section 3 describes the data used in 
this study. Section 4 presents the estimation results, while the findings appear in Section 5. 
2.2 Econometric model 
2.2.1 First-stage demand model 
In the first stage, a household decides how to allocate their budget to food and non-food 
commodities. We follow the Working–Leser model (Working 1943) and extend it with a quadratic 
term as shown in Eq. (1), which is similar to the formula used by Ecker and Qaim (2008) and 
Khanal, Mishra, and Keithly (2016): 
𝑤𝐹 = 𝛼𝐹 +  𝛾𝐹𝑙𝑛 𝑝𝐹 + 𝛽𝐹 𝑙𝑛 𝑀 + 𝜆𝐹(𝑙𝑛 𝑀)
2                                 (1) 
where wF is the share of studied food expenditure in household per capita disposal income (M), and 
𝑝𝐹 is the aggregated food price computed as stone price index. To control for the effects of socio-
demographic factors on food budget share, we implement a linear demographic translation through 
the intercept (Pollak and Wales 1981), where αF = α0 + ∑ δkzk ,kϵK zk is a vector of variables 
representing household characteristics that include household size, regional dummy, ratio of 
seniors, and ratio of children. This model can be estimated by using an OLS regression. After 
obtaining all the parameters, we then calculate the income elasticity, and uncompensated 
(Marshallian) price elasticities for total food through Equations (2)-(3) as follows: 
ηF = 1 +  
βF
ωF
+
2λ ln M
ωF
,                                                        (2) 
εF = −1 +  
γF
ωF
 .                                                                (3) 
2.2.2 Second-stage demand system 
In the second stage, we address the question of how households consume each food group under 
their food expenditure constraints. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) developed the widely-used 
Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS), and Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1997) further extended 
this system by proposing a quadratic almost ideal demand system (QUAIDS) that allows goods to 
be luxuries at low levels and necessities at higher levels of total expenditure. The budget shares in 
the QUAIDS are given as: 
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𝑤𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
+ 𝛽𝑖 𝑙𝑛 [
𝑚
𝑎(𝑝)
] +
𝜆𝑖
𝑏(𝑝)
{𝑙𝑛 [
𝑚
𝑎(𝑝)
]}
2
                                  (4)  
where wi is the budget share of ith food item; subscript i and j indicate goods, n is the number of 
the studied goods in the system; pj and m are prices of food commodity group j and total expenditure 
for the studied food, respectively. Further, 𝛼𝑖 ,  𝛽𝑖, 𝛾𝑖𝑗 and 𝜆𝑖 are parameters to be estimated, with 
a special case existing when 𝜆𝑖′𝑠 are zero, the QUAIDS reduces to AIDS, where lna(p) is the 
translog of the price index and is defined as 
lna(p) = α0 + ∑ αjlnpj
n
j=1 +
1
2
∑ ∑ γ𝑖𝑗ln
n
j=1
n
i=1 pilnpj,                    (5) 
and b(p) is the Cobb-Douglas price aggregator,  
b(p) = ∏ pi
βin
i=1 .                                                        (6) 
Then, the adding-up condition, homogeneity, and Slutsky symmetry require: 
∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 1,  ∑ 𝛽𝑖 = 0
n
i=1 , ∑ λi = 0
n
i=1 ，∑ γij = 0
n
i=1 .,                                 (7) 
∑ γij = 0
n
j=1 .,  and                                                                   (8) 
γij=γji,  i ≠ j.                                                                 (9) 
In addition to prices and income effects, we also need to control for the effect of 
demographic variables on the food demand system. There are several ways to get around this 
problem; we follow the procedure derived by Poi (2012), each household’s expenditure function is 
expressed with z as a vector of s characteristics as follows: 
𝑒(𝑝, 𝑧, 𝑢) = 𝑚0(𝑝, 𝑧, 𝑢)
∗𝑒𝑅(𝑝,𝑢),                                              (10) 
where m0(p,z,u) scales the expenditure function to account for household characteristics. Then 
Equation (10) can be decomposed as 
𝑚0(𝑝, 𝑧, 𝑢) = 𝑚0̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑧) ∗ ∅(𝑝, 𝑧, 𝑢).                                           (11) 
The first term measures the increase in the household’s expenditure as a function 
of the z vector not controlling for any changes in the consumption pattern, while the second 
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term controls for changes in relative prices and actual goods consumed. Poi (2012) specified the 
parameterization of the above function in QUAIDS as 
𝑚0̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑧) = 1 + 𝜌
′𝑧, and                                                                (12) 
ln∅(𝑝, 𝑧, 𝑢) =
∏ 𝑝
𝑗
𝛽𝑗
(∏ 𝑝
𝑗
𝜂𝑗
′𝑧
−1𝑘𝑗=1 )
𝑘
𝑗=1
1
𝑢
−∑ 𝜆𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1 𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑗
 ,                                          (13) 
where 𝜂𝑗
′  represents the jth column of s*k parameter matrix . Finally, the expenditure share 
equation with demographic variables follows the below equation form (Poi 2012), 
𝑤𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
+ (𝛽𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖
′𝑧) 𝑙𝑛 [
𝑚
𝑚0̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑧)𝑎(𝑝)
] +
𝜆𝑖
𝑏(𝑝)𝑐(𝑝, 𝑧)
{𝑙𝑛 [
𝑚
𝑚0̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑧)𝑎(𝑝)
]}
2
,   (14)  
where (𝑝, 𝑧) = ∏ 𝑝𝑗
𝜂𝑗
′𝑧𝑘
𝑗=1  , and imposing adding-up requires  ∑ 𝜂𝑟𝑗 = 0
𝑘
𝑗=1  for r=1,2,….s. The 
uncompensated price elasticity of good i with respect to changes in the price of good j can be 
described as 
ε𝑖𝑗
𝑀 = −𝛿𝑖𝑗 +
1
𝜔𝑖
(𝛾𝑖𝑗 − [𝛽𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖
′𝑧 +
𝜆𝑖
𝑏(𝑝)𝑐(𝑝,𝑧)
ln (
𝑚
𝑚0̅̅ ̅̅̅(𝑧)𝑎(𝑝)
)] ∗ (𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 ) −
(𝛽𝑗+𝜂𝑖
′)𝜆𝑖
𝑏(𝑝)𝑐(𝑝,𝑧)
(ln (
𝑚
𝑚0̅̅ ̅̅̅(𝑧)𝑎(𝑝)
))
2
) ,                 (15) 
where 𝛿𝑖𝑗 is defined such that 𝛿𝑖𝑗 = 0 for i=j and 𝛿𝑖𝑗 = 1 for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.  
The expenditure elasticity for good i is given by 
η𝑖 = 1 +
1
𝜔𝑖
[𝛽𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖
′𝑧 +
𝜆𝑖
𝑏(𝑝)𝑐(𝑝,𝑧)
ln (
𝑚
𝑚0̅̅ ̅̅̅(𝑧)𝑎(𝑝)
)].                                 (16) 
The price and income elasticities from second-stage are conditional on the first-stage. Following 
the procedures introduced by Carpentier and Guyomard (2001), and widely used by Boysen (2012) 
and Khanal, Mishra, and Keithly (2016), we calculate unconditional income and price elasticities 
for each food group based on the two-stage demand system estimation, and the unconditional 
expenditure elasticities are given by 
η𝑖
𝑈 = 𝑒𝑖𝜂𝐹  ,                                                             (17) 
and unconditional Marshallian price elasticities are 
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ε𝑖𝑗
𝑈,u = 𝜀𝑖𝑗 + 𝑤𝑗|F (
1
𝑒𝑗
+ ε𝐹) × 𝑒𝑖𝑒𝑗 + w𝐹𝑤𝑗|F𝜂𝐹𝑒𝑖 × (𝑒𝑗 − 1),.                      (18) 
where 𝑤𝑗|𝐹 denotes the budget share of the jth food commodity in the second stage. 
To achieve the second objective of this study, the estimated income elasticities are used to project 
the demand for each group under the different hypothetical changes in income and income 
distribution. As discussed by Zheng and Henneberry (2010), several assumptions need to be 
noticed when making these projections. For example, the prices of foods and the consumer’s 
preference are assumed to be unchanged for each income class, population size is assumed to be 
consistent, while the effects associated with population migration from rural to urban and market 
development are not considered. Thereby, the changes in food demand are solely caused by 
changes in income and income distribution. The simulated impact of changes in income distribution 
on the quantity consumed of each studied food group is estimated based on the following equation: 
∆𝑄𝑖(𝑐) = (
∆𝑀
𝑀
)
𝑐
𝐸𝑀,𝑖(𝑐)𝑞𝑖(𝑐)
0 𝑁𝐶 ,                                                 (19) 
where ∆𝑄𝑖(𝑐) represents the change of total quantity consumed of food group i for the households 
in income class C as a result of income changes in that class;  (
∆𝑀
𝑀
) represents the changes in 
income in class C; 𝐸𝑀,𝑖(𝑐) are the income elasticities for ith food commodity in class C;  𝑞𝑖(𝑐)
0  is the 
current average quantity consumed of food group i for each household in class C; 𝑁𝐶 is the number 
of households in class C. 
The last objective of this study is to project the quantity consumed in upcoming decades if 
maintaining current income growth and income distribution levels. Using estimates of price and 
income elasticities, we can project the change of each food group as income and price change 
through the equation proposed by Park et al (1996), 
%∆𝑄𝑖 = ∑ 𝜀𝑖𝑗%∆𝑃𝑗 + η𝑖
𝑈%𝛥𝑦𝑛𝑗=1   ,    (i, j= 1, 2, …, n) ,                    (20) 
where 𝜀𝑖𝑗 indicate the various price elasticities, and 𝜂𝑖 represents the estimated income elasticity 
for food commodity i. Therefore, given the percentage changes in price and income, the change in 
quantity consumed can be calculated accordingly. With the assumption of unchanged prices, here 
we solely examine how uniform income growth influences the food consumption in upcoming 
decades. It should be noted that the projections from a uniform increase in income would be biased 
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when significant changes occurred in income distribution in the future, but it still provides an 
overview for future food demand.  
2.3 The data  
The data used in this study is drawn from China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), coordinated 
by the Carolina Population Centre, Chapel Hill, USA, which was designed to examine the effects 
of the health- and nutrition-related issues in China, and to detect how the social and economic 
transformation of Chinese society is affecting the health and nutritional status of its population. 
Using a multistage, random cluster process to draw a sample of roughly 4,400 households with a 
total of 26,000 individuals, the CHNS was initially conducted in nine provinces: Guangxi, Guizhou, 
Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning, and Shandong, which are substantially 
different in geography, economic development, and public resources, as well as food consumption. 
Thus, the data has been widely used to conduct research on food, nutrition, and health-related 
research issues in China (Batis et al. 2014; L. Chen and Cheung 2013; Popkin and Du 2003; Zhong 
et al. 2012). In 2011, three additional municipal cities, Beijing, Chongqing, and Shanghai were 
included; this increased the sample size to around 6,000 households covering more than 30,000 
individuals. 
In the dietary questionnaire, the dietary assessment is a combination of three consecutive 24-hour 
periods at the individual level. The three consecutive days were randomly allocated to start from 
Monday to Sunday. For the 24-hour recall, respondents recorded the types, amounts, types of meal 
and place of consumption of all food consumed.5 Based on an individual’s consumption amount, 
household yearly food consumed quantities are computed and aggregated under eight main food 
groups, namely grains, vegetables, oil and fat, meats (pork, beef, mutton, and poultry), eggs, 
aquatic products, dairy products, and fruits. 
Moreover, CHNS conducted a detailed community survey consisting of food market information 
such as infrastructure, services, and organization, as well as the prices of foods at the community 
levels. Using an adjusted free market price for each specific food commodity from CHNS, food 
expenditure is calculated by multiplying quantity consumed with free market prices (Burggraf et 
                                                 
5 See Batis et al. (2014) and Zhai et al. (2014) for more details. 
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al. 2015), and then the value-weighted price index for each food group can be obtained by the 
following equation (Khanal et al. 2016): 
𝑃𝑔 = ∑
𝑉𝑖
𝑔
𝑉𝑔
𝑘
𝑖=1 ∗ 𝑃𝑖,                                                             (21) 
where 𝑃𝑔  represents the price index for food group g, and g=1,2…7,8. 
𝑉𝑖
𝑔
𝑉𝑔
 represents the value-
weighted share of food item i in group g, and 𝑃𝑖 represents the price of food item i. 
After matching the household food consumption data with related data sets and deleting the outliers, 
we keep 2,908 households in the rural area for this study. In accordance with the standard of 
division by China's National Bureau of Statistics for rural households, we equally divide our sample 
into five classes based on the distribution of household per capita disposal income. The description 
of yearly per capita food consumption, income, food expenditure, and socio-demographics among 
the different income classes for the sample in rural China is reported in Table 2.1. Firstly, in the 
view of the quantities of foods consumed by rural households, as expected, there exists significant 
inequality in food consumption, especially for meats, aquatic products, dairy products, and fruits, 
which show an upward trend with income increases. Obviously the consumption of meats, aquatic 
products, and fruits for the highest-income class (C5) is considerably higher than that for the 
lowest-income class (C1); this suggests a higher potential for growth in demand for these food 
groups in lower-income households. In addition, grains, vegetables, oil and fat consumption 
initially increase and then decrease gradually across income classes. For instance, the consumption 
of grain, a staple food in the Chinese diet, reaches the highest level of around 138.89 kg for the 
lower-income class of C2, but for the highest-income class it drops to 128.73 kg, indicating that 
the higher-income class tends to consume less staple foods than the lower-income classes do. 
Secondly, there exists a substantial difference in income across various classes, for instance, per 
capita disposal income of the highest-income class is approximately ten times more than that of the 
lowest-income group, indicating remarkable income inequality in rural China. However, in terms 
of expenditure on studied foods, the highest-income households spent only around 900 CNY more 
than the lowest-income households did; this illustrates that the differences in food expenditure 
across various income classes are not as large as income, which is similar to the evidence from 
urban Jiangsu in China (Zheng and Henneberry 2010). Finally, regarding the expenditure shares 
presented in Table 2.1, the share of food expenditure in household per capita net income decreases 
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from 0.634 for the lowest-income group to 0.120 for the highest-income group. This suggests that 
food expenditure plays a dominant role in household income for the lowest-income households. 
The share of each food commodity in total food expenditure proves that, in general, grains, 
vegetables, and meats are the main food resources for rural households. In particular, the share of 
grain consumption is approximately 37 percent for the lowest-income class, indicating a strongly 
monotonous diet for the lowest-income households. 
As shown in the bottom part of Table 2.1, lower-income households are more likely to have a larger 
household size and a higher ratio of children and seniors. Most of the middle- and highest-income 
households live in the south of China, which clearly indicates the significant regional difference in 
income distribution. 
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Table 2. 1  Income, food expenditure, and socio-demographics by income classes 
Variable C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 All 
Per Capita Quantity Consumed (Kg/Year) 
Grains 125.72 138.89 138.68 135.50 128.73 133.48 
 
(48.31) (57.31) (53.13) (53.51) (48.94) (52.57) 
Oil and Fat 14.48 16.93 14.95 15.08 14.13 15.11 
 
(11.03) (12.18) (11.14) (11.91) (10.55) (11.41) 
Vegetables 84.20 106.01 104.15 100.29 104.08 99.75 
 
(47.56) (51.93) (50.53) (49.49) (51.92) (50.91) 
Meats 12.82 25.31 28.51 28.47 30.11 25.00 
 
(15.40) (22.85) (23.98) (23.47) (23.02) (22.84) 
Eggs 7.26 8.07 8.44 9.73 11.01 8.89 
 
(8.95) (8.85) (9.53) (9.48) (9.53) (9.36) 
Aquatic products 3.02 7.65 6.81 10.53 13.21 8.21 
 (8.61) (14.15) (12.25) (15.53) (18.02) (14.46) 
Dairy Products 1.61 1.78 1.99 2.67 3.23 2.25 
 (6.13) (6.09) (6.66) (7.48) (8.41) (7.02) 
Fruits 12.16 19.51 23.32 21.54 28.69 21.00 
 (21.62) (30.79) (33.11) (30.31) (34.83) (30.90) 
Mean Expenditure Shares (%) 
Grains 0.36 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.27 
Oil and Fat 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.11 
Vegetables 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.20 
Meats 0.18 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.26 
Eggs 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 
Aquatic products 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.05 
Dairy Products 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Fruits 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 
Per Capita Food expenditure and Household Income (CNY/Year) 
Expenditure 1943.09 2907.15 3043.32 3039.37 3215.02 2829.76 
 
(795.41) (1202.58) (1435.31) (1539.31) (1492.91) (1396.84) 
Income 3094.06 5967.47 9207.59 14388.81 27741.86 12077.66 
 
(931.35) (800.30) (1124.97) (1824.81) (9259.66) (9679.32) 
Food expenditure 0.64 0.49 0.34 0.21 0.13 0.37 
Demographic Variables 
Residence (1 = South) 0.48 0.65 0.62 0.60 0.54 0.58 
 
(0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) 
Household Size  3.84 3.83 3.65 3.27 2.97 3.51 
 
(1.75) (1.67) (1.57) (1.34) (1.28) (1.57) 
Ratio of Seniors (%) 0.22 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.17 
 (0.34) (0.32) (0.28) (0.30) (0.30) (0.31) 
Ratio of Children (%) 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.14 
 
(0.21) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19) 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on CHNS data regarding 2,908 households in the rural areas of 11 provinces (Guangxi, 
Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, Beijing, Chongqing, and Shanghai), in 2011.Per 
capita food expenditure here refers to total expenditure on the studied food items. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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2.4 Results 
In the first stage, using the OLS estimation for a Working-Leser model as reported in Table 2.9.A.1 
in the appendices, the coefficients for income and aggregate price index are statistically significant 
for most of the income classes and R2 is approximately 0.691 for the pooled sample, the income 
and price elasticities for total food expenditure can be obtained using the estimates in the Working-
Leser model. In the second stage, a QUAIDS model is estimated by iterated feasible generalized 
non-linear least squares, and parameters for most of the independent variables are statistically 
significant as presented in Table 2.10.A.2. Parameters of the squared logarithm of expenditure are 
all significantly different from zero in most of the estimations, with the exception of vegetables 
and dairy products; this indicates the quadratic term of expenditure needs to be taken into 
consideration rather than the AIDS model in our demand system.  
2.4.1 Income and price elasticities for total food expenditure 
Since the coefficient of household per capita net income and its squared term are all statistically 
significant for the pooled sample, this result is consistent with the theory indicating a nonlinear 
relationship between income food expenditure as shown in Figure 2.1 Based on the estimates from 
the Working-Leser model across various income classes presented in Table 2.9.A.1, income 
elasticity for food expenditure (EF) is evaluated at the means of explanatory variables for the five 
classes as well as for the total sample. 
 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on CHNS sample, 2011. 
Figure 2. 1  Nonparametric Engel curve for total food share in income 
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As mentioned above, strong differences exist in expenditure shares, and we also find notable 
differences in income elasticities for food among various income classes as presented in Table 2.2, 
ranging from 0.686 for the lowest-income class to 0.128 for the highest-income class. This implies 
that a 1% income increase will drive 0.686% growth of the expenditure on studied food for the 
lowest-income households, but growth of only 0.128% for the highest-income households. The 
results demonstrate that food demand in rural China is in line with Engel’s law, and also suggest 
that there are substantial differences in food consumption among different income classes, 
especially the inequality between the lowest- and the highest-income households. Unlike income 
elasticities, the price elasticities show slight differences across the five income classes and range 
from -0.690 to -0.876, indicating that food expenditure is inelastic in price changes in rural China.  
Table 2. 2  Income and price elasticities for studied food calculated from the Working-Leser 
model 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 All 
EF 0.686 0.450 0.324 0.231 0.128 0.370 
εF -0.876 -0.865 -0.835 -0.690 -0.719 -0.840 
εFc -0.431 -0.640 -0.722 -0.639 -0.702 -0.704 
Source: Authors’ computations using CHNS data, 2011. 
 
2.4.2 Price, expenditure, and income elasticities for each food group 
As mentioned above, the price and expenditure elasticities are evaluated based on the parameters 
estimated from QUAIDS and at the sample means of explanatory variables. The conditional and 
unconditional Marshallian (uncompensated) own-price elasticities for eight studied food items for 
each income class are given in Table 2.3. Since the main concern of this research are income and 
price responsiveness across various income classes, the cross-price elasticities are not reported here. 
All own-price elasticities are statistically significant at 0.05% for all five income classes, as well 
as for the pooled sample. With the own-price elasticities, we can examine how the price change 
affects households’ demand for each food group. As expected, all the own-price elasticities are 
negative, which qualifies the law of demand that own-price reaction coefficients are non-positive; 
the positive expenditure elasticities indicate that all food groups are normal goods for rural 
households. 
For the whole sample, the conditional and unconditional own-price elasticities as presented in 
Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 appear higher in magnitude than that of previous studies (Burggraf et al. 
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2015; D. Chen et al. 2015; Fan et al. 1995; Zheng and Henneberry 2011). This suggests that for 
rural households these food commodities have become more price elastic, considering that 
households have more substitution possibilities for those food commodities as the economy 
develops. Among own-price elasticities, in general we find that animal products have higher price 
elasticities, for example, meats have the highest price elasticity for the whole population, as well 
as for the higher-income classes of C4 and C5; aquatic and dairy products have extremely large 
price elasticities for lowest-income households. This finding suggests that there are higher 
potentials of increasing the consumption of these food commodities in the rural area if effective 
policies are directed at lowering the prices of these foods. On the contrary, grain shows the lowest 
price elasticities, ranging from -0.131 to -0.308 among these food commodities, indicating that 
price might not be a significant factor influencing consumer’s behavior in grain consumption in 
rural China. 
Comparing the own-price elasticities across different income classes, we find that the variation of 
own-price elasticities is small between adjacent income classes, with the exception of the lowest-
income class, which tends to have the highest price elasticities for most of the food groups. The 
result indicates that policy measures targeting lowering the price of food commodities with the 
highest price elasticities will promote increased consumption of these food commodities for the 
lowest-income households; on the other hand, for the rest of the food commodities (grain and fruits) 
the lowest-income classes are less price elastic than higher-income classes. 
Similar to the previous studies for rural China, the results indicate that animal products and fruits 
have the highest expenditure elasticities for all income classes (Burggraf et al. 2015; Gao et al. 
1996; Jiang and Davis 2007). The expenditure elasticities vary across the different income classes; 
this suggests changes in consumer preference in different income classes. However, the differences 
in expenditure elasticities for the studied food groups from low-income class to high-income class 
are quite small, except for the elasticity of aquatic products for the lowest-income class, and these 
homogeneous elasticities across various income classes reflect a more equal distribution of food 
expenditure than the distribution in income across income classes.  
Unlike the food expenditure and own price elasticities, which show small variations across income 
classes, income elasticities are substantially different among different income groups and are 
consistently larger for the lowest-income class for all studied foods, which coincides with the 
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finding by Chen et al. (2015). Therefore, compared to the highest-income group, a growth in 
income for the lowest-income group would drive a greater increase in food demand in rural China 
than if income growth was uniform across the income groups. Specifically, grains have the lowest 
income elasticities across these groups; as expected, meats, aquatic products, dairy products, and 
fruits have the highest income elasticities, which implies that with income growth the demand for 
these food groups would increase substantially. Additionally, K. S. Huang and Gale (2009) find 
that grains are inferior goods except for the lowest-income class in China; this implies that with 
increasing income levels, the demand for grains will decrease. However, we have a different 
finding in rural China, namely that income elasticities of grains are positive for all income classes, 
although for the highest-income class it is relatively small (around 0.044) and is very close to zero 
for the highest-income group. Similar to the results from Zheng and Henneberry (2010), these 
authors’ calculated income elasticity is about 0.031 for urban Jiangsu Province. Furthermore, the 
income elasticities for oil and fat and eggs are comparatively small, especially for the highest-
income class, which are 0.066 and 0.049, respectively. This indicates that with an income increase, 
the demand for these foods is relatively small. Thus, we can conclude that the consumption of 
grains, oil and fat, and eggs is approaching a saturation level for the highest-income group. In 
general, our findings indicate that rural households would increase the demand for all the studied 
food commodities with increasing income levels, but to a different extent for various income 
classes. In particular, they have the highest demand for animal products, dairy products, as well as 
fruits. 
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Table 2. 3  Conditional and unconditional own price elasticities by income classes 
Var. C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 All 
Conditional price elasticity 
Grains -0.246 -0.269 -0.392 -0.341 -0.195 -0.281 
Oil and Fat -0.507 -0.310 -0.468 -0.356 -0.355 -0.404 
Vegetables -0.942 -0.741 -0.966 -0.845 -0.910 -0.880 
Meats -1.844 -1.287 -1.154 -1.105 -0.995 -1.218 
Eggs -0.923 -0.300 -0.394 -0.510 -0.071 -0.498 
Aquatic products -2.100 -1.137 -1.168 -0.383 -0.556 -0.780 
Dairy Products -1.909 -1.303 -0.491 0.187 0.576 -0.503 
Fruits -0.745 -0.941 -1.016 -0.436 -0.854 -0.708 
Unconditional price elasticity 
Grains -0.173 -0.196 -0.308 -0.260 -0.131 -0.211 
Oil and Fat -0.468 -0.263 -0.427 -0.316 -0.320 -0.366 
Vegetables -0.886 -0.666 -0.887 -0.751 -0.821 -0.813 
Meats -1.823 -1.250 -1.099 -0.983 -0.918 -1.222 
Eggs -0.909 -0.286 -0.381 -0.492 -0.055 -0.484 
Aquatic products -2.105 -1.134 -1.160 -0.357 -0.547 -0.790 
Dairy Products -1.907 -1.301 -0.492 0.193 0.579 -0.504 
Fruits -0.735 -0.932 -1.005 -0.406 -0.828 -0.700 
Source: Authors’ computations using CHNS data, 2011. 
 
Table 2. 4  Expenditure and income elasticities by income classes 
Var. C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 All 
Expenditure elasticity 
Grains 0.476 0.452 0.503 0.452 0.371 0.400 
Oil and Fat 0.957 0.850 0.643 0.582 0.556 0.673 
Vegetables 1.121 0.977 0.964 0.854 1.007 0.976 
Meats 1.803 1.596 1.531 1.603 1.493 1.640 
Eggs 1.027 0.680 0.544 0.646 0.419 0.675 
Aquatic products 2.430 1.723 1.506 1.563 1.689 1.824 
Dairy Products 1.681 1.316 1.811 1.824 1.670 1.730 
Fruits 1.302 1.530 1.568 1.326 1.294 1.448 
Income elasticity 
Grains 0.331 0.185 0.162 0.119 0.044 0.147 
Oil and Fat 0.664 0.348 0.206 0.153 0.066 0.247 
Vegetables 0.778 0.400 0.309 0.225 0.119 0.359 
Meats 1.251 0.653 0.491 0.422 0.176 0.604 
Eggs 0.713 0.278 0.175 0.170 0.049 0.248 
Aquatic products 1.687 0.705 0.484 0.411 0.199 0.671 
Dairy Products 1.166 0.538 0.581 0.480 0.197 0.637 
Fruits 0.903 0.626 0.503 0.349 0.153 0.533 
Source: Authors’ computations using CHNS data, 2011. 
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2.4.3 Food demand projection 
To address the second goal of this study, detecting how income distribution changes affect food 
consumption in rural China, we examine four scenarios where income varies by 1% of the total 
population income as proposed by Zheng and Henneberry (2010). Scenario 0 increases the incomes 
of all five income classes at the same rate, but keeps the current population income distribution 
pattern; scenarios 1 and 2 increase the incomes of lower- (C1 and C2) and higher- (C4 and C5) 
income classes, respectively, while keeping the incomes of the remaining income classes constant. 
Lastly, scenario 3 redistributes current incomes from the highest-income class (C5) to lower-
income classes (C1 and C2) but keeps the total population income constant. As presented in Table 
2.5, the current income distribution shows that the total incomes of the lowest-income class only 
account for 5.17% of the total population income, while that of the highest-income class accounts 
for approximately 45.78%. Taking a selected 1% of total income of the whole sample as the amount 
of the variation in the four scenarios, a 1% variation in total sample incomes translates into a 
variation of 19.34%, 10.03%, 4.20%, and 2.18% for income classes C1, C2, C4, and C5, 
respectively.  
Table 2.5 also shows the projected income distribution under the four scenarios. Particularly, the 
income distribution is unchanged under scenario 0; regarding scenarios 1 and 3, which favored 
lower-income classes, the new income distribution changes little compared with the current income 
distribution. For instance, under scenario 3, if an amount of 1% of the total sample income is 
transferred from the highest- (C5) to the lowest- (C1) income class, the shares of total incomes by 
lowest income and highest income only change 1% and -1%, respectively. However, as the main 
focus of this study is to detect income response to alternative income distribution patterns, a small 
variant in income distribution patterns would be large enough to drive a remarkable change in food 
consumption. 
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Table 2. 5  Projected distribution of households, population, and incomes by income class 
 C1  C2 C3 C4 C5 
Households 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 
Population 21.72 21.90 20.82 18.66 16.89 
Incomes 5.17 9.97 15.29 23.79 45.78 
Scenario 0      
All 1% 5.17 9.97 15.29 23.79 45.78 
Scenario 1      
Increase in C1 6.11 9.87 15.14 23.55 45.33 
Increase in C2 5.12 10.86 15.14 23.55 45.33 
Scenario 2      
Increase in C4 5.12 9.87 15.14 24.54 45.33 
Increase in C5 5.12 9.87 15.14 23.55 46.32 
Scenario 3      
Transfer C5 to C1 6.17 9.97 15.29 23.79 44.78 
Transfer C5 to C2 5.17 10.97 15.29 23.79 44.78 
Source: Authors’ computations using CHNS data, 2011. 
The projected increase in food demand under various incomes and income distribution in rural 
China under four scenarios considered is reported in Table 2.6. Based on the current consumption 
level for the whole surveyed sample, since there are no changes in the income distribution under 
the scenario 0, the estimated demand increases for studied food are given by the average income 
elasticities due to a uniform 1% increase in total incomes of all the surveyed households. In scenario 
1, a 1% of total income increase given to the lower income classes (C1 or C2) will drive substantial 
increase in the demand for studied foods, especially to the lowest income class, for instance, if 
incomes increase 1% of the total sample income for the lowest income class the demand for dairy 
products will grow 2.71% accordingly. In scenario 2, when income growth is given to higher-
income class (C4 or C5) the estimated demand will increase with relatively lower extent than in 
scenario 1, and even lower than if incomes increase uniformly for all populations. However, similar 
to scenario 1, in scenario 3, we also find a higher increase in estimated demand for all food groups 
if transferring 1% of the total sample income from the highest-income class (C5) to lower-income 
classes (C1 or C2).  
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Table 2. 6  Projected increase in food demand under various income classes and income 
distribution scenarios. 
 
Current 
consumption (kg) 
Estimated demand increase 
 
Unchanged 
distribution 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
 
Increase in 
C1 
Increase in 
C2 
Increase in 
C4 
Increase 
in C5 
Transfer C5 
to C1 
Transfer C5 
to C2 
Grains 382697 0.15 1.02 0.39 0.10 0.01 0.92 0.37 
Oil and Fat 43263 0.25 2.09 0.80 0.13 0.01 1.96 0.77 
Vegetables 286575 0.36 2.14 0.86 0.19 0.02 1.94 0.81 
Meats 71799 0.60 2.08 1.33 0.41 0.04 1.67 1.24 
Eggs 25465 0.25 1.92 0.52 0.16 0.01 1.76 0.49 
Aquatic products 23407 0.67 2.13 1.33 0.45 0.07 1.68 1.18 
Dairy Products 6401 0.64 2.71 0.94 0.48 0.06 2.23 0.81 
Fruits 60031 0.53 1.73 1.20 0.31 0.04 1.42 1.10 
Source: Authors’ computations using CHNS data, 2011. 
As discussed above, a different income distribution might have largely different impacts on food 
consumption in rural China. In order to provide an overview for food consumption in the future, 
we assume that the prices and income growth are consistent as shown in Table 2.7. There are two 
average income growth rates, one is about 7.6% from 1997 to 2014, while the other is 
approximately 7.9% from 2001 to 2014. According to the two income growth rates, food demand 
in 2020, 2025, and 2030 are projected, respectively, using the quantity consumed in 2014 for 
respective food groups as a base-year demand as reported by China's National Bureau of Statistics. 
As presented in Table 2.8, the projected demand for all food groups increases as expected, while 
the demand for grain, oil and fat, and eggs is relatively lower than for other foods, for instance, the 
projected demand for aquatic and dairy products is 9.7 and 9.0 in 2030, with approximately 42.76% 
and 40.28% increases compared with the quantities consumed in 2014, respectively. This implies 
that policies focusing on increasing rural household income will improve the food demand in rural 
China dramatically. 
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Table 2. 7  Income growth assumption by income classes 
Year Income growth rate (%) 
 1979-2014 2001-2014 
2014 7.616 7.918 
2020 8.196 8.544 
2025 8.868 9.275 
2030 9.655 10.135 
Source: The data in 2014 is from China's National Bureau of Statistics. 
 
Table 2. 8  Projected food demand in rural China 
   Projected Per Capita Food demand  Projected Per Capita Food demand Change 
 
Income  
elasticities 
2014 
Base 2020 2025 2030 
 
2020 2025 2030 
Grains 0.147 159.1 161.0 163.0 165.2 167.4 169.8 172.3  1.20 2.48 3.81 5.23 6.72 8.31 
Oil and Fat 0.247 13.6 13.9 14.2 14.5 14.8 15.2 15.5  2.02 4.18 6.46 8.90 11.50 14.29 
Vegetables 0.359 88.9 91.5 94.3 97.3 100.6 104.1 107.8  2.94 6.10 9.48 13.12 17.04 21.30 
Meats 0.604 29.2 30.6 32.2 34.0 35.9 37.9 40.3  4.95 10.37 16.28 22.79 29.95 37.91 
Eggs 0.248 8.89 9.1 9.3 9.5 9.7 9.9 10.2  2.03 4.19 6.49 8.94 11.54 14.35 
Aquatic products 0.671 6.8 7.2 7.6 8.0 8.5 9.1 9.7  5.50 11.55 18.19 25.54 33.67 42.76 
Dairy Products 0.637 6.4 6.7 7.1 7.5 7.9 8.4 9.0  5.22 10.95 17.22 24.14 31.77 40.28 
Fruits 0.533 27.1 28.3 29.6 31.0 32.5 34.2 36.0  4.37 9.12 14.28 19.93 26.10 32.91 
Source: Authors’ computations using CHNS data, 2011. 
2.5 Conclusions  
The demand for eight major food groups is estimated by income class using a household data set 
drawn from the CHNS in rural China. The Working-Leser model is employed in the first step to 
investigate the responsiveness of demand for total studied food expenditure to the changes in 
income. The quadratic almost ideal demand system is then estimated for the eight food groups 
using a non-linear seemingly unrelated regression technique in the second step. After obtaining the 
estimated income elasticities of studied food groups for various income classes, we examine the 
responsiveness of food demand to the changes in income distribution. 
The results suggest that there are significant differences in food demand across various income 
classes. The lowest-income households are more sensitive to income and price changes than the 
highest-income households for most of the food groups. We conclude that effective policies 
directed to lowering food prices or increasing household incomes will result in substantially higher 
demand for food in rural China, especially for the lowest-income households since they have the 
highest own-price and income elasticities for most of the food groups. 
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According to the projected increase in demand for the studied food groups under four scenarios, 
we can draw several conclusions. Firstly, we can conclude that a small change in income 
distribution will drive considerable variation in food consumption. Secondly, any policies designed 
to increase incomes that favor lower-income households will give stronger rise to food demand 
than policies that favor higher-income classes. Thirdly, policies intended to redistribute income 
from higher-income classes to lower-income classes will drive higher demand for food as well, 
although there is no growth in average income for the whole population. Fourthly, a uniform 
increase in income would also boost food demand by a larger amount than if the income growth 
was solely received by higher-income classes. Finally, keeping the current income distribution and 
growth, the projected food consumption in rural China would increase consistently in the next 
decades, especially for aquatic and dairy products. 
In conclusion, income elasticities for rural households are still relatively large, and there exists 
substantial inequality in food consumption. Consequently, policies designed to increase household 
income in rural areas would be helpful to increase their food consumption, especially to improve 
the welfare of the lowest-income class. As the estimation results indicate, quite different food 
demand patterns are shown in various income classes, and hence income distribution should be 
taken into account instead of an average estimation for the population as a whole. 
 
  
Chapter 2 Heterogeneity in food consumption among income classes in rural China 
35 
 
References 
Banks, J., Blundell, R., & Lewbel, A. (1997). Quadratic Engel Curves and Consumer Demand. The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 79(4), 527–539. 
Batis, C., Sotres-Alvarez, D., Gordon-Larsen, P., Mendez, M. A., Adair, L., & Popkin, B. (2014). 
Longitudinal Analysis of Dietary Patterns in Chinese Adults from 1991 to 2009. The British 
journal of nutrition, 111(8), 1441–1451. doi:10.1017/S0007114513003917 
Boysen, O. (2012). A Food Demand System Estimation for Uganda (The Institute for International 
Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series No. iiisdp396). IIIS. 
https://ideas.repec.org/p/iis/dispap/iiisdp396.html. Accessed 13 July 2016 
Burggraf, C., Kuhn, L., ZHAO, Q., Teuber, R., & Glauben, T. (2015). Economic growth and 
nutrition transition: an empirical analysis comparing demand elasticities for foods in China 
and Russia. Journal of Integrative Agriculture, 14(6), 1008–1022. doi:10.1016/S2095-
3119(14)60985-0 
Carpentier, A., & Guyomard, H. (2001). Unconditional Elasticities in Two-Stage Demand Systems: 
An Approximate Solution. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 83(1), 222–229. 
doi:10.1111/0002-9092.00149 
Chen, D., Abler, D., Zhou, D., Yu, X., & Thompson, W. (2015). A Meta-analysis of Food Demand 
Elasticities for China. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, ppv006. 
doi:10.1093/aepp/ppv006 
Chen, L., & Cheung, D. (2013). Food consumption elasticity as an indicator of intergenerational 
persistence: evidence from China. 
http://www.ferdi.fr/sites/www.ferdi.fr/files/chen%20lin.pdf. Accessed 21 April 2015 
Deaton, A., & Muellbauer, J. (1980). An Almost Ideal Demand System. The American Economic 
Review, 70(3), 312–326. 
Ecker, O., & Qaim, M. (2008). Income and price elasticities of food demand and nutrient 
consumption in malawi. In American Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting, 
Orlando FL, July (pp. 27–29). http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/6349/2/451037.pdf. 
Accessed 21 February 2014 
Fan, S., Wailes, E. J., & Cramer, G. L. (1995). Household Demand in Rural China: A Two-Stage 
LES-AIDS Model. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 77(1), 54–62. 
doi:10.2307/1243888 
Chapter 2 Heterogeneity in food consumption among income classes in rural China 
36 
 
Gao, X. M., Wailes, E. J., & Cramer, G. L. (1996). A Two-Stage Rural Household Demand 
Analysis: Microdata Evidence from Jiangsu Province, China. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 78(3), 604–613. 
Halbrendt, C., Gempesaw, C., Dolk-Etz, D., & Tuan, F. (1994). Rural Chinese Food Consumption: 
The Case of Guangdong. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 76(4), 794–799. 
doi:10.2307/1243740 
Han, T., Cramer, G. L., & Wahl, T. I. (1997). Rural Household Food Consumption in China: 
Evidence from the Rural Household Survey (1997 Annual Meeting, July 13-16, 1997, 
Reno\Sparks, Nevada No. 35797). Western Agricultural Economics Association. 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/waeare/35797.html. Accessed 22 February 2014 
Han, T., & Wahl, T. I. (1998). China’s rural household demand for fruit and vegetables. Journal of 
Agricultural and Applied Economics, 30(1). 
http://econpapers.repec.org/article/agsjoaaec/15108.htm. Accessed 22 February 2014 
Huang, J., Yang, J., & Rozelle, S. (2011). Changing Food Consumption Pattern and Demand for 
Agri-based Industrial Products in China: Implications for Southeast Asia’s Agricultural 
Trade. Agricultural Development, Trade & Regional Cooperation in Developing East Asia, 
162–210. 
Huang, K. S., & Gale, F. (2009). Food demand in China: income, quality, and nutrient effects. 
China Agricultural Economic Review, 1(4), 395–409. doi:10.1108/17561370910992307 
Jiang, B., & Davis, J. (2007). Household Food Demand in Rural China. Applied Economics, 39(1–
3), 373–380. 
Khanal, A. R., Mishra, A. K., & Keithly, W. (2016). Heterogeneity in Food Demand among Rural 
Indian Households: The Role of Demographics. Canadian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics/Revue canadienne d’agroeconomie, 64(3), 517–544. doi:10.1111/cjag.12094 
Park, J. L., Holcomb, R. B., Raper, K. C., & Capps, O. (1996). A demand systems analysis of food 
commodities by US households segmented by income. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 78(2), 290–300. 
Pinstrup-Andersen, P., & Caicedo, E. (1978). The potential impact of changes in income 
distribution on food demand and human nutrition. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 60(3), 402–415. 
Poi, B. P. (2012). Easy demand-system estimation with quaids. Stata Journal, 12(3), 433. 
Chapter 2 Heterogeneity in food consumption among income classes in rural China 
37 
 
Pollak, R. A., & Wales, T. J. (1981). Demographic Variables in Demand Analysis. Econometrica, 
49(6), 1533–1551. doi:10.2307/1911416 
Popkin, B. M., & Du, S. (2003). Dynamics of the Nutrition Transition toward the Animal Foods 
Sector in China and its Implications: A Worried Perspective. The Journal of Nutrition, 
133(11), 3898S–3906S. 
Raunikar, R., Huang, C. L., & Purcell, J. C. (1985). The changing United States food market. 
Journal of Agribusiness, 3(1), 42–45. Accessed 28 February 2014 
Sutherland, D., & Yao, S. (2011). Income inequality in China over 30 years of reforms. Cambridge 
Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 4(1), 91–105. doi:10.1093/cjres/rsq036 
Working, H. (1943). Statistical Laws of Family Expenditure. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 38(221), 43–56. doi:10.2307/2279311 
Wu, H., Ding, S., & Guanghua Wan. (2015). Income inequality and rural poverty in China. China 
Agricultural Economic Review, 7(1), 65–85. doi:10.1108/CAER-01-2014-0005 
Yu, X., & Abler, D. (2009). The Demand for Food Quality in Rural China. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 91(1), 57–69. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8276.2008.01159.x 
Zhai, F. Y., Du, S. F., Wang, Z. H., Zhang, J. G., Du, W. W., & Popkin, B. M. (2014). Dynamics 
of the Chinese diet and the role of urbanicity, 1991–2011. Obesity Reviews, 15, 16–26. 
doi:10.1111/obr.12124 
Zhang, Y., Tian, W.-M., Wang, J., Liu, H., & Cao, L. (2012). Food Consumption Trends in China 
(Report submitted to the Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forestry). http://www.daff.gov.au/agriculture-food/food/publications/food-consumption-
trends-in-china. Accessed 3 March 2014 
Zheng, Z., & Henneberry, S. R. (2011). Household food demand by income category: evidence 
from household survey data in an urban chinese province. Agribusiness, 27(1), 99–113. 
doi:10.1002/agr.20243 
Zhong, F., Xiang, J., & Zhu, J. (2012). Impact of demographic dynamics on food consumption — 
A case study of energy intake in China. China Economic Review, 23(4), 1011–1019. 
doi:10.1016/j.chieco.2012.05.005 
Zhou, Z.-Y., Wu, Y.-R., & Tian, W.-M. (2003). Food consumption in rural China: preliminary 
results from household survey data. In Proceedings of the 15th Annual Conference of the 
Chapter 2 Heterogeneity in food consumption among income classes in rural China 
38 
 
Association from Chinese Economics Studies, Australia. 
http://mams.rmit.edu.au/1i9r574vbsgp.pdf. Accessed 21 February 2014 
 
  
Chapter 2 Heterogeneity in food consumption among income classes in rural China 
39 
 
Appendices: 
Table 2. 9.A.1 Working–Leser model estimation 
 Dependent variable: Share of studied food expenditure 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 All 
Log of Income -0.119*** -0.111** 0.023 0.235*** -0.883* -0.075*** 
 (0.026) (0.056) (0.049) (0.064) (0.534) (0.009) 
Squared Log of Income -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.014*** -0.021*** 0.038 -0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.026) (0.000) 
Residence 0.081*** 0.093*** 0.067*** 0.022*** 0.012** 0.053*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
Household Size  -0.002 0.003 0.003 -0.005 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ratio of Seniors -0.020 -0.027 -0.024 -0.016 -0.003 -0.010 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.019) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) 
Ratio of Children -0.025 -0.076** -0.041 -0.022 0.002 -0.029** 
 (0.036) (0.038) (0.032) (0.024) (0.013) (0.014) 
Log Price Index 0.080*** 0.067*** 0.057*** 0.068*** 0.036*** 0.059*** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
Intercept 1.718*** 1.943*** 1.120*** -0.250 5.126* 1.574*** 
 (0.192) (0.468) (0.410) (0.404) (2.748) (0.055) 
N 581 582 582 582 581 2908 
F 30.169 38.757 58.150 27.517 33.922 897.611 
R2 0.277 0.328 0.422 0.256 0.302 0.691 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CHNS data. 
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Table 2. 10.A.2 Parameters of QUAIDS for the full sample with IFGNL estimation 
 
Grains Oil and 
Fat 
Vegetables Meats Poultry Aquatic 
products 
Dairy 
Products 
Fruits 
Log Prices  of (𝛾𝑖𝑗)         
                 Grains 0.304*** 0.030 -0.045*** -0.231*** 0.011 -0.070*** -0.013* 0.014 
 (0.026) (0.020) (0.010) (0.051) (0.008) (0.014) (0.007) (0.020) 
                 Oil and Fat  0.168*** 0.027** -0.293*** 0.034*** -0.066*** -0.018** 0.119*** 
  (0.028 (0.014) (0.039) (0.010) (0.015) (0.008) (0.014) 
                 Vegetables   0.027*** -0.031 0.002 -0.005 -0.005* 0.031* 
   (0.007) (0.034) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.014) 
                 Meats    0.702*** -0.072*** 0.147*** 0.034* -0.256*** 
    (0.077) (0.023) (0.029) (0.019) (0.030) 
                 Poultry     0.027*** -0.017*** -0.008** 0.022** 
     (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.010) 
                 Aquatic products      0.041*** 0.014*** -0.045*** 
      (0.013) (0.005) (0.014) 
                 Dairy Products       0.008** -0.012 
       (0.004) (0.008) 
                 Fruits        0.128*** 
        (0.022) 
Log Expenditure (𝛽𝑖) -0.099*** -0.172*** -0.036 0.427*** -0.046*** 0.084*** 0.019 -0.179*** 
 (0.030) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.015) (0.020) (0.013) (0.017) 
Squared Log Expenditure (𝜆𝑖) 0.011*** -0.019*** -0.004 0.035*** -0.004** 0.007*** 0.001 -0.027*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Residence 0.013*** -0.003*** 0.003*** -0.017*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household Size  -0.001 0.001*** 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ratio of Seniors -0.006** -0.002** -0.005*** 0.007*** 0.000 0.002** 0.000 0.003*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Ratio of Children 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.001** -0.003** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)** (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Intercept -0.276*** -0.195*** 0.108*** 1.235*** -0.055*** 0.233*** 0.049*** -0.099*** 
 (0.039) (0.046) (0.028) (0.054) (0.020) (0.029) (0.016) (0.035) 
Scaling parameters for 
demographics (ᵨ) Coefficient  
Standard 
errors       
Residence 0.700*** (0.200)       
Household Size -0.016 (0.021)       
Ratio of Seniors -0.182** (0.087)       
Ratio of Children 0.116 (0.190)       
Log-likelihood         =  24559.145 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CHNS data. Standard errors are given in parentheses. * p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Abstract 
This article analyzes the impact of education on income inequality between ethnic minorities and 
Han in China by using the data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) over the 
period 1993-2011. An instrumental variable approach using two institutional changes is applied to 
address the endogeneity of education in income equations for various subsamples. To investigate 
the impact of education on income inequality between ethnic minorities and Han, we introduce an 
interaction term between the ethnic minority status and years of education. Our results suggest that 
there exists significant income inequality to the disadvantage of ethnic minorities for the full, 
female, and urban samples, and depending on the instrument also for the rural sample. Nevertheless, 
our results for these samples show specific returns to education for ethnic minorities, which implies 
that a portion of the income gap can be overcome with additional education. We find that in general 
one additional year of education will increase earned incomes of ethnic minorities by 26.3-28% 
and in particular by 13.5-14.4% for women from an ethnic minority group, by 10.4-14% for ethnic 
minorities with urban household registration, and by 10.8% for ethnic minorities with rural 
household registration. However, we cannot obtain conclusive results for the male sample due to 
weak instruments. 
Keywords: income inequality; ethnic minorities; education; endogeneity; China 
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3.1 Introduction 
The Chinese government started in the end of 1978 to implement economic reforms known as 
“Socialism with Chinese characteristics.” China has since then experienced high economic growth; 
the average GDP annual growth rates have been approximately 7-9%, and poverty rates have 
largely declined from 60.7% in 1990 to 6.3% in 20111, lifting 500 million people out of severe 
poverty. Nevertheless, income inequality in China has severely increased after 1990 (Benjamin et 
al. 2005, Li and Sicular 2014). China has shifted from a comparatively equal to a very unequal 
society. The national Gini coefficient in China currently stands at high levels between 0.47 and 
0.52 (Yue et al. 2013).2 In such an unequal situation disadvantaged social groups such as ethnic 
minorities usually suffer more from income inequality. How is the situation in China? Is there 
considerable income inequality between ethnic minorities and Han, the majority group, in China? 
In addition, China’s ethnic minorities, with a few exceptions, have generally less education than 
do Han (Hannum 1999, 2002, Ding 2006). If there is income inequality between ethnic minorities 
and Han, can additional education, which is usually linked to higher incomes, help to reduce it?  
To address these questions, we adjust Mincer’s income equation by including the ethnic status and 
an interaction term between the ethnic status and years of education as additional variables. Data 
for this research are taken from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS)3 over the period 
1993-2011. We pay special attention to educational attainment because with more education 
individuals usually earn more; yet this also implies that education might be endogenous in the 
income equation, as individuals might increase their educational attainment to receive higher 
incomes; therefore, we use an instrumental variable approach to capture the endogeneity of 
education in income equations by applying two institutional changes.  
To analyze income inequality between ethnic minorities and Han matters, as it has real life 
consequences. Ethnic minorities who earn less over the lifecycle also have less for the basic needs 
of their families and fewer savings for retirement; thus, they might end up to be poorer and less 
integrated in society; this might buttress social tensions. Given that ethnic tensions are an ever more 
crucial global issue, useful lessons about income differentials between ethnic groups can be learned 
from a transition country like China.    
This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the essential literature on the income 
effect of ethnic minority status and on the education efficiency (return to education) gap between 
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ethnic minorities and Han in China. Section 3 provides the empirical framework, which is an 
amendment of Mincer’s income equation. Section 4 describes the data and provides descriptive 
statistics. Section 5 shows the empirical findings for the full sample and for the female, male, urban, 
and rural subsamples. In the last section we draw conclusions. 
3.2 Literature review 
3.2.1 The income effect of ethnic minority status 
Income inequality is pronounced along racial and ethnic lines in many countries. Income gaps 
between ethnic groups can be attributed to at least two possible explanations, which are not 
mutually exclusive and interlinked with other pre-labor market circumstances. First, differences in 
between-group income differentials, such as in education, labor market experience, and 
occupational composition can explain a portion of the income gap. Second, labor market 
discrimination in job access and wages can explain another portion of the income gap (Becker 
1971).  
Over time many governments have tried to tackle income inequality by addressing these two major 
issues with all kinds of public policies, including aﬃrmative action, equal opportunity legislation, 
and educational and ﬁnancial benefits for the disadvantaged. The recent literature, however, 
suggests that despite all of these public efforts, there is still considerable income inequality 
throughout the world. For example, ethnic minorities in Vietnam earn approximately 11% less than 
does the majority group (Hung et al. 2009). The causes are largely attributed to lower labor market 
returns due to ethnic minorities’ characteristics. In Latin America, a large portion of the ethnic 
wage gap in favor of the white can be attributed to differences in educational attainment and 
occupational segregation (Ñopo et al. 2010). In Israel, changes in the earnings structure through 
skill-based technological change have mainly led to increased inequality between ethnic minorities 
and the majority group (Haberfeld and Cohen 2007). In Great Britain, the income gap is mainly 
attributed to ethnic minorities making up a larger portion in lower paying jobs (Brynin and Güveli 
2012). In the United States, the income gap between whites and blacks has been persistent over 
time and is largely attributed to skill differences (Altonji and Blank 1999). Nevertheless, Fang and 
Heywood (2006) find no considerable difference in earnings in output-based pay between 
Europeans and non-Europeans in Canada.  
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In China, with the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the government started 
to reclassify ethnic groups and autonomous areas and progressively set up a preferential policy 
framework. Fifty-five ethnic minorities alongside the Han-majority have been classified since 1949. 
Actually China has implemented a very advanced preferential policy framework to tackle labor 
market discrimination and ethnic inequalities, but one look into the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region (XUAR) and the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) tells us how poorly these policies have 
been enforced (Gilley 2001, Yee 2003, Hillman 2008). Regarding income differentials between 
ethnic minorities and Han, the literature suggests differences in human capital, household and 
regional characteristics as the major determinants. Hannum and Xie (1998) compare differences in 
occupational attainment between ethnic minorities and Han in XUAR by using 1982 and 1990 
census data. They find an increasing gap in occupational attainment between ethnic minorities and 
Han over time. Gustafsson and Li (2003) analyze rural income differences between ethnic 
minorities and Han based on survey data from 19 provinces in 1988 and 1995. They find an 
increasing income gap of 19.2% in 1988 to 35.9% in 1995, indicating lower income levels for 
ethnic minorities. By using the 1988 Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) data, Johnson and 
Chow (1997) find that ethnic minorities in rural and urban areas earn approximately 19% and 4.5% 
less than Han, respectively.  Li (2003) uses the CHIP data for 1995 and discovers that ethnic 
minorities earn 9% less than Han. Yang (2005) and Appleton et al. (2005), however, observe mixed 
results. Yang (2005), who studies variations in the returns to education based on the 1988 and 1995 
CHIP data, observes largely insignificant coefficients for the ethnic minority status. Similar results 
have been obtained by Appleton et al. (2005) who analyze the CHIP data for 1988, 1995, 1999, 
and 2002. Except for 1995, they observe insignificant coefficients for the ethnic minority status in 
all other years considered. The authors, moreover, suggest that from 1990 to 2002 ethnic minorities’ 
wages in urban areas increased faster than Han’s wages. Based on the 1989-2006 CHNS data, 
Hasmath and Ho (2015) find that ethnic minorities earn 8-17% less than Han; however, after 
controlling for education, experience, and gender, no considerable wage gap in favor of the Han 
remained. Nevertheless, through additional qualitative interviews with ethnic minorities in Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Shenzhen, the authors find that discrimination, lack of guanxi (social networks), and 
cultural differences led to difficulties in finding good jobs for ethnic minorities in China’s urban 
labor market.   
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3.2.2 The return to education gap between ethnic minorities and Han 
Education is a crucial human capital determinant in income equations (Mincer 1974).4 More 
education is generally regarded as a major factor for finding “better jobs” and earning higher 
incomes. There is an extensive literature concerned with the impact of education on incomes in 
China, particularly after the transition to a more market based economy. Returns to education in 
China have been low in the 1980s and 1990s. Byron and Manaloto (1990), Johnson and Chow 
(1997), and  Liu (1998) find that returns to education were approximately 3-4%. Other studies (e.g., 
Bishop and Chiou 2004) find that returns to education in the middle of the 1990s in China were 
approximately 5-6%. Since the middle of the 1990s returns to education have risen. Qian and 
Smyth (2008) report that returns to education in urban China in 2005 were approximately 12-13%. 
Ge and Yang (2011) observe that in 2007 returns to education in urban China stood at 11.4%, an 
increase of roughly 7.8 percentage points compared to 1988. Both studies’ estimation results are 
based on OLS specifications. Ren and Miller (2012), however, find lower returns to education with 
7.4% and 7.5% for men and women, respectively, in urban China in 2006; yet the returns to 
education have almost doubled compared to the 1990s. A limited number of returns to education’ 
studies have controlled for the endogeneity of education with instrumental variables (see Chen and 
Hamori 2009, Fang et al. 2012, Fleisher et al. 2005, Heckman and Li 2004, Li and Luo 2004, 
Mishra and Smyth 2013, Wang et al. 2014, Zhang et al. 2007). These studies mostly use 
conventional instruments for education, such as spouse’s education, parental education, parental 
income, number of siblings, or year of birth. The returns to education are usually higher compared 
to studies which have applied OLS estimation techniques. Card (1999) observes that the IV results 
are usually 20-40% higher than the OLS results because of different marginal returns to schooling 
for the subgroups considered.           
Regarding the ethnic status, Fang et al. (2012) find that the ethnic minority status has a statistically 
significantly negative effect in the returns to education equation by using CHNS data for the period 
1997-2006. In contrast, Wang et al. (2014) find that the ethnic minority status has no statistically 
significant effect in the private returns to education equation by using data from the CHIP. Mishra 
and Smyth (2013) find that the returns to education for the Korean minority in urban areas in 
Northeast China are approximately 10.6% and 10.2% for women and men, respectively, when an 
OLS approach is used. The returns to education are with 16.4% and 24.1% for women and men, 
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respectively, considerably higher when an IV approach is used. This confirms the finding that 
returns to education are higher when an IV approach is applied.   
Institutional changes are found to be significant instruments for education (Fang et al. 2012, Song 
2012, Xie and Mo 2014). Fang et al. (2012) and Song (2012) initially use the 1986 Compulsory 
Education Law (Law) as instrument for education in the returns to education equation; this method 
is further complemented by Xie and Mo (2014) by including an additional institutional change—
the 1991 Provisions on the Prohibition of Using Child Labor (Provisions)— as instrument for 
education in the health outcome estimation. The regulations imply that individuals who were born 
before 1971 were not affected by the Law and individuals who were born before 1975 were not 
affected by the Provisions. The introduction of these two regulations has considerably increased 
educational attainment in China. Xie and Mo (2014) have shown convincing evidence that there 
are notable increases in educational attainment between 1971 and 1972 and between 1974 and 1975 
that exceed the long-term trend of increasing educational attainment in China (Figure 3.1). 
 
Data source: Calculated by the authors from the CHNS, 1993–2011. 
Figure 3. 1  Educational attainment by year of birth 
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years of education upper middle school, technical school or above
college, university or above lower middle school or above
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3.3 Empirical framework 
3.3.1 The benchmark model 
We employ an adjusted Mincer approach to investigate the differences in earned incomes between 
ethnic minorities and Han. The following function is estimated 
𝐿𝑛 (𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑚𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛼𝑒𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 + 𝛼𝑚𝑒𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑘𝐾 𝑋𝑖𝑘 + 𝜀       (1) 
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of earned income.5 Earned income is used because 
we are primarily interested in income differences that result from unequal payment.6 The crucial 
independent variables in our model are Minority (0/1) which stands for the ethnic minority status, 
Yearseduc which stands for years of education, and an interaction term (Minority*Yearseduc) 
between the ethnic minority status and years of education. 𝑋𝑖𝑘  includes other individual 
characteristics as well as regional and time fixed effects. A thorough description of these variables 
will be given in section 4. Standard errors (𝜀) are robust to a clustered sample design. Altogether 
we estimate a total sample and separate subsamples for women and men and for individuals with 
urban and rural household registration. 
3.3.2 The income effect of ethnic minority status and returns to education  
Income gaps between ethnic groups can largely be attributed to in-between-group differentials and 
labor market discrimination in job access and wages. If there are inequalities in earned incomes for 
ethnic minorities, 𝛼𝑚 has a negative sign which indicates that ethnic minorities have less earned 
income than do Han; this might be related to on the job or wage discrimination against ethnic 
minorities, differences in Chinese Mandarin (Putonghua) language proficiency, or differences in 
the cultural integration of ethnic minorities.  
The major in-between-group differential is educational attainment. 𝛼𝑒 is expected to have a 
positive sign, as the returns to education are usually positive. The main hypothesis of our study is 
that returns to education might be higher for ethnic minorities with more education because of the 
scarcity of ethnic minorities with higher educational attainments in the Chinese labor market (Ding 
2006, Hannum 1999, 2002); therefore, 𝛼𝑚𝑒 is expected to be positive. If 𝛼𝑚𝑒 is positive, this means 
that one additional year of education for ethnic minorities will lead to more additional income 
increase for ethnic minorities in comparison to Han with the same years of education.  
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There might be several driving forces at different educational levels that could explain the higher 
returns to education for ethnic minorities in China. First, at lower levels of education institutional 
factors such as the Law and Provisions presumably raise the education of ethnic minorities who 
would otherwise follow low-income generating activities or help with household chores (assuming 
independence of taste and ability factors). Second, at higher levels of education the preferential 
policies for ethnic minorities might be major driving forces for the higher returns to education for 
ethnic minorities in China. For example, ethnic minorities receive extra points in the university 
entrance exams and might, therefore, have less forgone income and higher returns to education 
than do Han. Furthermore, ethnic minorities with university degrees might signal to potential 
employers to be from the “ethnic elite” who enjoy higher political and economic power within the 
respective autonomous regions; therefore, they might get better job possibilities and receive higher 
incomes.  
Other potential in-between-group differences between ethnic minorities and Han include 
household size and regional characteristics. We discuss these factors more thoroughly in section 
4.2.  
3.3.3 Accounting for the endogeneity of education in the income equation 
To control for the endogeneity of education, we use two institutional changes as instruments. The 
1986 Compulsory Education Law and the 1991 Provisions on the Prohibition of Using Child Labor 
have been used as instruments for education in previous studies (Fang et al. 2012, Song 2012, Xie 
and Mo 2014).  
The 9-year Compulsory Education Law that officially came into effect in July 1986 covers six 
years of primary school and three years of junior middle school. The goal was to increase 
educational attainment and to eliminate illiteracy in China. The law expects children who reached 
the age of six to enroll in school for nine compulsory years without any tuition fee (Fang et al. 
2012); thus, normally a pupil would finish the nine years of compulsory schooling at the age of 15. 
This implies that individuals who were born before 1971 were not affected by the law (Xie and Mo 
2014).  
The Provisions on the Prohibition of Using Child Labor that came officially into effect in April 
1991 prohibits employment of children who are younger than 16 years of age. This implies that 
individuals who were born before 1975 were not affected by the provisions (Xie and Mo 2014). 
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The Provisions complement the Compulsory Education Law, as young adults can only start 
working after terminating their compulsory education at the age of 15. 
The variables for the instruments are not directly reported in the CHNS and are constructed based 
on the year of birth. Two dummy variables are used. First, for the 1986 Compulsory Education 
Law variations in the implementation of the Law in different provinces are considered (Huang 
2015). A dummy variable is then constructed for those affected and unaffected by the Law in each 
province. The threshold birth year for those affected by the Law is 1971 for Beijing, Chongqing, 
Liaoning, and Heilongjiang; 1972 for Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Hubei, and Henan; 1973 for 
Guizhou, and 1976 for Hunan and Guangxi. Second, for the 1991 Provisions all individuals who 
were born after 1991 are affected by the regulation and all individuals who were born before 1991 
are unaffected by the regulation.  
The IV model is estimated by the following two stage least square (2SLS) procedure. 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐̂ 𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑙𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑘𝐾 𝑋𝑖𝑘 + 𝜗                     (2) 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐̂ 𝑖 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾𝑝𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖 + 𝛾𝑚𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑘𝐾 𝑋𝑖𝑘 + 𝜔                           (3) 
where equations (2) and (3) are the first stage regressions for the endogenous variable of education 
when the Law and the Provisions are used as instruments, respectively. In the second stage of the 
regression the actual value of 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 is substituted by the predicted value from the equations 
(2) and (3). The estimation in the second stage is as follows: 
𝐿𝑛 (𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒) = 𝛼0
′ + 𝛼𝑚
′ 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛼𝑒
′ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐̂ 𝑖 + 𝛼𝑚𝑒
′ 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐̂ 𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑘
′
𝐾 𝑋𝑖𝑘 + 𝜀
′       (4) 
where 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐̂ 𝑖 is the predicted value of years of education from the regression in the first stage. 
All other independent variables controlled for are the same as in model (1). 
3.4 Data and descriptive statistics 
3.4.1 Data 
We use data from the CHNS. The CHNS applies a multistage, random cluster process to draw a 
sample of roughly 4,400 households with a total of 26,000 individuals. The sample includes waves 
from 1989 to 2011 and was conducted in nine provinces (Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Jiangsu, 
Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou) for the years 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 
2004, 2006, 2009, 2011, and three municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing) for the year 2011. 
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The CHNS uses a weighted sampling scheme to randomly select four counties in each province 
(one low income, two middle income, and one high income) and selects the provincial capital and 
lower income cities when possible. The CHNS randomly selects villages and townships within the 
counties, urban and suburban neighborhoods within the cities.  
In the sample used for this article, the total number of 26,000 observations is reduced by the 
following restrictions. First, the 1989 and 1991 waves are excluded from the analysis because the 
household registration type (hukou), which is used for setting up the urban and rural subsamples, 
is initially reported in 1993; thus, we restrict our sample to the period 1993-2011. Second, our 
sample contains only full-time workers who reported to earn an individual wage, including annual 
wage, bonus, or other income from the job. This implies that individuals who are still at school, 
part-time workers, or individuals who are doing unpaid family work are excluded from the analysis. 
Moreover, our sample includes only individuals within the official working age of 16 to 65 years. 
Third, missing observations are dropped from the analysis. The total sample used in our research, 
thus, consists of 13,851 observations. The subsamples for Han and ethnic minorities include 12,594 
and 1,257 observations, respectively. The subsamples for individuals with urban and rural 
household registration include 8,385 and 5,466 observations, respectively. 
3.4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in our study for the full sample, for 
ethnic minorities, and for Han. Subsamples for gender (female/male) and household registration 
(urban/rural) are also shown. Approximately 9% of our sample are ethnic minorities. This 
proportion is similar to the national average of approximately 8.4%; therefore, no additional 
weighting based on ethnicity is applied in our study.   
All annual earned income values are adjusted to reflect 2011 prices. The adjustment is computed 
by dividing the annual average Consumer Price Index for 2011 by the annual average for earlier 
years. Ethnic minorities and Han have average annual earned incomes of 12,195 CNY and 14,243 
CNY, respectively. The difference of means in annual earned incomes between ethnic minorities 
and Han is different from zero. The t-statistic is 5.6174 with 13,849 degrees of freedom, and the 
corresponding two-tailed p-value is 0.0001, which is less than 0.05. This difference renders our 
research important and demands for a more rigorous econometric analysis that will be conducted 
with this study. 
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Women’s and men’s average annual earned incomes are 12,469 CNY and 15,128 CNY, 
respectively. The difference of means in annual earned incomes between women and men is also 
different from zero (t-statistic -12.5085, two-tailed p-value 0.0001). This renders the usage of two 
sub-samples for women and men important. Furthermore, the wage inequality ratio in China in 
2014 for women to men stood at 0.63 (GGGR 2014). With deregulation more and more private 
companies seem to make use of discriminatory measures against women in the Chinese labor 
market (Gustafsson and Li 2000, Chi and Li 2008, Zhang et al. 2008, Li et al. 2011). When 
considering the ethnic status, the difference in earned incomes between women and men is also 
pronounced in our sample. Women with an ethnic minority and Han status earn on average 10,351 
CNY and 12,678 CNY, respectively. Men with an ethnic minority and Han status earn on average 
13,413 CNY and 15,301 CNY, respectively. Women with an ethnic minority status have, thus, the 
lowest average annual earned income by gender comparison. 
Previous studies find a considerable urban-rural income gap (Khan and Riskin 2005, Sicular et al. 
2007, Li and Sicular 2014)  and regional income differences in China  (Démurger et al. 2006,   
Gustafsson and Li 2002). In our sample people with urban and rural household registration have 
annual earned incomes of 15,701 CNY and 11,536 CNY, respectively. The difference of means in 
annual earned incomes between urban and rural household registration is also different from zero 
(t-statistic -19.6874, two-tailed p-value 0.0001). This renders the usage of two sub-samples for 
urban and rural areas important. Ethnic minority people usually live in less-developed rural areas 
in China (Gustafsson and Li 2003). When considering the ethnic status, the difference in earned 
incomes between urban and rural household registration in our sample is also pronounced. Ethnic 
minorities and Han with urban household registration earn on average 13,985 CNY and 15,829 
CNY, respectively. Ethnic minorities and Han with rural household registration earn on average 
10,657 CNY and 11,660 CNY, respectively. Ethnic minorities in rural areas have, thus, the lowest 
average annual earned income by regional comparison.  
Regarding education, the literature suggests that returns to education are usually positive. The 
question arises whether there is income inequality for ethnic minorities because of less educational 
attainment. Ethnic minorities and Han have on average 9.681 and 10.556 years of education, 
respectively. The difference of means in years of education between ethnic minorities and Han is 
different from zero (t-statistic 6.7129, two-tailed p-value 0.0001). This renders the usage of an 
interaction term between ethnic minority status and years of education important. Ethnic minorities 
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with rural household registration and women with an ethnic minority status have with 7.463 and 
9.340 years, respectively, the lowest average years of education.  
The descriptive statistics include additional individual characteristics, regional, and time control 
variables (Table 3.1). Alongside the ethnic status and years of education, there are other important 
explanatory variables that might be crucial to explain the income gap between ethnic minorities 
and Han. One important individual characteristic is the household size. Preferential policies have 
allowed ethnic minorities in rural areas to have more than one child, while for most of the Han 
people the one-child policy was applied from 1979 until 2015. The policy could have a link with 
lower income, in particular for women with an ethnic minority status who might engage in child 
rearing rather than follow an income generating activity. In our sample, the average household size 
for ethnic minorities and Han is 3.91 and 3.85 children, respectively. There is no difference of 
means in household size between ethnic minorities and Han (t-statistic -1.3996, two-tailed p-value 
0.1616). The variable will, therefore, be tested for its significance in the econometric model settings.  
Other important determinants that might have a link with ethnic minorities’ lower incomes are 
language and cultural barriers. The CHNS has neither information on Chinese Mandarin 
(Putonghua) language proficiency nor on cultural integration of ethnic minorities. However, the 
ethnic minority dummy and the interaction term (Minority*Yearseduc) implicitly control for 
language and culture alongside possible discrimination. Yet with the available CHNS data, it is 
impossible to completely disentangle these factors. In our view, the CHNS database is still the best 
available secondary data source to analyze income inequality between ethnic minorities and Han 
at an aggregate level for China.  
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Table 3. 1  Summary statistics for full-time workers by ethnic status, gender, and household registration 
 Total  Han  Ethnic minorities 
 Full Female Male Urban Rural  Full Female Male Urban Rural  Full Female Male Urban Rural 
Dependent variables                  
Annual earned income (CNY) 14057 12469 15128 15701 11536  14243 12678 15301 15829 11660  12195 10351 13413 13985 10657 
 (12340) (11349) (12856) (13064) (10658)  (12438) (11458) (12952) (13162) (10666)  (11147) (9934) (11728) (11541) (10565) 
Main independent variables                  
Minority (Ethnic minority 0/1) 0.091 0.090 0.092 0.069 0.124             
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.25) (0.33)             
Yearseduc (Years of education) 10.476 10.427 10.510 12.024 8.102  10.556 10.534 10.570 12.006 8.193  9.681 9.340 9.906 12.262 7.463 
 (4.41) (4.71) (4.20) (4.26) (3.50)  (4.39) (4.66) (4.19) (4.26) (3.48)  (4.58) (5.03) (4.24) (4.25) (3.58) 
Instrumental variables                  
Law (The 9-year Compulsory  0.251 0.304 0.215 0.232 0.280  0.250 0.305 0.213 0.234 0.276  0.255 0.296 0.229 0.198 0.305 
education Law) (0.43) (0.46) (0.41) (0.42) (0.45)  (0.43) (0.46) (0.41) (0.42) (0.45)  (0.44) (0.46) (0.42) (0.40) (0.46) 
Provisions (The Provisions on the 
Prohibition of  Using Child Labor) 
0.195 
(0.40) 
0.235 
(0.42) 
0.168 
(0.37) 
0.172 
(0.38) 
0.230 
(0.42) 
 0.193 
(0.39) 
0.233 
(0.42) 
0.166 
(0.37) 
0.172 
(0.38) 
0.225 
(0.42) 
 0.216 
(0.41) 
0.256 
(0.44) 
0.189 
(0.39) 
0.164 
(0.37) 
0.260 
(0.44) 
                  
Control variables                  
Individual characteristics                  
Age 39.57 37.77 40.78 39.85 39.13  39.50 37.66 40.74 39.86 38.92  40.25 38.82 41.19 39.76 40.67 
 (11.17) (10.68) (11.32) (10.35) (12.30)  (11.12) (10.60) (11.29) (10.40) (12.18)  (11.65) (11.44) (11.70) (9.75) (13.06) 
Age squared 1690.34 1540.54 1791.37 1695.23 1682.85  1683.84 1530.98 1787.16 1696.70 1662.89  1755.45 1637.72 1833.21 1675.37 1824.27 
 (899.12) (832.72) (927.76) (834.98) (989.51)  (893.63) (824.25) (923.45) (839.55) (975.06)  (950.35) (909.48) (969.18) (771.38) (1076.58) 
Household size 3.86 3.85 3.87 3.62 4.23  3.85 3.85 3.86 3.62 4.23  3.91 3.86 3.95 3.60 4.18 
 (1.42) (1.41) (1.43) (1.29) (1.54)  (1.42) (1.41) (1.43) (1.29) (1.55)  (1.43) (1.39) (1.45) (1.29) (1.48) 
Male (0/1) 0.597   0.579 0.625  0.597   0.581 0.623  0.602   0.556 0.642 
Married (0/1) 0.816 0.799 0.828 0.829 0.796  0.819 0.803 0.829 0.830 0.800  0.789 0.754 0.812 0.816 0.766 
Urban (0/1) 0.605 0.633 0.587    0.620 0.644 0.603    0.462 0.516 0.427   
Government or SOE 0.486 0.487 0.486 0.648 0.238  0.497 0.496 0.497 0.646 0.253  0.383 0.394 0.375 0.678 0.129 
Collective enterprise  0.279 0.260 0.291 0.121 0.521  0.266 0.248 0.278 0.117 0.508  0.407 0.384 0.421 0.169 0.611 
Farming 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.023 0.059  0.036 0.036 0.037 0.024 0.057  0.043 0.050 0.038 0.009 0.072 
Private enterprise 0.148 0.156 0.142 0.153 0.139  0.151 0.160 0.145 0.158 0.139  0.118 0.116 0.119 0.091 0.141 
Foreign enterprise 0.009 0.013 0.007 0.010 0.008  0.009 0.013 0.006 0.010 0.008  0.009 0.010 0.008 0.005 0.012 
Other (reference) 0.041 0.046 0.037 0.045 0.035  0.041 0.046 0.037 0.045 0.035  0.041 0.046 0.038 0.048 0.036 
Observations 13851 5579 8272 8385 5466  12594 5079 7515 7804 4790  1257 500 757 581 676 
 The mean values are reported for continuous variables and the percentages for discrete variables. The standard deviation is in parentheses. Regional controls include dummies for Chongqing (reference), 
Beijing, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou. Time controls include year dummies for 1993 (reference), 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2011. 
Data source: Calculated by the authors from the CHNS, 1993–2011. 
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3.5 Results 
3.5.1 OLS estimations for the impact of ethnic status and education on earned income 
Table 3.2 shows the OLS estimation results for the full, female, male, urban, and rural samples.  
The columns (1) to (5) in Table 3.2 provide the results without the interaction term, and the columns 
(6) to (10) provide the results with the interaction term (Minority*Yearseduc).  
Regarding the ethnic minority status, the estimation results show a negative and statistically 
significant effect of the ethnic minority status on earned income in all models without interaction 
term, except for the rural sample (column (5)). Similarly, the ethnic minority status is negative and 
statistically significant in the full, female, male, and rural samples for the models with interaction 
term (columns (6), (7), (8), (10)), but is insignificant in the urban sample (column (9)). Gustafsson 
and Li (2003), Li (2003), and Johnson and Chow (1997) also find statistically significant 
coefficients for the ethnic minority status in income equations. Our OLS estimation results provide 
additional evidence that there exists income inequality to the disadvantage of ethnic minorities in 
China. With the inclusion of regional and work-related controls as well as household size, 
education, and other individual characteristics, we find that there is still a portion in the income 
gap that is attributed to the ethnic minority status. The income gap to the disadvantage of ethnic 
minorities might be related to discrimination in job access and wages, language and cultural 
barriers, as well as other pre-labor market differences.  
Regarding years of education, the estimation results clearly show a statistically significantly 
positive effect of years of education on earned income in all model specifications. Considering the 
full samples, one additional year of education increases earned incomes by 4.9-5%. Precisely, the 
returns to education for women range from 6.1-6.3%, for men from 3.8-3.9%, for urban areas are 
4.8%, and for rural areas range from 3.7-3.8%.  
However, the OLS estimation results show statistically significant returns to education for ethnic 
minorities only for the full and the female samples. An additional year of education will increase 
earned incomes for ethnic minorities by 1.6% for the full sample and by 2% for women. As 
mentioned earlier, institutional factors might be major driving forces for the higher returns to 
education for ethnic minorities in China. In the next section the potential endogeneity of years of 
education will be analyzed with an instrumental variable approach.  
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Table 3. 2  OLS estimation for earned income equations by gender and household registration 
Variables Dependent variable: Logarithm of earned income 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Full sample Female Male Urban Rural Full sample Female Male Urban Rural 
Minority -0.119*** -0.137** -0.102** -0.087** -0.122 -0.280*** -0.330*** -0.205* -0.191 -0.220** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) 
Yearseduc 0.050*** 0.063*** 0.039*** 0.048*** 0.038*** 0.049*** 0.061*** 0.038*** 0.048*** 0.037*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Minority*Yearseduc      0.016** 0.020** 0.010 0.009 0.013 
      (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Male 0.282***   0.197*** 0.375*** 0.281***   0.197*** 0.374*** 
 (0.02)   (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)   (0.02) (0.03) 
Age 0.067*** 0.082*** 0.064*** 0.050*** 0.083*** 0.067*** 0.081*** 0.064*** 0.050*** 0.082*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.029 -0.068* 0.096*** 0.046* -0.007 0.029 -0.069** 0.096*** 0.046* -0.007 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Urban 0.129*** 0.127*** 0.126***   0.129*** 0.125*** 0.126***   
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)   (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)   
Household size -0.016 -0.015 -0.019* -0.019** -0.009 -0.016 -0.015 -0.019* -0.019** -0.009 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Government or SOE 0.094* 0.132* 0.056 0.056 0.236** 0.093* 0.130* 0.056 0.055 0.236** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.10) 
Collective enterprise  -0.006 0.070 -0.068 0.080* 0.080 -0.006 0.069 -0.067 0.079* 0.080 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09) 
Farming -0.031 -0.021 -0.043 0.069 0.064 -0.031 -0.024 -0.042 0.068 0.063 
 (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.11) 
Private enterprise 0.060 0.080 0.039 -0.044 0.293*** 0.060 0.078 0.040 -0.044 0.292*** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.10) 
Foreign enterprise 0.331*** 0.389*** 0.279*** 0.284*** 0.522*** 0.332*** 0.388*** 0.281*** 0.283*** 0.523*** 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.14) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.14) 
Regional controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 6.753*** 6.513*** 7.124*** 6.945*** 6.651*** 6.775*** 6.543*** 7.137*** 6.955*** 6.665*** 
 (0.18) (0.25) (0.20) (0.16) (0.28) (0.18) (0.25) (0.20) (0.16) (0.28) 
N 13851 5579 8272 8385 5466 13851 5579 8272 8385 5466 
R2 0.379 0.388 0.372 0.540 0.238 0.380 0.388 0.372 0.540 0.238 
F 105.259 71.341 83.775 131.961 41.435 109.527 69.773 82.975 128.079 45.274 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010.  
Minority stands for the ethnic minority status (0/1) and Yearseduc for years of education. Robust standard errors (clustered on community id) are in parentheses. Regional controls include dummies for 
Chongqing (reference), Beijing, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou. Time controls include year dummies for 1993 (reference), 1997, 2000, 2004, 
2006, 2009, 2011. The reference group for the type of work unit is ‘others’. For the subsamples the respective male and urban dummies are excluded from the analysis. 
 
Data source: Calculated by the authors from the CHNS, 1993–2011.
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3.5.2 The estimation of the impact of two institutional changes on educational attainment 
Before we proceed with the IV estimations, the relationship between the authorization of the 
regulations (Law and Provisions) and educational attainment will be explored. Xie and Mo (2014) 
have already shown convincing evidence that there are notable increases in educational attainment 
between 1971 and 1972 and between 1974 and 1975 that exceed the long-term trend of increasing 
educational attainment in China, which renders the impacts of the Law and Provisions on 
educational attainment important. To further explore the impacts of the Law and Provisions on 
educational attainment in our samples, we provide OLS estimations in Table 3.3. 
The results for the full sample and for almost all subsamples suggest that both instrumental 
variables have statistically significantly positive impacts on educational attainment. Only the 
coefficient of Law for the rural sample is insignificant, which implies that for the rural sample the 
Law might not be a valid instrument for education. In general, individuals who are regulated by 
the Compulsory Education Law and by the Provisions on Using Child Labor receive roughly 0.76 
and 1.1 years of additional education, respectively. The impacts of the regulations are particularly 
pronounced for women and in urban areas. Xie and Mo (2014), who obtain similar results for 
women, explain that traditionally parents would invest more in the education of their sons rather 
than in the education of their daughters. The regulations have, therefore, higher impacts on women. 
The higher impact of the regulations in urban areas might indicate higher enforcement of the Law 
and the Provisions in urban rather than in rural areas, where children often have to help with 
household chores instead of going to school (Castro Campos 2013). Even though our results show 
a strong correlation between the two institutional changes and education in the male sample, based 
on the previous discussion a weak instrument problem is likely to occur for the male and rural 
subsamples. 
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Table 3. 3  The effects of institutional changes on years of education by gender and household registration 
Variables Dependent variable: Years of education 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Full sample Female Male Urban Rural Full sample Female Male Urban Rural 
Law 0.757*** 0.917*** 0.415* 1.040*** 0.326      
 (0.17) (0.22) (0.21) (0.24) (0.22)      
Provisions      1.066*** 1.270*** 0.720*** 1.336*** 0.711*** 
      (0.19) (0.25) (0.21) (0.25) (0.25) 
Minority -0.429 -0.891** -0.138 -0.234 -0.061 -0.438 -0.912*** -0.141 -0.253 -0.069 
 (0.28) (0.35) (0.31) (0.41) (0.26) (0.28) (0.35) (0.31) (0.42) (0.26) 
Male 0.682***   0.377*** 1.210*** 0.673***   0.367*** 1.203*** 
 (0.10)   (0.11) (0.15) (0.10)   (0.11) (0.15) 
Age 0.053* 0.118*** 0.034 0.017 0.036 0.082** 0.158*** 0.061 0.044 0.075 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Age squared -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.002*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.106 -0.541*** 0.125 -0.098 0.038 -0.111 -0.556*** 0.125 -0.085 0.018 
 (0.14) (0.19) (0.16) (0.18) (0.19) (0.14) (0.19) (0.16) (0.18) (0.19) 
Urban 3.228*** 3.556*** 2.997***   3.230*** 3.555*** 2.997***   
 (0.19) (0.22) (0.21)   (0.19) (0.22) (0.21)   
Household size -0.184*** -0.250*** -0.170*** -0.254*** -0.071* -0.183*** -0.247*** -0.170*** -0.247*** -0.073* 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04) 
Government or SOE 0.683** 0.738* 0.630* 0.177 1.235*** 0.671** 0.707* 0.631* 0.167 1.226*** 
 (0.31) (0.38) (0.33) (0.37) (0.32) (0.31) (0.38) (0.34) (0.37) (0.32) 
Collective enterprise  -0.558* -0.650* -0.471 -1.108*** 0.220 -0.563* -0.672* -0.465 -1.105*** 0.213 
 (0.32) (0.39) (0.34) (0.42) (0.30) (0.32) (0.39) (0.34) (0.43) (0.30) 
Farming -0.892* -0.922 -0.783 -0.920 -0.307 -0.908* -0.934 -0.793 -0.911 -0.331 
 (0.51) (0.59) (0.52) (0.63) (0.33) (0.51) (0.59) (0.53) (0.64) (0.33) 
Private enterprise -0.347 -0.468 -0.288 -0.974** 0.670** -0.366 -0.496 -0.301 -0.991** 0.643** 
 (0.33) (0.37) (0.37) (0.40) (0.31) (0.33) (0.37) (0.37) (0.40) (0.31) 
Foreign enterprise -0.368 -0.442 -0.381 -0.996 0.850 -0.357 -0.437 -0.379 -0.954 0.829 
 (0.57) (0.68) (0.59) (0.67) (0.68) (0.57) (0.69) (0.59) (0.67) (0.68) 
Regional controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 7.506*** 6.872*** 8.430*** 11.853*** 6.609*** 6.987*** 6.126*** 7.913*** 11.413*** 5.858*** 
 (0.91) (1.21) (1.01) (1.19) (1.03) (0.98) (1.29) (1.03) (1.24) (1.06) 
N 13851 5579 8272 8385 5466 13851 5579 8272 8385 5466 
F 61.676 59.182 46.099 20.792 21.536 69.441 72.089 48.918 27.012 22.077 
R2 0.345 0.432 0.296 0.217 0.239 0.347 0.434 0.297 0.219 0.241 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010.  
The variable Law refers to the 9-year Compulsory Education Law and the variable Provisions to The Provisions on the Prohibition of Using Child Labor. Minority stands for the ethnic minority status (0/1) and 
Yearseduc for years of education. Robust standard errors (clustered on community id) are in parentheses. Regional controls include dummies for Chongqing (reference), Beijing, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou. Time controls include year dummies for 1993 (reference), 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2011. The reference group for the type of 
work unit is ‘others’. For the subsamples the respective male and urban dummies are excluded from the analysis. 
Data source: Calculated by the authors from the CHNS, 1993–2011.
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3.5.3 Instrumental variable estimation for the impact of ethnic status and education on earned 
income 
Tables 3.4 to 3.6 show the IV regression results for the full sample and for the subsamples for both 
model settings without (columns (1) to (5)) and with interaction terms (columns (6) to 10)). Tables 
3.4 and 3.5 include with the Law and Provisions only one instrument, respectively, and Table 3.6 
includes both instruments. Each table contains the major second and first stage coefficients as well 
as weak identification and endogeneity test results. Over-identification test results are additionally 
reported in Table 3.6 because more than one instrument is used to instrument years of education 
(Baum et al. 2007).  
We first examine the results for the models without interaction terms (columns (1) to (5)) given in 
Table 3.4. We find that the IV estimates for the ethnic minority status are all statistically 
insignificant, except for the urban sample. Nevertheless, all coefficients for the ethnic minority 
status have negative signs. The IV estimates for years of education are all statistically significantly 
positive, except for the rural sample. Generally, the F statistics should be larger than 10 to discard 
a weak instrument problem when one instrument is used (Staiger and Stock 1997). The F statistics 
are all larger than 10, except for the male and the rural samples, which indicates that the Law is a 
valid instrument to explain the variations in years of education for the full, female, and urban 
samples.  
Let us now turn to the results for the models with interaction term (columns (6) to (10)) given in 
Table 3.4. The IV estimates for the ethnic minority status have a negative sign in all samples and 
are statistically significant in the full, female, and urban samples. The potential reasons for this 
income inequality have been mentioned in section 5.2. The IV estimates for years of education are 
all statistically significantly positive, except for the male and rural samples. The IV estimates for 
the interaction term are all positive and statistically significant in the full, female, and urban 
samples. When including the interaction term (Minority*Yearseduc) as a second endogenous 
variable, the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical value is 7.03 for the 5% tolerance level (Stock and 
Yogo 2005). As expected, the results for the male and rural samples are still unreliable due to the 
low F statistics, which indicates weak instrument problems. The test results show that the Law is 
invalid for instrumenting the interaction term (Minority*Yearseduc) in the male and rural samples; 
therefore, we cannot get conclusive results about how education impacts the earned incomes of 
ethnic minorities compared to Han in the male and rural samples. 
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On the basis of the results given in Table 3.4, we can conclude that the IV estimation results for 
the full, female, and urban samples with interaction terms (columns (6), (7), (9)) are the most 
reliable. This supports the findings that the impact of the Law is particularly pronounced for women 
and in urban areas. Our results confirm that there are specific returns to education for ethnic 
minorities. The results show that one additional year of education will increase earned incomes of 
ethnic minorities by 27.4% and in particular by 13.5% for women from an ethnic minority group 
and by 10.5% for ethnic minorities with urban household registration. 
Regarding returns to education, the results show that one additional year of education will increase 
earned incomes by 19.8-19.9% for the full sample, which is much larger than the 4.9-5% obtained 
from the OLS estimations, but in line with previous findings (Card 1999). For women, the returns 
to education are with 18-18.2% slightly lower than the average. For individuals with urban 
household registration, the returns to education are within the range of 11.2-11.4%. 
The next step is to estimate the earned income equations with Provisions as a single instrument 
(Table 3.5). The IV estimation results for the models without interaction terms (columns (1) to (5)) 
show statistically significantly negative results for the ethnic minority status only in the urban 
sample; all the other samples show statistically insignificant results, but with negative signs. For 
years of education all results are statistically significantly positive. The F statistics for all samples 
exceed the threshold value of 10. For the models with interaction terms (columns (6) to (10)), the 
ethnic minority status is statistically significantly negative in all samples, except for the male 
sample. For years of education all results are again statistically significantly positive. The IV 
estimates for the interaction term are all positive and statistically significant in all samples, except 
for the male sample. The F statistics for the models with interaction term are below the threshold 
value of 7.03 only for the male sample, which renders the results for the male sample unreliable; 
this indicates that Provisions as a single instrument is invalid for instrumenting the interaction term 
for the male sample. 
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Table 3. 4  Instrumental variable estimation with one instrument (law) for earned income equations by gender and household 
registration 
Variables Dependent variable: Logarithm of earned income 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Full sample Female Male Urban Rural Full sample Female Male Urban Rural 
Second stage           
           
Minority -0.057 -0.032 -0.068 -0.071* -0.097 -2.770** -1.330** -8.397 -1.359* -1.132 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.04) (0.13) (1.19) (0.58) (10.39) (0.70) (0.70) 
Yearseduc 0.199*** 0.182*** 0.296* 0.114*** 0.523 0.198*** 0.180*** 0.389 0.112*** 0.486 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.16) (0.03) (0.34) (0.06) (0.06) (0.34) (0.03) (0.32) 
Minority*Yearseduc      0.274** 0.135** 0.825 0.105* 0.134 
      (0.12) (0.06) (1.01) (0.06) (0.09) 
First stage           
           
Law 
 
Minority*Law 
 
0.757*** 
(0.17) 
0.917*** 
(0.22) 
 
0.415* 
(0.21) 
1.040*** 
(0.24) 
0.326 
(0.22) 
 
 
1.332*** 
(0.40) 
 
 
2.372*** 
(0.67) 
 
 
0.760** 
(0.35) 
 
 
1.800*** 
(0.54) 
 
 
2.110*** 
(0.28) 
N 13851 5579 8272 8385 5466 13851 5579 8272 8385 5466 
Weak identification tests           
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic       45.212 27.962 7.992 x 47.247 4.433 x 17.216 13.791 1.014 x 21.008 2.289 x 
Endogeneity test           
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors 16.181 5.823 9.945 5.266 9.870 23.383 12.636 14.184 8.901 12.522 
Chi-square(2) P-value 0.000 0.016 0.002 0.022 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.012 0.002 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The variable Law refers to the 9-year Compulsory Education Law. Minority stands for the ethnic minority status (0/1) and Yearseduc for years of education. Robust standard 
errors (clustered on community id) are in parentheses.  x denotes that the respective test results are not qualified. 
Notes: Weak identification tests are used to test whether the instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable. When one instrument is used, there is no weak instrument problem 
when the F statistic is larger than 10. When two instruments are used, there is no weak instrument problem when the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical value is larger than 7.03 for the 5% tolerance level. The 
endogeneity test is used to test whether the instrumented explanatory variable is really endogenous; the model qualifies if the respective p-value is smaller than 0.05. All regressions control for the variables 
given in Table 3.2. For the subsamples the respective male and urban dummies are excluded from the analysis.  
 
Data source: Calculated by the authors from the CHNS, 1993–2011.
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Table 3. 5  Instrumental variable estimation with one instrument (provisions) for earned income equations by gender and 
household registration 
Variables Dependent variable: Logarithm of earned income 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Full sample Female Male Urban Rural Full sample Female Male Urban Rural 
Second stage           
           
Minority -0.062 -0.045 -0.074 -0.069* -0.108 -2.841** -1.436*** -8.707 -1.785* -0.944** 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (0.09) (1.26) (0.52) (10.43) (0.93) (0.48) 
Yearseduc 0.186*** 0.166*** 0.251*** 0.121*** 0.311*** 0.177*** 0.151*** 0.293* 0.120*** 0.287*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.03) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.16) (0.03) (0.11) 
Minority*Yearseduc      0.280** 0.144*** 0.854 0.140* 0.108* 
      (0.12) (0.05) (1.01) (0.07) (0.06) 
First stage           
           
Provisions 
 
Minority*Provisions 
 
1.066*** 
(0.19) 
1.270*** 
(0.25) 
0.720** 
(0.21) 
1.336*** 
(0.25) 
0.710*** 
(0.25) 
 
 
1.301*** 
(0.42) 
 
 
2.361*** 
(0.66) 
 
 
0.546 
(0.42) 
 
 
1.587*** 
(0.53) 
 
 
2.227*** 
(0.32) 
N 13851 5579 8272 8385 5466 13851 5579 8272 8385 5466 
Weak identification tests           
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic       83.523 50.243 22.452 71.355 19.718 26.967 25.139 0.975 x 17.125 10.103 
Endogeneity test           
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors 24.040 8.816 17.442 10.469 15.637 31.811 15.465 20.368 13.284 18.688 
Chi-square(1) P-value 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The variable Provisions refers to The Provisions on the Prohibition of Using Child Labor. Minority stands for the ethnic minority status (0/1) and Yearseduc for years of 
education. Robust standard errors (clustered on community id) are in parentheses. x denotes that the respective test results are not qualified. 
Notes: Weak identification tests are used to test whether the instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable. When one instrument is used, there is no weak instrument problem 
when the F statistic is larger than 10. When two instruments are used, there is no weak instrument problem when the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical value is larger than 7.03 for the 5% tolerance level. The 
endogeneity test is used to test whether the instrumented explanatory variable is really endogenous; the model qualifies if the respective p-value is smaller than 0.05. All regressions control for the variables 
given in Table 3.2. For the subsamples the respective male and urban dummies are excluded from the analysis. 
Data source: Calculated by the authors from the CHNS, 1993–2011. 
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On the basis of the results given in Table 3.5, we can conclude that the IV estimation results with 
interaction terms for the full, female, urban, and rural samples are the most reliable (columns (6), 
(7), (9), (10)). The results for the ethnic minority status are statistically significantly negative. The 
potential reasons for this income inequality have been mentioned in section 5.2. We find that there 
are specific returns to education for ethnic minorities. One additional year of education will 
increase earned incomes of ethnic minorities by 28% and in particular by 14.4% for women from 
an ethnic minority group. Moreover, the returns to education for ethnic minorities with urban and 
rural household registration are 14% and 10.8%, respectively.  
Regarding returns to education, we find that an additional year of education can increase earned 
incomes by 17.7-18.6% for the full sample, by 15.1-16.6% for the female sample, by 12-12.1% for 
the urban sample, and by 28.7-31.1% for the rural sample. The IV estimates are again higher than 
the OLS estimates (Table 3.2) and slightly lower than the IV estimates when the Law is considered 
as a single instrument (Table 3.4), except for the rural sample, where a weak instrument problem 
is observed when the Law is considered as a single instrument.   
We will now examine the results given in Table 3.6, where both instruments (the Law and the 
Provisions) are used. We find that there are overlapping instrumental variable effects, which means 
that the coefficients for either the Law or the Provisions are insignificant when both instruments 
are used. When four instrumental variables are used (the Law, the Provisions, and their interactions 
with the ethnic minority status), the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical value is 11.04 for the 5% 
tolerance level (Stock and Yogo 2005). Similar to the findings in Table 3.4, there are weak 
instrument problems for the male and rural samples when interaction terms are considered. This 
implies that for the rural sample, the Provisions as a single instrument for education should be used 
(Table 3.5) rather than the Law (Table 3.4) or both instruments (Table 3.6). Despite the overlapping 
instrumental variable effects, the estimation results for all the other samples are in line with 
previous findings.  
On the basis of the results given in Table 3.6, the results for the ethnic minority status are 
statistically significantly negative in the urban sample for the models without interaction term and 
in the full, female, urban, and rural samples for the models with interaction terms. The potential 
reasons for this income inequality have been mentioned in section 5.2. Furthermore, we can 
conclude that there are specific returns to education for ethnic minorities. The results show that one 
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additional year of education will increase earned incomes of ethnic minorities by 26.3% and in 
particular by 13.6% for women from an ethnic minority group and by 10.4% for ethnic minorities 
with urban household registration.  
Regarding returns to education, we find that an additional year of education can increase earned 
incomes by 17.7-18.9% for the full sample, by 15.6-17% for the female sample, and by 11.2-11.9% 
for the urban sample. 
Finally, it has to be mentioned that the IV estimator might overestimate the average marginal return 
to education because of heterogeneous effects of human capital. For example, the Law and 
Provisions might lead to higher returns to education for less-educated individuals. A one year 
increase in educational attainment is, thus, not the same at each given year of education. 
Furthermore, dummy variables that indicate whether an individual is affected or not by the Law or 
the Provisions based on the year of birth as predictor of education are imprecise, as within-year-
variation is not considered. For example, individuals who were born earlier in the year might 
terminate compulsory schooling earlier than individuals who were born later in the year. 
Additionally, the distance to tertiary education schools is not controlled for in our estimations but 
might affect whether an individual continues schooling or not. 
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Table 3. 6  Instrumental variable estimation with two instruments (law and provisions) for earned income equations by gender 
and household registration 
Variables Dependent variable: Logarithm of earned income 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Full sample Female Male Urban Rural Full sample Female Male Urban Rural 
Second stage           
           
Minority -0.061 -0.042 -0.074 -0.070* -0.109 -2.669** -1.359*** -6.289 -1.336* -0.956** 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (0.09) (1.08) (0.52) (6.22) (0.70) (0.45) 
Yearseduc 0.189*** 0.170*** 0.251*** 0.119*** 0.297*** 0.177*** 0.156*** 0.252** 0.112*** 0.273*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.02) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.12) (0.02) (0.10) 
Minority*Yearseduc      0.263** 0.136*** 0.614 0.104* 0.110* 
      (0.11) (0.05) (0.60) (0.06) (0.06) 
First stage           
           
Law 
 
Provisions 
 
Minority*Law 
 
Minority*Provisions 
0.264* 
(0.18) 
0.910*** 
(0.21) 
0.386 
(0.25) 
1.060*** 
(0.28) 
0.009 
(0.25) 
0.715*** 
(0.25) 
0.482* 
(0.26) 
1.046*** 
(0.27) 
-0.1.00 
(0.26) 
0.769*** 
(0.27) 
 
 
 
 
1.071  
(0.71) 
0.309 
(0.74) 
 
 
 
 
1.668* 
(0.98) 
0.828 
(0.91) 
 
 
 
 
0.746 
(1.083) 
-0.148 
(1.11) 
 
 
 
 
1.865* 
(0.94) 
0.108  
(0.91) 
 
 
 
 
1.037* 
(0.50) 
1.261* 
(0.47) 
N 13851 5579 8272 8385 5466 13851 5579 8272 8385 5466 
Weak identification tests           
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic       42.991 26.615 11.240 38.357 10.142 15.942 13.482 2.020 x 16.371 5.189 x 
Overidentification test           
Hansen J statistic 0.103 0.117 0.159 0.078 1.579 0.745 0.576 0.727 0.837 1.581 
Chi-square(1) P-value 0.748 0.733 0.690 0.780 0.209 0.689 0.750 0.695 0.658 0.454 
Endogeneity test           
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors 25.293 9.424 17.229 10.947 12.713 31.491 15.382 15.292 11.921 15.442 
Chi-square(1) P-value 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The variable Law refers to the 9-year Compulsory Education Law and the variable Provisions to The Provisions on the Prohibition of Using Child Labor. Minority stands for 
the ethnic minority status (0/1) and Yearseduc for years of education. Robust standard errors (clustered on community id) are in parentheses. x denotes that the respective test results are not qualified.   
Notes: Weak identification tests are used to test whether the instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable. When two instruments are used, there is no weak instrument problem 
when the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical value is larger than 7.03 for the 5% tolerance level. When four instruments are used, there is no weak instrument problem when the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical 
value is larger than 11.04 for the 5% tolerance level. The endogeneity test is used to test whether the instrumented explanatory variable is really endogenous; the model qualifies if the respective p-value is 
smaller than 0.05. All regressions control for the variables given in Table 3.2. For the subsamples the respective male and urban dummies are excluded from the analysis. 
Data source: Calculated by the authors from the CHNS, 1993–2011.
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3.6 Conclusions 
In this article, we examine the impact of education on income inequality between ethnic minorities 
and Han in China by using CHNS data over the period 1993-2011. Based on several OLS and IV 
estimations, this article enhances our understanding of the specific returns to education for ethnic 
minorities. We contribute to the existing literature by including the ethnic minority status and an 
interaction term between the ethnic minority status and years of education in Mincer’s income 
equation. We control for the endogeneity of education with institutional changes. The main 
hypothesis of our study is that returns to education might be higher for ethnic minorities with more 
education because of the scarcity of ethnic minorities with higher educational attainments in the 
Chinese labor market (Ding 2006, Hannum 1999, 2002). Institutional factors might be major 
driving forces for the higher returns to education for ethnic minorities in China. 
The OLS results show that there is statistically significant income inequality to the disadvantage 
of ethnic minorities in China. The income difference might be attributed to language and cultural 
barriers, discrimination in job access and wages, as well as pre-labor market inequalities. 
Nevertheless, the OLS results show specific returns to education for ethnic minorities for the full 
sample and for the female sample, which implies that a portion of the income gap can be overcome 
with additional education. For the full sample, an additional year of education will increase earned 
incomes for ethnic minorities by 1.6%, and for the female sample by 2%. The OLS results show 
that an additional year of education will roughly increase earned incomes by 3.8-6.3% depending 
on the sample considered.   
However, the potential endogeneity of education and the resulting simultaneous causality between 
educational attainment and earned income has to be taken into account. Therefore, we apply an IV 
approach to control for the endogeneity of education by using two instrumental variables, the 1986 
Compulsory Education Law and the 1991 Provisions on the Prohibition of Using Child Labor (see 
also Fang et al. 2012, Song 2012, Xie and Mo 2014). The endogeneity test results suggest that 
years of education is indeed an endogenous variable in all models considered, but the weak 
identification tests suggest that the Law is weakly identified in the male and rural samples and that 
the Provisions are weakly identified in the male sample; therefore, reliable conclusions can be 
drawn for the full, female, and urban samples when the Law or the Provisions are used as an 
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instrument for education and for the rural sample when the Provisions are used as an instrument 
for education.  
Our IV estimation results suggest that there exists significant income inequality to the disadvantage 
of ethnic minorities for the full, female, and urban samples when either the Law or the Provisions 
are used as an instrument for education and for the rural sample when the Provisions are used as 
an instrument for education. We find that for the full sample one additional year of education will 
increase earned incomes of ethnic minorities by 26.3-28%. In particular, one additional year of 
education will increase earned incomes by 13.5-14.4% for women from an ethnic minority group, 
by 10.4-14% for ethnic minorities with urban household registration, and by 10.8% for ethnic 
minorities with rural household registration. 
The returns to education from IV estimations show that an additional year of education can increase 
earned incomes by 17.7-19.9% for all individuals. In particular, an additional year of education can 
increase earned incomes by 15.1-18.2% for women, by 11.2-12.1% for individuals with urban 
household registration, and by 28.7-31.1% for individuals with rural household registration. The 
higher returns to education from IV estimations in comparison to OLS estimations are a common 
phenomenon in the literature (Card 1999). 
The following limitation of our study should be noted. The CHNS sample over the period 1993-
2011 includes only nine provinces so that our findings cannot be generalized for overall China 
(Gustafsson and Li 2002). The TAR and XUAR are not included in our study; yet income 
inequalities between ethnic minorities and Han in these two regions are particularly pronounced 
(Gilley 2001, Hannum and Xie 1998, Yee 2003); therefore, further regional specific studies are 
required.  
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Notes: 
1 See http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/CHN 
2 The Gini coefficient ranges from zero (perfect equality) to one (perfect inequality). 
3 See https://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china. 
4 Educational attainment depends on child characteristics (including “innate ability”), household characteristics, school 
and teacher characteristics (quality) and costs related to schooling, where school and teacher characteristics (quality) 
and prices related to schooling are both linked to education policies and local community characteristics (List and 
Rasul 2011, p. 140 based on Glewwe and Kremer 2006). 
5 In the CHNS, respondents are asked to report their earned income (annual wage) which includes the annual wage, 
bonus, and other income from the job. 
6 For a discussion on different income measures, please refer to Li and Sicular (2014). 
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Abstract 
The interdependence between alcohol and cigarette consumption has received little attention in the 
literature on consumer behavior, particularly in transition economies such as China. The available 
literature generally addresses the interdependence between alcohol and cigarette consumption by 
estimating demand systems; however, in our case data on price variation and price information for 
a specific consumer are limited. A structural equation model is applied as an alternative to estimate 
the interdependence between alcohol and cigarette consumption with absence of price variation, 
using parental consumption patterns as instrumental variables for offspring’s consumption. The 
empirical investigation is conducted by using the data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey 
(CHNS) over the period from 1993 to 2011. The results indicate that alcohol and cigarettes are 
complementary goods for men in China. When the demand for alcohol (cigarettes) increases, the 
demand for cigarettes (alcohol) will also increase, ceteris paribus. From a public health perspective 
this implies that measures for reducing alcohol or cigarette consumption might have a double 
dividend effect on health.  
Keywords: alcohol and cigarette consumption; structural model, instrumental variable; China   
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4.1 Introduction 
A number of studies have shown that extensive alcohol and cigarette consumption can lead to 
harmful health outcomes (Bazzano et al. 2007; Cochrane et al. 2003; Deng et al. 2006; Hao et al. 
2004; Ruitenberg et al. 2002), and has been increasingly recognized as a serious public health 
concern worldwide. As a consequence a number of policies have been introduced to restrict alcohol 
and cigarette consumption, particularly in developed countries. Policies aimed at reducing alcohol-
related problems include taxation, consumption restriction for the underage, and limited 
availability of alcoholic beverages. Other strategies include regulating alcohol consumption 
through drunk-driving laws and limiting alcohol promotion as well as increasing public education 
and health campaigns (Babor 2010). Similar and in some countries even heavier restrictions have 
been imposed on smoking. Smoking is banned in almost all public places in Europe, the US and 
Australia among other countries. The major reason for such restrictive measures on smoking is that 
smoking not only negatively affects smokers but also non-smokers. Since 2011 smoking has been 
officially banned in public places in China. There is, however, no comprehensive public health 
policy in China for reducing alcohol-consumption (Hao et al. 2005); for example, there is no 
official age-limit for purchasing or consuming alcohol. Alcohol use is prevalent among adolescents 
in China (X. Li et al. 1996). 
The set of policies to reduce alcohol and cigarette consumption is huge; however, the policies are 
neither equally effective in improving public health nor efficient in reducing public health costs. 
Cook and Moore (2002) argue that the most effective policy is alcohol taxation (see also Gallet, 
2007). With a meta-analysis Gallet (2007) finds significant evidence that consumers drink less 
when prices for alcoholic beverages are increased. There is a large body of empirical literature on 
alcohol and cigarette demand analysis; however, the literature almost exclusively focuses on 
developed countries. The literature on China shows that an increased price has actually a very 
limited effect on alcohol consumption (Balestrini and Gamble 2006; Ogwang and Cho 2009; Tian 
and Liu 2011). Tian and Liu (2011) estimate that in China the price elasticity for spirit is -0.12; it 
indicates that alcohol taxation might be ineffective to reduce alcohol consumption in China. 
To implement the most efficient public health policy to control alcohol and cigarette consumption, 
it is particularly important to understand the relationship between the two goods. Policy 
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implications will differ depending on whether alcohol and cigarettes are substitutes or complements 
(see Yu and Abler, 2010). A tax imposed on alcohol or cigarettes will decrease the consumption of 
both goods when they are complements; this could lead to a comparatively larger public health 
benefit. A tax imposed on alcohol (cigarettes) will increase the consumption of cigarettes (alcohol) 
when they are substitutes; this might offset a portion of the public health benefit. 
There has been an extensive literature that investigates the demand for alcohol and cigarettes. 
Separate demand functions are estimated by a number of authors such as Jones (1989); Yen (1994); 
Goel (2004); Selvanathan and Selvanathan (2004); Lance et al. (2004); Yen (2005); Harris et al. 
(2006); Tan et al. (2009); Ogwang and Cho (2009); Kasteridis et al. (2010); Bilgic et al. (2010); 
Yuan and Yen (2012); Nguyen (2012). Alcohol and cigarette consumption in a demand system 
analysis are estimated by Sharpe et al. (2001) and Su and Yen (2000). The correlation between 
alcohol and cigarette consumption is, however, not the focus in these studies. There is a limited 
number of articles that investigate the actual relationship between alcohol and cigarette 
consumption. Jones (1989b) finds that in the US alcohol and tobacco are complements by using 
quarterly expenditure data for the period 1964 to 1983. Aristei et al. (2008) and Aristei and Pieroni 
(2010) also find that alcohol and tobacco are complements for Italian households (see also Decker 
and Schwartz, 2000). Decker and Schwartz (2000) conclude that higher alcohol prices decrease 
both alcohol and cigarette consumption; this indicates a complementary relationship between the 
two commodities; meanwhile, they also find that higher cigarette prices tend to decrease smoking 
participation but increase alcohol consumption; this indicates a substitutional relationship. 
Although the research on alcohol and cigarette consumption in China has been studied, most of the 
authors analyze the two commodities separately from each other (Bishop et al. 2007; Cai and Wang 
2010; Cochrane et al. 2003; Hu et al. 2007; Kenkel et al. 2009; Pan et al. 2006; Wang et al. 2006; 
Wu 1998; Yen et al. 2009; Yuanliang and Zongyi 2005). Only one paper by Yu and Abler (2010) 
analyzes interdependencies between alcohol and cigarette consumption in rural China by using 
panel data for 10 years (1994-2003). Their results indicate that alcohol and cigarettes are 
complements; however, they observe no statistically significant effect of cigarette prices on either 
alcohol or cigarette consumption. It is suggested that taxes on alcohol might have a double dividend 
effect on health, but an increase in taxes on cigarettes might be ineffective for reducing alcohol or 
cigarette consumption in rural China (Yu and Abler 2010). 
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This paper contributes to the existing literature by investigating the interdependence between 
alcohol and cigarette consumption in China based on individual consumption data employing a 
structural equation model introduced by Tauchmann et al. (2013). In this model parent’s 
consumption patterns are used as instruments for offspring’s consumption. The data are individual 
observations from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) from 1993 to 2011; furthermore, 
the effects of major demographic variables are analyzed and policy implications are discussed. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. The next section outlines the conceptual framework 
and econometric specification. Section 3 describes the data set used in this study. Section 4 shows 
our estimation results. In the last section we present our research findings and draw conclusions. 
4.2  Conceptual framework 
4.2.1 Structural equation model 
The CHNS reports the quantities consumed of alcohol and cigarettes but provides no information 
on the actual expenditures. The available price data are only at community level. The prices of 
alcohol and cigarettes show no significant variation over the survey period and across communities. 
As a result of the data limitation, a structural equation model is employed in our analysis to consider 
insufficient price variation. Instead of specifying a conventional demand system, the analysis is 
based on a structural, interdependent model of the consumption of both commodities. The 
interdependence between alcohol and cigarette consumption is analyzed based on the quantities 
demanded. The model assumes that  
𝑄𝑎𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑎𝑄𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑎𝑖𝑡                                                  (1) 
𝑄𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑐𝑄𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑐𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑐𝑧𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐𝑖𝑡                                                    (2) 
where 𝑄𝑎𝑖𝑡 and 𝑄𝑐𝑖𝑡 stand for the quantity of alcohol and cigarettes consumed by individual i in 
year t, respectively. For equation (1) it is assumed that the demand for alcohol 𝑄𝑎𝑖𝑡 is a linear 
function of cigarette consumption 𝑄𝑐𝑖𝑡 . Control variables xit and variables that are specific for 
alcohol consumption zait are included. The coefficient 𝛼𝑎in equation (1) measures the marginal 
effect of cigarette consumption on alcohol consumption when cigarette consumption is changed by 
one unit, ceteris paribus. For equation (2) it is assumed that the demand for cigarettes 𝑄𝑐𝑖𝑡 is a 
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linear function of alcohol consumption 𝑄𝑎𝑖𝑡. Control variables xit and variables that are specific for 
cigarette consumption zcit are included. The coefficient 𝛼𝑐 in equation (2) measures the marginal 
effect of cigarette consumption on alcohol consumption, if alcohol consumption is reduced by one 
unit, ceteris paribus. 
Tauchmann et al. (2013) have demonstrated that the relationship between cross-price elasticity and 
cross-demand effect of alcohol and cigarettes has always reverse signs; this means that if the cross-
price elasticity is negative, the cross demand has a positive effect. As a result of increased demand 
for alcohol (cigarettes), the demand for cigarettes (alcohol) also increases. The goal of this paper 
is to estimate the cross-demand effect of the coefficients  𝛼𝑎 and 𝛼𝑐 and to identify the relationship 
between alcohol and cigarettes. This requires first to assess whether the quantities consumed are 
endogenous to each other. 
4.2.2 Instrumental variables 
To estimate equations (1) and (2) in their current form might lead to biased results as alcohol and 
cigarette consumption could be jointly determined. In this case an instrumental variable approach 
is commonly used. The reduced form representation for 𝑄𝑎𝑖𝑡 and 𝑄𝑐𝑖𝑡 is  
𝑄𝑎𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑎1𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑎2𝑧𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑎3𝑧𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑡                                           (3) 
𝑄𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑐1𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑐2𝑧𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑐3𝑧𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑡                                            (4) 
respectively; the coefficients from the reduced form representation for alcohol consumption are 
estimated in the following way: 
γa1 ≡
αaβc+βa
1−αaαc
,  γa2 ≡
δa
1−αaαc
, γa3 ≡
αaδc
1−αaαc
, 𝑣ait ≡
αaεcit+εait
1−γaαc
                 (5) 
The same approach applies for cigarette consumption. The interdependence between alcohol and 
cigarette consumption through instrumental variables is reflected in the alcohol and cigarette 
specific variables zait and zcit, respectively. A valid instrumental variable influences alcohol 
(cigarette) consumption without directly influencing cigarette (alcohol) consumption. It has been 
well documented that parent’s consumption behavior has significant influence on their children’s 
consumption behavior (Charles et al. 2014; Chen and Cheung 2013; Cox et al. 2000; Grawe and 
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Mulligan 2002; Melchior et al. 2010; Waldkirch et al. 2004; Wickrama et al. 1999). For example, 
Schmidt and Tauchmann (2011) find that in Germany parental drinking and smoking behavior has 
a statistically significant influence on filial drinking and smoking behavior. Alongside with the 
learning story proposed by Tauchmann et al. (2013) that children may learn smoking and drinking 
behavior from their parents, parents’ personal preferences (Charles et al. 2014; Chen and Cheung 
2013)  and biological reasons might as well play a pronounced role in offspring’s consumption 
behavior (French and Popovici 2011). For instance, Davies and Soundy (2009) conclude that there 
are several specific genes having influence on the development of nicotine dependence  based on 
the evidence from twin and family studies. The results from other research (Boardman et al. 2010; 
Loukola et al. 2014; MacKillop et al. 2010) also support this idea; they indicate that genetics play 
a substantial role in the etiology of nicotine dependence. Similarly, a number of studies have 
revealed that alcohol dehydrogenase (ADH) and aldehyde dehydrogenase (ALDH) both play a 
significant role in alcohol consumption and risk of alcoholism (Edenberg 2007; Mayfield et al. 
2008; Stickel et al. 2017; Tawa et al. 2016). Therefore, we assume that parental alcohol and 
cigarette consumption might affect filial consumption through genetic inheritance, no matter 
whether parents and children are living in the same household or not. In this way, parental drinking 
(smoking) behavior might serve as a potentially valid instrument for filial alcohol and cigarette 
consumption since they are highly correlated; moreover, parental drinking (smoking) behavior has 
less likelihood to be directly correlated with filial cigarette (alcohol) consumption, given the fact 
that there are different genes influencing alcohol and cigarette consumption, respectively.  
For the instruments to be valid, parental smoking (drinking) has, conditional on parental drinking 
(smoking) behavior, no direct effect on filial alcohol (tobacco) consumption; while this does not 
mean that the cross-correlation between parental smoking (drinking) and filial drinking (smoking) 
is zero. As the vectors zait and zcit each include two instruments of maternal consumption and 
paternal consumption that are each parameterized in terms of three “drinking” and two “smoking” 
indicators, the coefficients 𝛼𝑎 and 𝛼𝑐 are over-identified. The over-identification test is applied to 
test for possible model over-identification and validation of instruments. 
First, in the reduced form equation all possible instruments are included. An F-test is used to test 
whether the unrestricted model (including all instrumental variables) or the restricted model should 
be used. Since we have one endogenous variable and more than one instrument, the F-test for weak 
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instruments is not straightforward. When instruments are weak, point estimators will be biased, 
and the Wald test is unreliable. There are several tests recommended by Finlay and Magnusson 
(2009) allowing to have the correct size even if the instruments are weak, such as the Anderson-
Rubin (AR) test (Anderson and Rubin 1949), the Kleibergen-Moreira Lagrange Multiplier (LM) 
test (Kleibergen 2007; Moreira 2003), and the Conditional Likelihood-Ratio (CLR) test. We use 
the CLR test since it is more powerful than the AR and LM tests (Andrews et al. 2006). Second, the 
over-identification (J) test recommended by Finlay and Magnusson (2009) is applied in this study. 
Finally, the valid instruments are used in the structural model to estimate 𝛼𝑎 and 𝛼𝑐. The estimation 
results are compared and the most reliable model is selected. 
4.2.3 The econometric specification 
The estimation approach that is usually applied for such a theoretical setting is a standard IV- 
estimation. A closer look at the CHNS data (see section 3), however, reveals that the sample 
includes a large proportion of non-consumers. Zero consumption accounts for approximately 51 % 
and 56 % for alcohol and cigarettes, respectively. In our case the application of an OLS approach 
leads to inconsistent results as an OLS approach considers the actual consumption data only and 
does not consider zero consumption data. The most commonly used methods to address zero 
consumption data is proposed by Heien and Wessells (1990) and Shonkwiler and Yen (1999). They 
assume that an individual decides on his/her consumption in a two-step process. First, s/he makes 
the decision to participate (smoke and/or drink) or not. Second, s/he decides about the actual 
quantities demanded. However, the HW (Heien and Wessells) estimator is well known for lacking 
a decent basis. The drawback of the CTS (consistent two-step) estimation procedure is that a 
variable that only affects the decision to consume but not the decision on the actual quantities 
consumed is required. Tauchmann et al. (2013) have stated that it is hard to identify such a variable 
for alcohol and cigarette consumption; therefore, a Tobit model is used in our structural equations. 
Although a Tobit model follows strict assumptions6, it is a widely used model to account for zero 
consumption patterns.  
                                                 
6 It requires normal distributed errors and assumes that any variable in the model affects the participation decision and 
consumption equation with the same sign (Greene 2011). 
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To estimate the structural equation model, the instrumental variable (iv) Tobit model is applied. 
The iv-Tobit model follows a two-stage procedure. First, all coefficients θ are estimated by a Tobit 
procedure to predict 𝑄𝑎𝑖𝑡 and 𝑄𝑐𝑖𝑡. Second, the structural model is estimated by a Tobit procedure 
with the predicted regressors of 𝑄𝑎𝑖𝑡 and 𝑄𝑐𝑖𝑡. The primary objective of this article is to show the 
relationship between alcohol and cigarette consumption. The emphasis is on the signs of  𝛼𝑎 and 
𝛼𝑐.  
4.3. Data   
Data from the CHNS are used in this article. The survey begins in 1989 with a sample of 
approximately 4,400 households with a total of approximately 16,000 individuals. Follow-up 
surveys conducted in 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011. The CHNS has a multi-
stage random cluster design and surveys people from nine provinces in China (Liaoning, 
Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, and Guizhou) for the years from 
1989 to 2011, as well as from three municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing) for the year 
2011 as shown in the map in Figure 4.1. The twelve regions considered vary in terms of their 
economic development, public resources, and geographic features among other factors. Alongside 
with health and nutrition related questions, the CHNS captures a wide range of socioeconomic 
characteristics.  
Since 1993 the survey covers a number of questions on consumers’ drinking and smoking 
behaviors. Regarding the drinking behavior, the respondents are asked “Did you drink beer or any 
other alcoholic beverage last year?”, and “How often did you drink beer or any alcoholic 
beverage?” Individuals who drank any alcoholic beverage last year were further required to report 
the types of each alcoholic beverage (beer, grape wine including various colored wines, rice wine, 
and liquor) and quantities (bottle for beer, Liang (Chinese ounce) or 50g for other alcoholic 
beverages) of alcoholic beverages consumed in each typical drinking week in the previous year. 
To calculate the quantity of pure alcohol consumed, we follow the measurement recommended by 
Li et al. (2011). The percent of pure alcohol is 4 % for beer, 52 % for liquor, and 10 % for wine; 
moreover, the beer bottle volume is set at 640 ml, which is most common in China. The questions 
on consumers’ cigarette consumption include “Have you ever smoked cigarettes?”, if respondents 
have answered “Yes”, they are further asked “Do you still smoke cigarettes now?” and “How 
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many cigarettes do you smoke per day”. Based on these questions, we can define an individual as 
an ex-smoker or a current smoker. 
 
Figure 4.  1Map of Survey Regions 
The darker shaded regions in this map are the provinces in which the survey has been conducted. 
Source: http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china/about/proj_desc/chinamap 
 
As aforementioned, parental alcohol and cigarette consumption behaviors serve as essential 
instruments in our analysis. In the CHNS each individual has his/her own ID as well as his/her 
parental IDs; thus, we can match individuals’ consumption with parents’ consumption using the 
parental-child identifiers to select a sample consisting of parents-offspring pairs. In other words, 
matching here means that the sample is confined to families for which two generations participate 
in the CHNS but who not necessarily live in the same household. As aforementioned, the CHNS is 
not a fixed point survey; therefore, it is strongly unbalanced, especially when matching the 
children’s information with parents’ information. As indicated in similar studies, researchers who 
use the CHNS data commonly conduct pooled estimations and control for time fixed effects instead 
of considering a panel structure  (Qin, Wang, and Zhuang 2016; Eriksson, Pan, and Qin 2014; 
Dolton and Xiao 2015); thus, this procedure is also used in our analysis. 
The WHO reports that men are more likely to consume alcohol in China than women; 
approximately 58 % and 29 % of Chinese men and women consume alcohol, respectively. The 
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WHO also informs that there are more than 300 million smokers in China, which accounts for 
almost one-third of the world’s total. The Global Adult Tobacco Survey (GATS) states that 
approximately one-third (28.1 %) of the Chinese population smoked in 2010, including 52.9 % 
men and 2.4 % women (WHO 2010). The proportion of female smokers is also very low in our 
sample; it accounts for roughly 1.59 %.  
This lack of variation for female consumers pertains us from drawing reliable conclusions. A 
pooled male and female sample might also disguise the true relationship of alcohol consumption 
and other socio-demographic and economic factors (Yen et al. 2009). It seems that alcohol and 
cigarette consumption is more a male’s behavior in China; therefore, this paper focuses on adult 
men’s alcohol and cigarette consumption. We restrict our sample to men older than sixteen years 
of age. After merging all other variables regarding individuals’ demographic, socio-economic and 
household background information, the sample consists of 6,124 individuals. 
The definitions and summary statistics of all variables used in our study are presented in Table 4.1. 
The dependent variables are the quantities consumed of alcohol (𝑄𝑎𝑖𝑡) and cigarettes (𝑄𝑐𝑖𝑡). In the 
total sample, men consumed on average 6.79 gram of pure alcohol per week and 5.93 cigarettes 
per day. Among the men who reported to consume, the average amounts consumed are 14.58 grams 
of pure alcohol per week and 13.50 cigarettes per day. The probability that men consume alcohol 
(cigarettes) is 49 % (44 %), respectively, in our sample. The relatively large proportion of non-
consumption in the sample is accounted for to avoid estimation bias (see section 2.3).  
Parental alcohol and cigarette consumption are chosen as specific variables for filial alcohol and 
cigarette consumption, respectively (see section 2.2). To avoid unobserved heterogeneity, a set of 
indicators is used to identify parents’ alcohol and cigarette consumption7, instead of using the 
actual amounts of parental alcohol and cigarette consumption (Table 4.1). 8  The descriptive 
statistics show that 90 % of mothers reported no alcohol consumption in the previous year; 2 %, 
4 % and 5 % reported to have consumed alcohol daily, weekly and monthly, respectively. The 
                                                 
7 In terms of parental drinking behavior, parents who drink alcohol almost every day are defined as daily consumers; 
parents who drink alcohol three to four times a week or once or twice a week are defined as weekly consumers; parents 
who drink alcohol once or twice a month or no more than once a month are defined as monthly consumers.  
8 We use the indicators because when using the actual amount of parental alcohol and cigarette consumption as 
instruments, most of the over-identification tests are rejected; this indicates that the actual amount of parental alcohol 
and cigarette consumption are actually correlated with the unobserved factors of the disturbances in structural equations. 
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alcohol consumption figures are higher for fathers compared with those for mothers. The 
descriptive statistics show that 38 % of fathers reported no alcohol consumption in the previous 
year; approximately 25 % are daily consumers; 22 %, and 15 % reported to have consumed alcohol 
weekly and monthly, respectively. The cigarette consumption data show similar patterns. Among 
the mothers 95 % never smoked, 1 % smoked in the past, and 4 % still smoke. Among the fathers 
34 % never smoke, 8 % smoked in the past, and 58 % still smoke. 
The individual consumer control variables consist of age, age squared, marital status, and the 
highest education level of father and mother. A set of regional dummies that distinguish between 
residences in different provinces and urban versus rural controls are used. Year dummies are 
included to control for the time fixed effects (section 2.1) because the available panel structure is 
strongly unbalanced.(see also Dolton and Xiao 2015; Eriksson et al. 2014; Qin et al. 2016). The 
other variables often controlled for include labor market status, education, number of children, 
current living situation and income (Su and Yen 2000; Yen 2005), which are excluded by 
Tauchmann et al. (2013) due to their potential endogeneity. However, the intergenerational impact 
of parents on their offspring might be mainly through family income and education (Blanden et al. 
2007; Chen and Cheung 2013; Restuccia and Urrutia 2004). In order to avert unobserved 
heterogeneity and reverse causality invalidating our instruments, we also control for education, 
occupational status, and household income as a comparison to check the robustness of our 
estimation results. 
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Table 4. 1  Descriptive statistics of the main variables 
Variable Definition Mean Std.Dev. 
Quantity of pure alcohol Amount of pure alcohol consumed per week (gram) 6.79 12.87 
 Among the consuming 14.58 15.56 
Quantity of cigarettes Number of cigarettes consumed per day 5.93 8.08 
 Among the consuming 13.50 6.82 
Drink Probability of alcohol consumption 0.49 0.50 
Smoke Probability of cigarette consumption 0.44 0.50 
    
Parental consumption    
Father’s alcohol consumption    
 Father never drinks (base)  0.38 0.49 
 Father is a daily drinker 0.25 0.43 
 Father is a weekly drinker 0.22 0.42 
 Father is a monthly drinker 0.15 0.35 
Mother’s alcohol consumption    
 Mother never drinks (base)  0.90 0.31 
 Mother is a daily drinker 0.02 0.14 
 Mother is a weekly drinker 0.04 0.18 
 Mother is a monthly drinker 0.05 0.22 
Father’s cigarette consumption    
 Father never smokes (base) 0.34 0.48 
 Father ever smoked  0.08 0.27 
 Father still smokes 0.58 0.49 
Mother’s cigarette consumption    
 Mother never smokes (base) 0.95 0.22 
 Mother ever smoked 0.01 0.08 
 Mother still smokes 0.04 0.20 
Control variables    
Age Age in year 26.03 7.60 
Age squared Age square 735.50 465.00 
Married Married (0/1) 0.41 0.49 
Education father Father’s highest education level  1.53 1.26 
Education mother Mother’s highest education level 0.98 1.18 
Education Highest education level 2.44 1.18 
Presently working Presently working? (0/1) 0.76 0.43 
Logarithm of income Logarithm of household income 9.67 1.13 
Urban Lives in urban area (0/1) 0.28 0.45 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CHNS samples. In total, we have 6124 observations. The mean values are reported for 
continuous variables and the percentages for discrete variables. 
Notes:  
a : Individuals who drink alcohol almost every day are defined as daily consumers; individuals who drink alcohol three to four times 
a week or once or twice a week are defined as weekly consumers; individuals who drink alcohol once or twice a month or no more 
than once a month are defined as monthly consumers. 
b: Education refers to the highest education level, there are seven categories defined as: 0, no school; 1, graduated from primary 
school; 2, lower middle school degree; 3, upper middle school degree; 4, technical or vocational degree; 5, university or college 
degree; 6, master’s degree or higher. The same definition for the Education father and Education mother. 
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4.4 Estimation results  
First, the significance of the instruments in the reduced form Tobit specification as given in 
equations (3) and (4) is tested (Table 4.2). Second, the standard and instrumental Tobit model 
specifications for both equations are compared (Tables 4.3 and 4.4).  
4.4.1 Reduced form results for the Tobit specification 
Maternal and paternal alcohol and cigarette consumption data are employed as instruments in the 
reduced form estimations (Table 4.2). Column (1)-(4) and (5)-(8) show the results for alcohol and 
cigarette consumption, respectively. In the aggregate, there is a positive correlation between a son’s 
alcohol and cigarette consumption and his parent’s consumption. Our estimation results are robust 
with different model specifications. 
For alcohol consumption as shown in columns (1)-(4), the coefficients for parental smoking 
behavior are statistically significantly positive in all model specifications. Parent’s prior smoking 
behavior has no statistically significant effects but parent’s current smoking behaviors have 
significant cross-effects on sons’ alcohol consumption. The results show that parents who consume 
alcohol positively affect their son’s alcohol consumption. Specifically, paternal alcohol 
consumption has a comparatively stronger effect on a son’s alcohol consumption than has maternal 
alcohol consumption. The F-test that the instruments are jointly zero is rejected (F-statistic is 
approximately 20) for all model specifications; this implies that parental alcohol consumption 
behavior is highly correlated with a son’s alcohol consumption (𝑄𝑎𝑖𝑡). The results also show a 
statistically significantly positive cross correlation between parental current cigarettes consumption 
and their son’s alcohol consumption. In order to reassess the validity of instruments, an over-
identification test has been conducted in the structural Tobit estimation.  
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Table 4. 2  Tobit reduced form estimation for alcohol and cigarette consumption 
 Amount of pure alcohol (𝑄𝑎𝑖𝑡)  Amount of cigarettes (𝑄𝑐𝑖𝑡) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Father is a daily drinker 10.149*** 10.147*** 10.064*** 9.907***  1.476*** 1.553*** 1.498*** 1.426** 
 (0.91) (0.91) (0.91) (0.90)  (0.57) (0.56) (0.56) (0.56) 
Father is a weekly drinker 10.792*** 10.794*** 10.690*** 10.612***  1.041* 1.018* 0.934 0.900 
 (0.88) (0.88) (0.88) (0.87)  (0.58) (0.58) (0.58) (0.57) 
Father is a monthly drinker 6.840*** 6.837*** 7.010*** 6.995***  -0.289 -0.184 -0.064 -0.063 
 (0.85) (0.85) (0.86) (0.85)  (0.67) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) 
Mother is a daily drinker 10.628*** 10.626*** 10.642*** 10.654***  2.315 2.386* 2.375* 2.394* 
 (2.19) (2.19) (2.20) (2.21)  (1.43) (1.42) (1.42) (1.42) 
Mother is a weekly drinker 5.896*** 5.898*** 5.872*** 5.781***  1.899* 1.836 1.805 1.782 
 (1.69) (1.69) (1.69) (1.69)  (1.13) (1.12) (1.12) (1.12) 
Mother is a monthly drinker 9.814*** 9.816*** 9.998*** 9.854***  1.541* 1.486 1.546* 1.485* 
 (1.33) (1.33) (1.33) (1.32)  (0.92) (0.91) (0.90) (0.90) 
Father ever smoked 1.033 1.038 0.882 0.842  2.907*** 2.752*** 2.598*** 2.584*** 
 (1.16) (1.16) (1.16) (1.16)  (0.86) (0.85) (0.85) (0.85) 
Father still smokes   1.189* 1.195* 1.184* 1.200*  4.348*** 4.121*** 4.114*** 4.110*** 
 (0.69) (0.69) (0.69) (0.69)  (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) 
Mother ever smoked 6.774 6.786 6.860 6.354  2.867 2.505 2.596 2.353 
 (4.77) (4.77) (4.75) (4.75)  (2.48) (2.46) (2.48) (2.48) 
Mother still smokes 3.251** 3.258** 3.267** 3.337**  4.134*** 3.938*** 3.912*** 3.955*** 
 (1.65) (1.65) (1.65) (1.64)  (0.96) (0.96) (0.95) (0.95) 
Age 2.944*** 2.941*** 2.589*** 2.596***  2.622*** 2.697*** 2.441*** 2.441*** 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)  (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) 
Age Squared -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.031*** -0.031***  -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 3.865*** 3.867*** 3.627*** 3.433***  1.805*** 1.767*** 1.549*** 1.473*** 
 (0.75) (0.75) (0.75) (0.75)  (0.52) (0.52) (0.52) (0.52) 
Education mother -0.077 -0.084 -0.034 -0.135  -0.904*** -0.661*** -0.631** -0.682*** 
 (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34)  (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
Education father 0.065 0.056 0.085 -0.028  -0.139 0.123 0.147 0.096 
 (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30)  (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Urban 2.289*** 2.265*** 2.639*** 2.399***  -0.215 0.522 0.835 0.722 
 (0.76) (0.79) (0.79) (0.79)  (0.51) (0.53) (0.53) (0.53) 
Education  0.043 0.017 -0.209   -1.361*** -1.375*** -1.475*** 
  (0.31) (0.31) (0.32)   (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Presently working   4.554*** 3.928***    3.567*** 3.271*** 
   (0.82) (0.83)    (0.57) (0.58) 
Logarithm of income    1.563***     0.718*** 
    (0.41)     (0.26) 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -65.274*** -65.306*** -63.283*** -75.460***  -43.286*** -42.083*** -40.804*** -46.356*** 
 (4.98) (4.99) (4.98) (6.05)  (3.64) (3.65) (3.60) (4.15) 
N 6124 6124 6124 6124  6124 6124 6124 6124 
F-statistic 21.471 20.840 20.805 20.344  34.317 34.502 35.685 34.882 
Pseudo-R2 0.033 0.033 0.035 0.035  0.035 0.036 0.038 0.038 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regional controls include dummies for Chongqing (reference), Beijing, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou. Time controls include year dummies for 1993 (reference), 1997, 2000, 
2004, 2006, 2009, 2011.  
Source: Authors’ estimations based on CHNS samples. 
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The columns (5)-(8) show the reduced Tobit estimation for cigarette consumption. Parents’ 
drinking behavior shows statistically significantly positive effects on a son’s cigarette consumption. 
Paternal smoking behavior has a stronger influence than maternal smoking behavior on a son’s 
cigarette consumption. When the father has ever smoked or is still smoking, the predicted amount 
of cigarettes consumed by a son are approximately three to four additional cigarettes compared to 
children whose fathers never smoked. The F-test that the instruments are jointly zero is rejected 
(F-statistic is approximately 35) for all models; this implies that the instruments are highly relevant 
to explain a son’s cigarette consumption. The cross effects of parental alcohol consumption show 
statistically significant influence on a son’s cigarette consumption, specifically, if the father or the 
mother is a daily drinker.  
With regards to the control variables, there is a statistically significant age effect. A higher level of 
age statistically significantly increases the probability to consume alcohol and cigarettes until the 
effect decreases after a threshold indicated by a declining age-square coefficient. Tauchmann et al. 
(2013) and Yen et al. (2009) find similar results. It is also found that married individuals are more 
likely to consume alcohol and cigarettes than unmarried individuals; Yen et al. (2009) observe 
similar findings for China. The level of parental education is also controlled for in the analysis. 
Paternal education has no statistically significant effect on a son’s alcohol and cigarette 
consumption. In contrast, maternal education shows a statistically significant negative effect on a 
son’s cigarette consumption. The descriptive statistics indicate that the maternal education level is 
still very low; the average education level of mothers in our sample is below primary school. This 
means that maternal education can still be improved; this might even be a very efficient way to 
reduce filial cigarette consumption. Whether the individual lives in urban or rural area shows no 
statistically significant impact on cigarette consumption, while it indicates that urban residents 
drink alcohol more than do rural residents.  
In the view of the additional control variables of education, occupation and income, we find that 
education has a negative impact on alcohol and cigarette consumption but is not statistically 
significant for alcohol consumption; while occupation and income both show a statistically 
significantly positive impact on alcohol and cigarette consumption. As aforementioned education, 
occupation and income might be potentially endogenous. We should, thus, be cautious when 
interpreting the coefficients for these variables.  
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4.4.2 Estimation results for the structural Tobit model 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 present the estimation results for the structural equations with and without the 
instrumental variables. A son’s cigarette (𝑄𝑐𝑖𝑡) and alcohol consumption (𝑄𝑎𝑖𝑡) are instrumented 
with the indicators of parental cigarette and alcohol consumption, respectively. As the control 
variables in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 have largely the same magnitude and signs as in the reduced form 
specification, the further discussion will focus on 𝛼𝑎 and 𝛼𝑐.  
The coefficients of 𝑄𝑐𝑖𝑡 show statistically significant positive effects on alcohol consumption in 
both models. Although the coefficients from the instrumental Tobit model (Table 4.4) are slightly 
higher than those from the regular Tobit estimation (Table 4.3), they have the same signs. The 
findings suggest that smoking increases not only the probability but also the propensity to drink. 
Nevertheless, a weak instrument test and the over-identification test need to be applied to verify 
the estimation results. All the specific variables of parental alcohol consumption are highly 
significant as in the Tobit reduced form estimation. The null hypothesis that all instruments are 
jointly zero in the first stage is significantly rejected as it is shown with the F-statistics (larger than 
20). Moreover, we find that there is no weak instruments problem in our estimation using the CLR 
test. The P-value indicates that the estimates of 𝑄𝑐𝑖𝑡 and 𝑄𝑎𝑖𝑡 are highly significant (at the 5 % level) 
in various model specifications for alcohol and cigarette consumption. 
The over-identification test in the second stage is not rejected for all the model specifications; this 
implies that either one or more of our instruments are valid or that our structural model is specified 
correctly; therefore, the estimates from the instrumental Tobit model are consistent, though the 
estimations from the regular Tobit model are likely to have smaller standard errors. The results 
from the instrumental estimation show that when cigarette consumption is reduced by one cigarette, 
the estimated alcohol consumption tends to decrease by approximately 0.8 gram per week for men 
in China.  
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Table 4. 3  Tobit estimation for alcohol and cigarette consumption 
 Amount of pure alcohol (𝑄𝑎𝑖𝑡)  Amount of cigarettes (𝑄𝑐𝑖𝑡) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Quantity of cigarettes 0.783*** 0.790*** 0.783*** 0.778***      
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)      
Quantity of pure alcohol      0.277*** 0.276*** 0.273*** 0.271*** 
      (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Father is a daily drinker 9.480*** 9.467*** 9.410*** 9.291***      
 (0.85) (0.85) (0.84) (0.84)      
Father is a weekly drinker 10.366*** 10.393*** 10.315*** 10.260***      
 (0.82) (0.82) (0.82) (0.82)      
Father is a monthly drinker 6.952*** 6.917*** 7.062*** 7.053***      
 (0.81) (0.81) (0.81) (0.81)      
Mother is a daily drinker 9.859*** 9.830*** 9.865*** 9.880***      
 (2.06) (2.07) (2.08) (2.08)      
Mother is a weekly drinker 5.625*** 5.649*** 5.620*** 5.540***      
 (1.65) (1.65) (1.65) (1.65)      
Mother is a monthly drinker 9.561*** 9.593*** 9.746*** 9.629***      
 (1.24) (1.24) (1.24) (1.24)      
Father ever smoked      2.876*** 2.728*** 2.590*** 2.578*** 
      (0.82) (0.82) (0.81) (0.81) 
Father still smokes        4.163*** 3.952*** 3.939*** 3.931*** 
      (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) 
Mother ever smoked      1.712 1.361 1.465 1.305 
      (2.56) (2.54) (2.56) (2.56) 
Mother still smokes      3.772*** 3.578*** 3.561*** 3.591*** 
      (0.94) (0.94) (0.93) (0.93) 
Age 2.176*** 2.132*** 1.853*** 1.863***  2.301*** 2.375*** 2.149*** 2.152*** 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24)  (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Age Squared -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.022***  -0.031*** -0.033*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 3.159*** 3.188*** 3.005*** 2.849***  1.347*** 1.310*** 1.117** 1.067** 
 (0.72) (0.72) (0.73) (0.72)  (0.51) (0.51) (0.51) (0.51) 
Mother’s highest education level 0.296 0.197 0.233 0.147  -0.893*** -0.656*** -0.628*** -0.664*** 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33)  (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) 
Father’s highest education level 0.076 -0.037 -0.014 -0.105  -0.142 0.115 0.136 0.100 
 (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)  (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Urban 2.491*** 2.168*** 2.474*** 2.279***  -0.541 0.171 0.459 0.387 
 (0.72) (0.75) (0.76) (0.75)  (0.49) (0.50) (0.51) (0.51) 
Education  0.585* 0.560* 0.371   -1.326*** -1.337*** -1.405*** 
  (0.30) (0.31) (0.31)   (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Presently working   3.749*** 3.241***    3.227*** 3.026*** 
   (0.78) (0.79)    (0.55) (0.56) 
Logarithm of income    1.280***     0.489* 
    (0.40)     (0.25) 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -57.444*** -57.736*** -56.224*** -66.227***  -38.240*** -37.070*** -35.998*** -39.831*** 
 (4.71) (4.71) (4.73) (5.80)  (3.49) (3.50) (3.46) (4.03) 
N 6124 6124 6124 6124  6124 6124 6124 6124 
F-statistic 29.495 28.563 28.146 27.376  54.900 53.845 54.326 52.383 
Pseudo-R2 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.049  0.047 0.048 0.050 0.050 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regional controls include dummies for Chongqing (reference), Beijing, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou. Time controls include year dummies for 1993 (reference), 1997, 2000, 
2004, 2006, 2009, 2011.  
Source: Authors’ estimations based on CHNS samples. 
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Table 4. 4  Tobit structural model estimation for alcohol and cigarette consumption 
 Amount of pure alcohol (𝑄𝑎𝑖𝑡)  Amount of cigarettes (𝑄𝑐𝑖𝑡) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Quantity of cigarettes 0.803** 0.851** 0.845** 0.851**      
 (0.31) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33)      
Quantity of pure alcohol      0.311*** 0.314*** 0.303*** 0.295*** 
      (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Father is a daily drinker 9.453*** 9.392*** 9.334*** 9.206***      
 (0.86) (0.87) (0.87) (0.86)      
Father is a weekly drinker 10.347*** 10.350*** 10.272*** 10.213***      
 (0.83) (0.83) (0.83) (0.83)      
Father is a monthly drinker 6.948*** 6.914*** 7.057*** 7.049***      
 (0.92) (0.92) (0.92) (0.92)      
Mother is a daily drinker 9.827*** 9.738*** 9.772*** 9.770***      
 (2.01) (2.02) (2.01) (2.01)      
Mother is a weekly drinker 5.605*** 5.599*** 5.569*** 5.482***      
 (1.53) (1.54) (1.54) (1.53)      
Mother is a monthly drinker 9.544*** 9.555*** 9.705*** 9.584***      
 (1.27) (1.27) (1.27) (1.27)      
Father ever smoked      2.857*** 2.707*** 2.575*** 2.566*** 
      (0.80) (0.79) (0.79) (0.79) 
Father still smokes        4.114*** 3.898*** 3.897*** 3.897*** 
      (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) 
Mother ever smoked      1.553 1.185 1.327 1.201 
      (2.47) (2.46) (2.45) (2.45) 
Mother still smokes      3.683*** 3.479*** 3.483*** 3.527*** 
      (1.01) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) 
Age 2.154*** 2.066*** 1.792*** 1.791***  2.266*** 2.336*** 2.121*** 2.129*** 
 (0.39) (0.42) (0.40) (0.40)  (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Age Squared -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.021***  -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 3.137*** 3.130*** 2.949*** 2.787***  1.282** 1.237** 1.062** 1.025** 
 (0.78) (0.79) (0.78) (0.78)  (0.52) (0.52) (0.52) (0.52) 
Mother’s highest education level 0.305 0.217 0.254 0.173  -0.892*** -0.656*** -0.629*** -0.663*** 
 (0.36) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35)  (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) 
Father’s highest education level 0.077 -0.043 -0.021 -0.111  -0.147 0.108 0.131 0.098 
 (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)  (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Urban 2.497*** 2.165*** 2.465*** 2.272***  -0.564 0.142 0.433 0.368 
 (0.72) (0.73) (0.74) (0.74)  (0.50) (0.51) (0.52) (0.52) 
Education  0.629 0.606 0.428   -1.320*** -1.333*** -1.398*** 
  (0.38) (0.38) (0.40)   (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Presently working   3.682*** 3.172***    3.188*** 3.003*** 
   (0.85) (0.85)    (0.55) (0.55) 
Logarithm of income    1.256***     0.467* 
    (0.38)     (0.26) 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -57.214*** -57.157*** -55.675*** -65.403***  -37.821*** -36.608*** -35.656*** -39.378*** 
 (5.69) (5.72) (5.62) (6.70)  (3.54) (3.53) (3.51) (4.18) 
N 6124 6124 6124 6124  6124 6124 6124 6124 
Weak instrument robust tests CLR 
(P-values) 
0.017 0.018 0.019 0.018  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Test for over-identifying 
restriction (P-values) 
0.248 0.235 0.228 0.261  0.731 0.768 0.799 0.806 
Notes: Two-step standard errors are in parentheses. Regional controls include dummies for Chongqing (reference), Beijing, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou. Time controls include year dummies for 1993 (reference), 1997, 2000, 
2004, 2006, 2009, 2011.  
Source: Authors’ estimations based on CHNS samples.
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The estimation results for cigarette consumption with and without instrumental variables are given 
in columns (5)-(8) of Tables 4.3 and 44, respectively. The coefficients for 𝑄𝑎𝑖𝑡 from the regular 
and instrumental Tobit estimations are statistically significant and have positive signs. The over-
identification test in the second stage is not rejected at the conventional level of significance; this 
suggests that the instrumental variables of parental cigarette consumption are jointly valid 
instruments; thus, the estimations from the instrumental Tobit model are consistent. When an 
individual consumes one gram of alcohol less, the predicted amount of cigarettes he consumes is 
likely to reduce by almost 0.3 cigarette per day.  
It is highlighted in section 2 that the relationship between cross-price elasticity and cross-demand 
effects of alcohol and cigarettes has always reverse signs. Unlike Yu and Abler 's (2010) findings 
that alcohol and cigarettes are complements but not vice versa, in our estimation cross-demand 
effects 𝛼𝑎  and 𝛼𝑐  are both positive; hence, cigarettes and alcohol are complements for men in 
China, and vice versa. When the demand for alcohol (cigarettes) increases, the demand for 
cigarettes (alcohol) will also increase, ceteris paribus. From a public health perspective this implies 
that measures for reducing alcohol or cigarette consumption might have a double dividend effect 
on health. 
4.5. Conclusion 
Harmful influences of smoking and drinking have been increasingly recognized as serious public 
health concerns. An efficient public health policy that seeks to minimize citizens’ burden and to 
maximize welfare gains should consider the relationship between alcohol and cigarette 
consumption. Due to insufficient price variation, the approach starting with a structural equation 
model that was introduced by Tauchmann et al. (2013) is used in this study to better understand 
the relationship between alcohol and cigarette consumption in China. The empirical estimation 
conducted for men older than 16 years of age uses data from the CHNS covering the period from 
1993 to 2011. A structural Tobit model is employed to address the censoring of the data. To account 
for the potential endogeneity of alcohol and cigarette consumption in the structural estimation, 
parents’ consumption behaviors are used as instruments for sons’ alcohol and cigarette 
consumption, respectively.  
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The main finding of our research is that alcohol and cigarettes are complementary goods for men 
in China. When the demand for alcohol (cigarettes) increases, the demand for cigarettes (alcohol) 
will also increase, ceteris paribus. This implies that a positive health effect could be achieved if 
only one of the two commodities is targeted with health measures, for example through a tax. This 
kind of positive health effect is often referred to as a double dividend health effect, or in a more 
popular vernacular, it is a health measure that could “kill two birds with one stone”.  
The results also indicate that parental alcohol and cigarette consumption has a significantly positive 
influence on a son’s alcohol and cigarette consumption, respectively. This suggests that parental 
alcohol and cigarette consumption behavior serves as a valid instrument for filial alcohol and 
cigarette consumption behavior if endogeneity is observed. Another interesting finding is that 
maternal education has a statistically significant effect on filial cigarette consumption. Any policy 
that seeks to improve women’s education in China might be helpful for reducing filial cigarette 
consumption. 
Finally, it can be concluded that the structural model serves as an excellent alternative if only 
consumption data are available. A limitation of this study is the comparatively small sample size; 
this stems from the fact that individual and parental data are merged. Further studies with other 
data sources are required to verify our results. To provide more elaborate policy recommendations, 
it might be fruitful in future studies to analyze the relationship between socio-economic factors and 
harmful health behavior, particularly due to China’s rapid economic shift over the last decades and 
the respective change in consumption behavior.  
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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of education on unhealthy consumption behaviors and their 
intergenerational persistence, using data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). 
After identifying a statistically significant positive correlation between filial and parental unhealthy 
consumption behaviors, an instrumental model is employed to account for the endogeneity of 
education in unhealthy consumption equations. We find that education has a negative impact on 
unhealthy consumption for all individuals considered in the sample. Specifically, an additional year 
of education decreases the probability of smoking, drinking, and binge drinking by 3.4%, 2.8%, 
and 1.8%, respectively. We also find that an additional year of education can counteract 
intergenerational persistence of smoking and binge drinking from the father, but that it has no 
impact on intergenerational persistence from the mother. In addition, we observe no impact of 
education on the intergenerational persistence of drinking from both parents. 
Keywords: unhealthy consumption, intergenerational persistence, education, China 
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5.1 Introduction 
Cigarette smoking and alcohol consumption are two crucial behaviors that can negatively affect 
health and longevity (Bazzano et al. 2007; Deng et al. 2006; Hao et al. 2004; Ruitenberg et al. 
2002). The Chinese government is increasingly concerned about the public health burden that arises 
from cigarette smoking and alcohol consumption. National legislators have begun to actively 
consider national bans on smoking in public and work places as well as on cigarette advertising. 
Nevertheless, tobacco control in China has remained particularly cumbersome because of the 
tobacco industry. There are over 300 million cigarette smokers in China who consume roughly 
one-third of the world’s cigarettes (WHO, 2015); 1.4 million people in China die annually from 
smoking-related diseases, and this number is expected to rise to over 3 million by 2050 if current 
smoking rates will continue (Yang et al. 2015). 
Alcohol consumption is another harmful health-related behavior. It is increasing faster in China 
than it is in other countries and shows a steady rise (Cochrane et al. 2003; Hao et al. 2005). The 
2007 national survey of alcohol consumption has revealed that in China 55.6% of men and 15.0% 
of women were frequent alcohol consumers (Li et al. 2011)9. Alcohol use disorders (AUDs)10 have 
become a frequent problem linked to disturbances in mental and physical health (Tang et al., 2013). 
Precisely, the AUD rates in China are 9.3% and 0.2% among men and women, respectively; this is 
comparatively larger than it is in other countries (WHO 2014).  
To control and better understand the determinants of cigarette smoking and alcohol consumption, 
a large number of studies have been conducted. These studies mainly focus on the impact of social 
demographic variables, such as income, on cigarette smoking and alcohol consumption. 
Furthermore, the impact of price on an individuals’ unhealthy consumption behavior has been 
extensively studied (Bishop et al. 2007; Tian and Liu 2011; X. Yu and Abler 2010). Bishop et al. 
(2007) find that price elasticity for cigarettes is approximately -0.5; however, income is less likely 
to affect cigarette smoking as the income elasticity is quite low ranging between 0.003 and 0.038. 
Yu and Abler (2010) find that neither price nor income have statistically significant impacts on 
cigarette smoking. Regarding alcohol consumption in China, Tian and Liu (2011) conclude that 
                                                 
9 They consider drinking on 5-7 days per week as frequent drinking. 
10 AUDs encompass harmful patterns of drinking such as alcohol dependence and abuse.  
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price has no significant impact since the price elasticity is virtually zero for beer and only −0.12 
for liquor. Yen et al. (2009) also find that income does not affect alcohol consumption for men 
while sociodemographic factors such as education, employment, and marital status play a 
significant role. 
Moreover, previous studies suggest that parental consumption behavior may also influence filial 
consumption behavior (Charles et al. 2014; Melchior et al. 2010; Waldkirch et al. 2004, 2004; 
Wickrama et al. 1999). Regarding cigarette smoking and alcohol consumption the empirical results 
are mixed. Some studies find a positive correlation between parental and filial alcohol consumption 
(Schmidt and Tauchmann 2011; Waldkirch et al. 2004), while others find no significant correlation 
(J. Yu 2003). Alternatively, filial consumption behavior might either depend on the maternal or on 
the paternal consumption behavior. Francesconi et al. (2010) find that a young adult who lives with 
an unmarried mother has a higher smoking propensity. Gundy (2002) finds that alcohol 
consumption is higher among children whose mothers typically drink approximately three or more 
drinks daily or who drink on a weekly basis, while fathers’ alcohol consumption only positively 
influence sons’ drinking behavior. The studies suggest that parental consumption behavior 
influences filial health outcomes; nevertheless, it has largely been ignored in the literature on China. 
If there exists a higher correlation of unhealthy consumption behaviors between generations, how 
could offspring be efficiently prevented from their parental unhealthy consumption behaviors? It 
has been found that education as a form of human capital investment can improve cognitive skills 
and enhance positive health behavior (Berger and Leigh 1989; Kenkel 1991). Some studies have 
revealed that education has a negative effect on the probability of smoking or on binge drinking 
(Cowell 2006; Jensen and Lleras-Muney 2012; Kemptner et al. 2011; Nayga 1999). However, other 
studies cannot provide evidence that education causes better health behavior (Reinhold and Jurges 
2010; Xie and Mo 2014; Zhong 2015). 
Our hypothesis is that education may discourage offspring from maintaining parental unhealthy 
habits such as smoking and drinking since higher educated people are more aware of the harmful 
consequences of unhealthy consumption. To the best of our knowledge, the impact of education on 
the intergenerational persistence of unhealthy consumption has not been studied so far.   
A reverse relationship between education and health has been indicated, as positive health behavior 
could also affect the demand for education (Currie and Hyson 1999) and school performance. Zhao 
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et al. (2012) find that smoking among teenagers can reduce their learning productivity. Based on 
mathematical test results, the authors find that smoking one cigarette per day can lower students’ 
scores by approximately 0.08 standard deviations. Balsa, Giuliano, and French (2011) also indicate 
that alcohol consumption also negatively influences students’ academic performance. These 
findings suggest that the endogeneity of education in estimating the impact of education on 
cigarette smoking and alcohol consumption should be taken into consideration.  
Since law changes as natural experiments generate exogenous variation in years of schooling both 
across regions and over time, some studies have applied an instrumental variable approach by using 
changes in compulsory schooling laws (Kemptner et al. 2011; Xie and Mo 2014). Some other 
institutional changes have been used, such as college attendance during war time (de Walque 2007), 
the number of academic track schools in a state (Amin et al. 2013), and the abolition of secondary 
school fees (Reinhold and Jurges 2010). Xie and Mo, (2014) investigate the causal effect of 
education on health using the Compulsory Schooling Law and the Provisions on the Prohibition of 
Using Child Labor as instruments for education; they cannot obtain conclusive results for smoking 
due to a violation of the exogeneity of their instruments. A limitation of this research is that they 
do not consider variations in the implementations of the Law in different provinces in China, which 
has been well documented by Huang (2015). 
Although many studies have estimated the causal link between health and education, no study has 
investigated how education impacts intergenerational transmissions of unhealthy consumption 
behaviors with consideration of its endogeneity. Does education have an impact on unhealthy 
consumption behaviors as well as their intergenerational persistence? To answer this question, our 
study’s contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we identify the correlation between 
offspring’s and parent’s unhealthy consumption behavior (smoking, drinking, and binge drinking). 
Second, we examine how education affects filial unhealthy consumption by using two institutional 
changes as instrumental variables for education. Third, we investigate the impact of education on 
the intergenerational persistence of unhealthy consumption.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the econometric 
models for unhealthy consumption participation and the estimation strategy of our study. In Section 
3, we describe the CHNS data and present descriptive statistics of the main variables. In Section 4, 
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we present our estimation results. In the last section, we discuss the results, draw conclusions, and 
provide policy recommendations. 
5.2 Empirical approach 
5.2.1 Benchmark model for intergenerational persistence of unhealthy consumption behavior 
Since Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986) initially presented an economic model of intergenerational 
transmissions, there has been significant interest in intergenerational mobility among economists. 
Our benchmark model is defined as follows: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌=1) = 𝛽0 + 𝜷𝟏𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 + 𝜶𝑿 + 𝜀𝑖                            (1)    
where Y is a binary variable which is one if the child has a health-risk consumption behavior and 
zero if the child has no health-risk consumption behavior. As Cowell (2006) points out, most 
empirical studies that focus on smoking and drinking are not only of concern for policy makers but 
also provide an interesting comparison to one another. In our study, we also estimate two main 
health-related behaviors, cigarette smoking and alcohol consumption. Both behaviors may have 
potential negative health consequences. Smoking incorporates a high risk of premature death, while 
a certain light-to-moderate drinking might actually decrease all-cause mortality (Hao et al. 2004). 
Therefore, we specify alcohol consumption into two indicators of “drinking” and “binge drinking”, 
as a harmful effect of binge drinking on health has been observed (Bazzano et al. 2007). 
The main independent variable Parent is a set of dummy variables for the maternal and paternal 
consumption behaviors. Six dummy variables are separately used to indicate whether the mother 
(father) is a current smoker/drinker/binge drinker. First, we separately introduce the maternal and 
paternal consumption behaviors in our models, then we include both of them. This is done to 
identify intergenerational persistence of unhealthy consumption behaviors. As most of the studies 
have found that parental consumption behaviors have a positive impact on filial consumption 
behavior, 𝜷𝟏 is expected to have a positive sign. X is the vector for control variables including 
individual demographic variables as well as year and regional dummies to control for year and 
regional fixed effects. 𝜀𝑖 is the disturbance with 𝜀𝑖~𝑁(0, 1).  
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5.2.2 Impact of education on unhealthy consumption behaviors  
After identifying the intergenerational persistence of unhealthy consumption behaviors, we further 
illustrate the impact of education on unhealthy consumption behaviors (smoking, drinking, and 
binge drinking). Our empirical model is defined as: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌=1) = 𝛽0
′ + 𝜷1
′ 𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 + 𝜷2
′ 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜶𝑿 + 𝜇𝑖                            (2)    
Education is measured by the years of education an individual has acquired. X is the vector of 
control variables as in Equation (1). 𝜇𝑖 is the disturbance with 𝜇𝑖~𝑁(0, 1).  
The coefficients 𝜷𝟏
′  and 𝜷2
′  are used to capture the intergenerational persistence of parents’ 
unhealthy consumption behaviors to their children as in Equation (1) and the impact of education 
on these unhealthy consumption behaviors, respectively. We hypothesize that higher education 
leads to better health knowledge and could reduce the probability of unhealthy consumption 
behaviors such as smoking and binge drinking; thus, 𝜷𝟐 is assumed to be negative; however, the 
impact of education on drinking is ambiguous since moderate drinking might not necessarily be an 
unhealthy consumption behavior.  
To obtain a consistent estimate for education, the potential endogeneity of education has to be taken 
into consideration. As mentioned earlier, law changes as quasi-experiments generate exogenous 
variation in years of schooling both across regions and over time. Changes in the Compulsory 
Schooling Law serve as a valid instrumental variable (Kemptner et al., 2011; Xie and Mo, 2014; 
Huang, 2015). Additionally, the enactment of the Provisions on the Prohibition of Using Child 
Labor in 1991, which aims to prohibit child labor in China, has increased educational attainment 
and serves as a valid instrument (Xie and Mo 2014).  
The 9-year Compulsory Education Law which was officially enacted on July 1, 1986 is expected 
to boost middle school education and to eradicate illiteracy. The law regulates that children who 
reached the age of six are to enroll in school without any tuition fee for nine compulsory years, 
covering six years of primary school and three years of junior middle school (Fang et al. 2012). In 
general, young individuals will complete the nine years of compulsory schooling at the age of 15; 
this indicates that individuals who were born after 1971 were affected by the law. Huang (2015) 
suggests that the variations in the Law’s implementation in different provinces should be 
considered; specifically, individuals born after 1971 are affected by the Law in Beijing, Chongqing, 
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Liaoning, and Heilongjiang; after 1972 in Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Hubei, and Henan; after 
1973 in Guizhou, and after 1976 in Hunan and Guangxi. We define individuals who were born 
after these threshold years with “1” because they are affected by the Law and individuals who were 
born before these threshold years with “0” because they are unaffected by the Law.  
The other institutional change is the Provisions on the Prohibition of Using Child Labor, which 
was enforced in April 1991. As a complementary regulation to the Compulsory Education Law, it 
indicates that children below 16 years of age are not allowed to be employed for any type of work. 
In this way, young adults can only start working after completing their compulsory education at 
the age of 15. We define individuals who were born after 1975 with “1” because they are affected 
by the Provisions and individuals who were born before 1975 with “0” because they are unaffected 
by the Provisions. The first stage to obtain the predicted year of education follows the equation as 
below: 
𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏̂ = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑎𝑤 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝜶𝑿 + 𝑢𝑖                               (3) 
A valid instrument for years of education should have a high correlation with the instrumented 
variable and should be uncorrelated with the error component in the respective model. In other 
words, the Law and the Provisions should affect individuals’ education but should not directly 
affect individuals’ unhealthy consumption behaviors. Thus, our estimations involve two stages. In 
the first stage, a joint F-test is used to test the correlation between the instruments and the 
potentially endogenous variable (years of education). In the second stage, a Wald test of exogeneity 
is applied to test whether the variable is indeed endogenous. When the test is rejected, the estimates 
from the regular Probit model (Equation 2) will be biased. Since two instruments are employed in 
each estimation, the Amemiya-Lee-Newey test is used to test for possible model over-identification 
and validation of instruments (Newey 1987). 
5.2.3 Impact of education on intergenerational persistence of unhealthy consumption  
To detect how education impacts the intergenerational persistence of unhealthy consumption, we 
further introduce the interaction term between parental unhealthy consumption and offspring’s 
education. The estimated model is defined as following: 
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃(𝒀=𝟏) = 𝛽0 + 𝜷𝟏
′ 𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐
′ 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏̂ + 𝜷𝟑
′ 𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 ∗ 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏̂ + 𝜶𝑿 + 𝛿𝑖        (4)    
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where 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏̂  is the estimated value of the years of education from Equation (3). The 
definitions of dependent and control variables are the same as in Equation (1). Our main concern 
is the coefficient of the interaction term, 𝜷𝟑
′ . The null hypothesis is that additional education can 
prevent individuals from persisting their parents’ unhealthy behaviors, therefore, 𝜷𝟑
′  is assumed to 
be negative. Given the potential endogeneity of education, the interaction term between parental 
unhealthy consumption and the two instruments for education (the Law and the Provisions) are 
used as instrumental variables for the interaction term in Equation (4). 
5.3. Data and variables 
5.3.1 Data 
The data used in this study are from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) over the period 
of 1991-2011. The CHNS covers nine provinces (Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Shandong, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou for the years of 1989, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 
2009, 2011, and three municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing) for the year 2011. The 
provinces and municipalities vary substantially in geography, economic development, public 
resources, and health indicators (see Map 1). The CHNS applies a multistage, random cluster 
process to draw a sample of roughly 4,400 households with a total of approximately 26,000 
individuals. Counties in the nine provinces are stratified by income (low, middle, and high), and a 
weighted sampling scheme was used to randomly select four counties in each province. The CHNS 
randomly selects villages and townships within the counties, urban and suburban neighborhoods 
within the cities. The questions regarding our main dependent variables have been reported since 
1991; thus, we drop the data for the first wave in 1989.  
5.3.2 Variables 
Health behaviors in this study are identified by cigarette smoking and alcohol consumption. 
Regarding cigarette smoking, the respondents are asked “Do you still smoke cigarettes now?”; those 
who reported to smoke (not to smoke) are defined as smokers (non-smokers). Regarding alcohol 
consumption, the respondents are asked “Did you drink beer or any other alcoholic beverage last year?”; 
those who reported to drink (not to drink) beer or any alcoholic beverage last year are defined as 
alcohol drinkers (non-alcohol drinkers). The respondents further reported the types of alcoholic 
beverages (beer, grape wine, rice wine, and liquor) and quantity (bottle for beer, Liang (Chinese 
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ounce) or 50g for other alcoholic beverages) they consumed in a typical week within the previous 
year. According to the quantity of each alcoholic beverage consumed, we calculated the percent of 
pure alcohol consumed based on Li et al. (2011). The percent of pure alcohol is 4% for beer, 52% 
for liquor, and 10% for wine; moreover, the beer bottle volume is set at 640 ml, which is most 
common in China. According to the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA) 
of the United States, one “standard” drink contains roughly 14 grams of pure alcohol. We define a 
male who consumes 14 drinks and a female who consumes 7 drinks a week as a binge drinker11, 
respectively.  
We match filial alcohol and cigarettes consumption with their parental consumption using the 
parental-child identifiers to select a sample consisting of parental-offspring pairs. After merging 
all other variables regarding filial demographic, socio-economic and household background 
information, we restrict our sample to offspring older than sixteen years of age. Our sample consists 
of 13,470 observations over the period from 1991 to 2011. There are approximately 25.6%, 35.1%, 
and 10.8% smokers, drinkers, and binge drinkers, respectively (Table 5.1). Regarding parental 
consumption behaviors, we observe that approximately 4.7% and 58.8% of mothers and fathers are 
smokers, respectively. 12.7% of mothers are drinkers and 5% are binge drinkers. Similar to 
smoking behavior, we also find that fathers have a higher probability of being a drinker and binge 
drinker with proportions of 62.6% and 24.3%, respectively. In general, fathers are more likely to 
smoke and to drink as well as to be binge drinkers than are mothers. As stated by Tang et al. (2013), 
women are discouraged from drinking alcohol as well as from using illicit substances in Chinese 
culture. Nevertheless, they also indicate that the current differential between men and women tends 
to diminish in the future. 
Education is the key explanatory variable in this study; it is measured as formal years of education 
ranging from 0-21 years. In our sample, the average of years of education obtained by the offspring 
                                                 
11 As defined by the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA), for women, low-risk drinking is 
no more than 3 drinks on any single day and no more than 7 drinks per week. For men, it is no more than 4 drinks on 
any single day and no more than 14 drinks per week. The study by Li et al., (2011) has defined binge drinking as 
consumption of 50 grams or more pure alcohol for men/ 40 grams or more for women on at least 1 day in the previous 
12 months. Since we have no information on daily drinking behavior, it should be noted that the probability of binge 
drinking calculated from our measurement may be higher than that from the NIAAA. 
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is around 9.5 years (Table 5.1), which indicates most of them have obtained six years of primary 
education and three years of secondary education. The evidence from two institutional changes 
which may influence the individual’s educational attainment shows that there are approximately 
58.3% and 45.8% of the total sample population affected by the Law and the Provisions, 
respectively. 
The other explanatory variables controlled for in this study are gender, age, age squared, working 
status (presently working), marital status, the logarithm of household income, residence (urban or 
rural), and parental age (Table 5.1). Additionally, we also include regional dummies to account for 
disparities in education and healthcare investment across provinces, and for differences in 
provincial characteristics. We also include dummies for the different survey waves to control for 
changes in individuals’ consumption behaviors over time.   
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Table 5. 1  Descriptive statistics of main variables. 
Variable Definition Mean Std.Dev. 
Dependent variables    
Smoking Probability of smoking 0.256 0.436 
Drinking Probability of drinking 0.351 0.477 
Binge drinking Probability of binge drinking 0.108 0.310 
Parents unhealthy consumption behavior     
Smoker Mother Mother smokes (0/1) 0.047 0.211 
Smoker Father Father smokes (0/1) 0.588 0.492 
Drinker Mother Mother is a drinker 0.127 0.333 
Drinker Father Father is a drinker 0.626 0.484 
Binge Mother Mother is a binge drinker 0.050 0.218 
Binge Father Father is a binge drinker 0.243 0.429 
Education    
 Education Years of education   9.538 4.168 
Instrumental variables for education    
Law Affected by the 9-Years Compulsory Education Law 0.583 0.493 
Provisions Affected by the Provisions on the Prohibition of Child Labor 0.458 0.498 
Control variables    
Male Male=1; female=0 0.646 0.478 
Age Age in year 23.880 6.941 
Age Squared Age squared 618.600 412.400 
Married Married (0/1) 0.283 0.450 
Logarithm of Income Logarithm of household income (inflated to 2011) 9.318 1.152 
Presently Working Presently Working? (Working=1; Not working=0) 0.740 0.438 
Urban Lives in urban area? (Urban=1; rural=0) 0.284 0.451 
Age Mother Mother’s age in year 51.100 8.504 
Age Father Father’s age in year 53.190 8.920 
Year dummies    
Yr1991 In 1991 (Reference) 0.176 0.381 
Yr1993 In 1993 0.171 0.376 
Yr1997 In 1997 0.167 0.373 
Yr2000 In 2000 0.170 0.375 
Yr2004 In 2004 0.081 0.272 
Yr2006 In 2006 0.071 0.258 
Yr2009 In 2009 0.077 0.266 
Yr2011 In 2011 0.089 0.284 
Regional dummies    
Liaoning Resides in Liaoning (Reference) 0.069 0.253 
Heilongjiang Resides in Heilongjiang 0.046 0.209 
Jiangsu Resides in Jiangsu 0.116 0.321 
Shandong Resides in Shandong 0.103 0.304 
Henan Resides in Henan 0.130 0.336 
Hubei Resides in Hubei 0.105 0.307 
Hunan Resides in Hunan 0.105 0.306 
Guangxi Resides in Guangxi 0.159 0.366 
Guizhou Resides in Guizhou 0.141 0.348 
Beijing Resides in Beijing 0.007 0.081 
Shanghai Resides in Shanghai 0.014 0.119 
Chongqing Resides in Chongqing 0.005 0.072 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CHNS samples. In total, we have 13,470 observations. 
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5.4. Results 
5.4.1 The intergenerational persistence of unhealthy consumption behaviors 
The estimates for the correlation between individuals’ unhealthy consumption and their parents’ 
consumption are presented in Table 5.2. We gradually introduce maternal and paternal smoking 
and drinking behaviors in the estimations, then we consider both of them. 
In line with previous studies (Green et al. 1991; Schmidt and Tauchmann 2011; Waldkirch et al. 
2004), our results show that parents’ smoking and drinking behaviors have statistically 
significantly positive correlations with children’s smoking and drinking behaviors. As shown in 
Column (1) and (2), when separately introducing mother and father’s smoking behavior in the 
smoking estimation, both of the variables “Smoker Mother” and “Smoker Father” have positive 
and statistically significant impacts on children’s smoking behaviors, as well as when including 
both of them in the estimation. The marginal effects from the smoking estimation show that 
individuals whose mothers or fathers are current smokers have 5.6% or 6.7% higher probability to 
smoke than do those whose mothers or fathers are non-smokers, respectively.  
Similar findings are also observed for drinking and binge drinking. The results show that parents’ 
drinking and binge drinking behaviors have statistically significant positive correlations with 
children’s drinking behaviors in all model specifications. Specifically, according to the marginal 
effects from the estimation for drinking, individuals whose mothers or fathers are drinkers are 21.7% 
and 18.7%, respectively, more likely to be also drinkers. Surprisingly, drinking mothers even have 
a higher contribution to the probability of children being binge drinkers than do drinking fathers. 
Regarding binge drinking, individuals whose mothers or fathers are binge drinkers have 12.5% or 
14.1% higher probability to be also binge drinkers, respectively. The results indicate that the 
offspring is more likely to persist with alcohol consumption rather than with cigarette smoking. 
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Table 5. 2  Probit estimations for smoking, drinking, and binge drinking. 
 Smoking  Drinking  Binge Drinking  
 (1) (2) (3) Marginal (5) (6) (7) Marginal (9) (10) (11) Marginal 
Smoker Mother 0.268***  0.247*** 0.056***         
 (0.07)  (0.07) (0.02)         
Smoker Father  0.299*** 0.296*** 0.067***         
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)         
Alcohol Mother     0.846***  0.734*** 0.217***     
     (0.04)  (0.04) (0.01)     
Alcohol Father      0.700*** 0.632*** 0.187***     
      (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)     
Binge Mother         1.117***  0.858*** 0.125*** 
         (0.06)  (0.06) (0.01) 
Binge Father          1.045*** 0.967*** 0.141*** 
          (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) 
Male 2.100*** 2.114*** 2.117*** 0.483*** 0.911*** 0.914*** 0.945*** 0.280*** 0.364*** 0.385*** 0.396*** 0.058*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) 
Age 0.171*** 0.172*** 0.171*** 0.039*** 0.075*** 0.070*** 0.074*** 0.022*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.010*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Age squared -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.214*** 0.215*** 0.212*** 0.048*** 0.187*** 0.188*** 0.193*** 0.057*** 0.120*** 0.110*** 0.119*** 0.017*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) 
Logarithm of Income -0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.033** 0.010** 0.075*** 0.067*** 0.061*** 0.009*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) 
Presently Working 0.284*** 0.286*** 0.285*** 0.065*** 0.200*** 0.201*** 0.216*** 0.064*** 0.037 0.034 0.038 0.006 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) 
Urban 0.046 0.067** 0.070** 0.016** 0.083*** 0.125*** 0.117*** 0.035*** -0.053 0.014 0.011 0.002 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) 
Constant -4.917*** -5.223*** -5.229***  -3.116*** -3.614*** -3.693***  -3.477*** -4.127*** -4.059***  
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)  (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)  (0.25) (0.26) (0.26)  
N 13470 13470 13470 13470 13470 13470 13470 13470 13470 13470 13470 13470 
Chi2 1942.475 1939.093 1960.387  2255.502 2350.031 2583.803  1017.278 1441.531 1632.267  
Pseudo R2 0.285 0.291 0.292  0.160 0.168 0.192  0.125 0.186 0.212  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
Notes: The cells show coefficients and marginal effects with robust standard errors in parentheses. We also control for regional and year fixed effects as well as parents’ 
ages in each regression. 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on CHNS samples.
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5.4.2 Impact of education on unhealthy consumption behaviors 
To investigate how education affects unhealthy consumption behaviors and their intergenerational 
persistence, we then introduce education in our benchmark model as discussed in Equation (2). The 
estimation results are presented in Table 5.3.  
We find that education has a statistically significant impact on smoking, drinking, and binge 
drinking. The marginal effect of education is negative and statistically significant for smoking and 
binge drinking, suggesting that higher education decreases the probability of smoking and binge 
drinking. In particular, an additional year of education leads to a 0.8% and 0.1% decrease in the 
probability of smoking and binge drinking, respectively, which is unexpectedly lower than in other 
studies (Cowell 2006; Huang 2015; Kemptner et al. 2011; Reinhold and Jurges 2010). With respect 
to drinking, the marginal effect of education is positive and statistically significant, indicating that 
an additional year of education raises the probability of being a drinker by approximately 0.2%. 
The finding seems to be implausible since more education is expected to reduce the probability of 
drinking. However, as mentioned previously, the estimation of these coefficients might be biased 
due to the potential endogeneity of education. Thus, we attempt to employ an instrumental Probit 
estimation to further address this issue and to better understand the impact of education on smoking, 
drinking, and binge drinking. In addition, the coefficients of parental consumption behaviors that 
indicate the intergenerational persistence of smoking, drinking, and binge drinking are almost of 
the same magnitude as in the benchmark models. 
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Table 5. 3  Probit estimations of the impact of education on individual’s unhealthy 
consumption. 
 Smoking Drinking Binge Drinking 
 (1) Marginal  (3) Marginal (5) Marginal 
Yearseduc -0.033*** -0.008*** 0.007** 0.002** -0.008* -0.001* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Smoke Mother 0.227*** 0.051***     
 (0.07) (0.02)     
Smoke Father 0.285*** 0.065***     
 (0.03) (0.01)     
Alcohol Mother   0.734*** 0.217***   
   (0.04) (0.01)   
Alcohol Father   0.632*** 0.187***   
   (0.03) (0.01)   
Binge Mother     0.859*** 0.126*** 
     (0.06) (0.01) 
Binge Father     0.967*** 0.141*** 
     (0.04) (0.01) 
Male 2.130*** 0.482*** 0.946*** 0.280*** 0.394*** 0.058*** 
 (0.07) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) 
Age 0.178*** 0.040*** 0.072*** 0.021*** 0.072*** 0.010*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Age squared -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.203*** 0.046*** 0.197*** 0.058*** 0.116*** 0.017*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) 
Logarithm of Income 0.029 0.006 0.027* 0.008* 0.068*** 0.010*** 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
Presently Working 0.272*** 0.061*** 0.220*** 0.065*** 0.034 0.005 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) 
Urban 0.135*** 0.031*** 0.103*** 0.030*** 0.025 0.004 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) 
Constant -5.205***  -3.697***  -4.056***  
 (0.25)  (0.20)  (0.26)  
N 13470 13470 13470 13470 13470 13470 
Chi2 1992.609  2591.583  1632.775  
Pseudo R2 0.296  0.193  0.212  
 
Notes: The variable Yearseduc indicates the years of education. The cells show coefficients with robust standard errors 
in parentheses. We also control for regional and year fixed effects in each regression, as well as the control variable 
for parents’ age. 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on CHNS samples. 
To further clarify the impact of education on these three consumption behaviors, two institutional 
changes (Law and Provisions) are introduced as instruments for years of education obtained by 
individuals. As discussed previously, a valid instrument is required to be highly correlated with the 
instrumented variable and to be uncorrelated with the disturbance; thus, we first employ an OLS 
regression to investigate the impact of the Law and the Provisions on years of education according 
to Equation (3). The estimation results are presented in Table 5.4. The estimates from column (1) 
and (2) suggest that these two instrumental variables have significantly positive impacts on 
educational attainment. When we include both instrumental variables in the education equation, 
the coefficient declines slightly. Generally, individuals regulated by the Law or the Provisions 
receive approximately 0.3 or 1.0 more years of education, respectively. The estimated coefficient 
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of the Law is lower than that reported by Xie and Mo (2014), and the coefficient of the Prohibition 
is higher than that by Xie and Mo (2014). This might have been expected since we match the data 
to include parents’ information and only consider individuals with parents’ information. 
Table 5. 4  OLS estimation of the impact of institutional changes on individual’s 
educational attainment. 
 Yearseduc 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Law 0.635***  0.321*** 
 (0.10)  (0.11) 
Provisions  1.116*** 1.007*** 
  (0.11) (0.11) 
Male 0.015 0.020 0.021 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Age 0.263*** 0.299*** 0.319*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Age squared -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.563*** -0.571*** -0.570*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Logarithm of income 0.827*** 0.833*** 0.831*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Presently working -0.715*** -0.719*** -0.718*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Urban 1.842*** 1.810*** 1.809*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Constant -0.765 -1.357* -1.792** 
 (0.82) (0.81) (0.84) 
Observations 13470 13470 13470 
F 160.435 167.200 161.499 
R2 0.250 0.254 0.254 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
Notes: The cells show coefficients with Newey’s two-step estimator, errors are presented in parentheses. We also 
control for regional and year fixed effects in each regression, as well as for parents’ age. The variables of Law and 
Provisions indicate whether an individual is affected by the 9-Years Compulsory Education Law and the Provisions 
on the Prohibition of Child Labor, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on CHNS samples. 
After observing a high correlation between education and the two instrumental variables, we 
introduce the Law and the Provisions into the model (2) and use Newey’s two-step estimator in our 
analysis. The estimation results are reported in Table 5.5. Education remains negative and 
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statistically significantly correlated with smoking and binge drinking, but with a larger magnitude 
than that from the regular Probit model. As expected, the coefficient of education for drinking 
changes from a statistically significantly positive sign in the regular Probit model to a statistically 
significantly negative sign in the instrumented Probit model; this suggests that additional education 
actually decreases the probability of drinking.  
From the Wald test of exogeneity for the instrumented variables, the null hypothesis of no 
endogeneity is rejected as the P value is less than 0.05 (Table 5.5); this indicates that the estimators 
from the regular Probit model are inappropriate and likely to be biased. To further examine the 
validity of the instrumental variables, over-identification tests are applied. The over-identification 
test in the second stage cannot be rejected in all model specifications; this suggests that the 
instrumental variables of the two institutional changes are jointly valid instruments (Table 5.5).The 
estimators from the instrumental model are consistent and convincing.  
Therefore, we conclude that an additional year of education reduces the probability of smoking, 
drinking, and binge drinking by 3.4%, 2.7%, and 1.8%, respectively (Table 5.5). Our findings are 
in line with previous studies (Cowell 2006; Huang 2015; Kemptner et al. 2011; Reinhold and Jurges 
2010); while the estimated impact of education on smoking is higher than that reported by Huang 
(2015), who finds that an additional year of education will decrease the smoking probability by 1.5 
percentage points. The reason is that we use a subsample from the whole population, and the 
average age (approximately 23 years) is lower than the 32.46 years reported in Huang (2015). This 
difference implies that improving education to reduce smoking might have a specific influence on 
younger people. 
Regarding the coefficient of parents’ unhealthy consumption behaviors, we find that parents’ 
unhealthy consumption behaviors have statistically significant and positive impacts on children’s 
unhealthy consumption behaviors; this is similar to the findings from the benchmark model (Table 
5.2). Specifically, we find that the intergenerational persistence of smoking from both mother and 
father is with 2.6% and 4.9%, respectively, comparatively lower than in the benchmark model, 
which is approximately 5.6% and 6.7% for mother and father, respectively. However, there are 
only slight changes in the intergenerational persistence of drinking and binge drinking compared 
with the regular Probit model. 
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5.4.3 Impact of education on intergenerational persistence of unhealthy consumption behaviors 
The estimation results for Equation (4) considering the interaction term between years of education 
and parents’ unhealthy consumption are presented in Table 5.6. To obtain convincing results, we 
use an instrumental Probit model by including an interaction term between parental unhealthy 
consumption behaviors and the Law and the Provisions as instruments for the interaction term in 
Equation (4). As shown in column (1), the interaction term between “Smoke Mother” and 
“Yearseduc” is insignificant, indicating that education has no specific impact on individuals whose 
mothers are current smokers compared with individuals whose mothers are non-smokers. However, 
the coefficient for the interaction term between “Smoke Father” and “Yearseduc” is statistically 
significantly negative; this suggests that an additional year of education can decrease the 
probability to smoke of individuals with smoking fathers. However, we find that an additional year 
of education cannot prevent intergenerational persistence of binge drinking from mothers, but we 
do find it can counteract the intergenerational persistence from fathers, as the coefficient of the 
interaction term (“Binge Father*Yearseduc”) is statistically significantly negative. However, we 
find that education has neither a statistically significant impact on the intergenerational persistence 
of drinking from mothers nor from fathers.  
The Wald test of exogeneity for the instrumented variables indicates that the estimators from the 
instrumented Probit model are consistent. The over-identification test in the second stage cannot 
be rejected in all model specifications for smoking, drinking, and binge drinking; this indicates that 
the estimators from the instrumental model are consistent and convincing. We conclude that an 
additional year of education can counteract intergenerational persistence of unhealthy consumption 
behaviors from fathers but not from mothers. Our findings imply that individuals whose mothers 
have unhealthy consumption behaviors are more likely to follow unhealthy consumption behaviors. 
Our findings imply that policies designed to decrease intergenerational persistence of unhealthy 
consumption behaviors through education may not be efficient when mothers have unhealthy 
consumption behaviors; it might require other measures that directly influence mothers’ 
consumption behaviors rather than filial education. 
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Table 5. 5  Instrumental Probit estimation of smoking and drinking. 
 Smoking  Drinking  Binge drinking  
 (1) (2) (3) Marginal (5) (6) (7) Marginal (9) (10) (11) Marginal 
Yearseduc -0.180*** -0.169*** -0.168*** -0.034*** -0.088** -0.104*** -0.101*** -0.028*** -0.093** -0.144*** -0.131*** -0.018** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) 
Smoke Mother 0.144*  0.134* 0.026*         
 (0.08)  (0.07) (0.02)         
Smoke Father  0.248*** 0.246*** 0.049***         
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)         
Alcohol Mother     0.856***  0.745*** 0.204***     
     (0.04)  (0.04) (0.01)     
Alcohol Father      0.709*** 0.639*** 0.175***     
      (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)     
Binge Mother         1.122***  0.874*** 0.133*** 
         (0.05)  (0.06) (0.01) 
Binge Father          1.026*** 0.944*** 0.148*** 
          (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) 
Male 2.121*** 2.130*** 2.134*** 0.424*** 0.913*** 0.916*** 0.947*** 0.260*** 0.363*** 0.383*** 0.394*** 0.060*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) 
Age 0.209*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.012*** 0.093*** 0.091*** 0.095*** 0.009*** 0.085*** 0.098*** 0.094*** 0.006*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) 
Age squared -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Married 0.123*** 0.129*** 0.128*** 0.025*** 0.137*** 0.129*** 0.136*** 0.037*** 0.074 0.030 0.049 0.008 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) 
Logarithm of Income 0.146*** 0.139*** 0.139*** 0.028*** 0.117*** 0.127*** 0.117*** 0.032*** 0.138*** 0.182*** 0.163*** 0.024*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) 
Presently Working 0.168*** 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.035*** 0.137*** 0.126*** 0.143*** 0.039*** -0.019 -0.064 -0.050 -0.007 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.01) 
Urban 0.386*** 0.384*** 0.383*** 0.077*** 0.245*** 0.318*** 0.306*** 0.085*** 0.131 0.288*** 0.259*** 0.036** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.01) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.02) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.02) 
Constant -4.841*** -5.102*** -5.108***  -3.076*** -3.572*** -3.652***  -3.619*** -4.123*** -4.080***  
 (0.25) (0.26) (0.26)  (0.20) (0.20) (0.21)  (0.26) (0.27) (0.28)  
N 13470 13470 13470 13470 13470 13470 13470 13470 13470 13470 13470 13470 
Chi2 1916.323 1982.725 1986.862  2260.154 2320.435 2578.479  1025.061 1342.543 1519.043  
Wald test of exogeneity 0.000 0.001 0.001  0.007 0.002 0.002  0.055 0.003 0.009  
Test for over-identifying 
restriction (P-values) 
0.241 0.273 0.224  0.273 0.142 0.175  0.854 0.733 0.611  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
Notes: The variable Yearseduc indicates the years of education. The cells show coefficients with Newey’s two-step estimator, errors are presented in parentheses. We 
also control for regional and year fixed effects in each regression, as well as for parents’ age. 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on CHNS samples. 
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Table 5. 6  Instrumental Probit estimation of the impact of education on intergenerational persistence of smoking, drinking, and 
binge drinking 
 Smoking  Drinking  Binge drinking 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Yearseduc -0.069*** -0.011 -0.011  -0.092** -0.074* -0.072  -0.087* -0.078 -0.074 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Smoke Mother 0.719  0.728         
 (1.01)  (1.02)         
Smoke Father  1.304*** 1.259***         
  (0.32) (0.32)         
Smoke Mother* Yearseduc -0.062  -0.068         
 (0.12)  (0.13)         
Smoke Father* Yearseduc  -0.108*** -0.104***         
  (0.03) (0.03)         
Drink Mother      1.064*** 1.057***     
      (0.27) (0.28)     
Drink Father     0.357  0.140     
     (0.37)  (0.38)     
Drink Mother* Yearseduc     0.052  0.063     
     (0.04)  (0.04)     
Drink Father* Yearseduc      -0.038 -0.044     
      (0.03) (0.03)     
Binge Mother         1.698***  0.764 
         (0.56)  (0.60) 
Binge Father          2.023*** 1.773*** 
          (0.34) (0.35) 
Binge Mother* Yearseduc         -0.059  0.011 
         (0.06)  (0.06) 
Binge Father* Yearseduc          -0.104*** -0.087** 
          (0.04) (0.04) 
Male 2.119*** 2.127*** 2.131***  0.915*** 0.915*** 0.947***  0.362*** 0.371*** 0.384*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Age 0.185*** 0.190*** 0.188***  0.092*** 0.091*** 0.093***  0.084*** 0.088*** 0.086*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Age squared -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.180***  0.138*** 0.128*** 0.136***  0.073 0.048 0.065 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Logarithm of Income 0.056*** 0.059*** 0.060***  0.116*** 0.122*** 0.110***  0.137*** 0.150*** 0.136*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Presently Working 0.244*** 0.242*** 0.242***  0.140*** 0.128*** 0.149***  -0.019 -0.036 -0.025 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Urban 0.183*** 0.189*** 0.190***  0.244*** 0.298*** 0.282***  0.120 0.198* 0.183* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
Constant -4.908*** -5.746*** -5.742***  -3.018*** -3.810*** -3.859***  -3.647*** -4.353*** -4.280*** 
 (0.25) (0.31) (0.31)  (0.21) (0.27) (0.28)  (0.26) (0.28) (0.29) 
N 13470 13470 13470  13470 13470 13470  13470 13470 13470 
Chi2 2000.109 2047.738 2049.147  2259.055 2335.772 2593.960  1025.232 1388.592 1562.737 
Wald test of exogeneity 0.010 0.000 0.000  0.003 0.003 0.001  0.097 0.000 0.005 
Test for over-identifying 
restriction (P-values) 
0.585 0.763 0.538  0.514 0.380 0.634  0.946 0.338 0.383 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010.  
Notes: The variable Yearseduc indicates the years of education. The cells show coefficients with Newey’s two-step estimator, errors are presented in parentheses. We also control for 
regional and year fixed effects in each regression, as well as for parents’ age. Source: Authors’ estimations based on CHNS samples. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
This paper investigates the impact of education on unhealthy consumption behaviors and their 
intergenerational persistence. After identifying a statistically significant correlation between 
parental and filial unhealthy consumption behaviors, we attempt to illustrate the impact of 
education on filial unhealthy consumption behaviors. However, due to the presence of potential 
endogeneity of education in health behaviors estimations, it requires more rigorous estimation to 
obtain reliable results. Since the 9-year Compulsory Education Law and the Provisions on the 
Prohibition of Using Child Labor as quasi-experiments having significant influence on the 
education attainment, we employ an instrumental estimation by using these two institutional 
changes as instruments for education in unhealthy consumption equations. Through introducing an 
interaction term between parental unhealthy consumption and filial education, we further clarify 
the impact of education on the intergeneration persistence of unhealthy consumption. The data used 
is from the CHNS over the period 1991-2011. 
The empirical estimation results indicate that in China parental unhealthy consumption behaviors 
have statistically significant and positive correlations with children’s unhealthy consumption 
behaviors; therefore, our findings suggest that there exists significant intergenerational persistence 
of unhealthy consumption behaviors. Precisely, the probability of intergenerational persistence of 
smoking is approximately 2.6% and 4.9% from mother and father, respectively, while that of binge 
drinking is approximately 13.3% and 14.8% from mother and father, respectively. Drinking 
behavior has the largest probability of intergenerational persistence which is approximately 20.4% 
and 17.5% from mother and father, respectively. 
We also find that an additional year of education has a statistically significant negative impact on 
smoking, drinking, and binge drinking. One additional year of education decreases the probability 
to be smoking, drinking, and binge drinking by 3.4%, 2.8%, and 1.8%, respectively. Another 
interesting finding is that an additional year of education can counteract intergenerational 
persistence of smoking and binge drinking from the father, but it has no impact on intergenerational 
persistence from the mother. Since drinking behavior is ambiguous to be considered as an 
unhealthy consumption behavior, we find that there is no impact of education on the 
intergenerational persistence of drinking. 
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Hence, our results suggest that policies oriented to control smoking and binge drinking should take 
parents’ consumption behaviors into consideration; education is expected to be an efficient way to 
control unhealthy consumption behaviors in China; however, education may not be an efficient 
way to prevent intergenerational persistence of unhealthy consumption from the mother.  
There are some limitations of our study: First, due to the absence of data on consumers’ daily 
alcohol consumption, the definition of binge drinking in our study is different from other studies 
(see, Li et al., 2011), which may induce higher probability of binge drinking for our sample. Second, 
the primary goal of this study is to investigate the causal relationship between education and 
unhealthy consumption as well as its intergenerational persistence, further research needs to be 
conducted to shed light on the mechanism or channel through which these unhealthy consumption 
behaviors transmit to the next generation. Thus, the findings from our results should be cautiously 
interpreted and implemented. 
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Abstract 
Previous literature has shown that low-income individuals are more likely to make poor health 
choices in developed countries. From an extended life-course utility model where income serves 
as a budget constraint and as a source of future health utility, we attempt to investigate the 
relationship between income and overweight. The empirical estimations are conducted for 
overweight initiation and cessation, as well as for participation reflecting a decision to start and a 
previous decision to not stop. The data used for this research is from the China Health and Nutrition 
Survey (CHNS). The results suggest that body weight and the probability of overweight initiation 
increase with income but at a decreasing rate, indicating an inverted U-shape relationship; while 
the probability of overweight cessation decreases with income but at an increasing rate, suggesting 
a U-shape relationship. Our findings conclude that in contrast to developed countries, low-income 
individuals are less likely to be overweight in a transition country like China. The major reason is 
probably because of an income constraint for unhealthy food items; however, when income exceeds 
the critical value of the inverted U-shape curve, it reverses because low-income individuals seem 
to have less utility from future health. In particular, this change appears to happen earlier with 
increasing income for women and urban residents. 
Keywords: health behavior, low-income, overweight, life-course utility, China
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6.1 Introduction 
In the last decades, there has been a growing number of studies investigating the effect of income 
on individuals’ health; meanwhile, policymakers all over the world are increasingly concerned 
about the relationship between health and low-income. In developed countries, the overall health 
risk behavior is more prevalent for low-income individuals than for other socioeconomic groups 
(see Lantz et al., 1998). It is claimed that income generally has a positive correlation with “good” 
health-related behaviors (Benzeval et al. 2000; Binkley 2010; Jolliffe 2011). Individuals with lower 
income tend to make less healthy consumption choices. As a consequence, they are more likely to 
suffer from nutrition-related health problems such as overweight and obesity (Ball and Crawford 
2005; Sobal and Stunkard 1989). 
From an economic perspective, the budget constraint is an important determinant of poor food 
consumption behaviors among low-income individuals (see Binkley, 2010). Especially in the 
nutrition related literature, researchers argue that low-income individuals cannot afford to purchase 
healthy food, since healthy food is comparatively expensive (Drewnowski and Darmon 2005; 
Drewnowski and Eichelsdoerfer 2010). Notwithstanding, Stewart et al. (2003) find that with 
additional income low-income households would not purchase more vegetables and fruits; 
furthermore, a number of vegetables and fruits are actually reasonably priced (Kuchler and Stewart 
2008). This suggests that a budget constraint might not be the most crucial factor in explaining 
differences in unhealthy food consumption or health outcomes among individuals with different 
income levels in developed countries. Using a life-course utility model, Binkley (2010) puts 
forward another hypothesis: Low-income individuals have a comparatively higher direct utility 
from present consumption and a less intense desire for longevity in the future; therefore, they are 
more likely to have poor consumption behaviors. 
However, the opposite is true for developing countries. For example, a number of studies show that 
overweight is relatively more widespread among high-income individuals (Fernald 2007; C. A. 
Monteiro et al. 2004; B. M. Popkin 1999). With the development of the economy and increasing 
incomes, calorie consumption has been enhanced (Ogundari and Abdulai 2013); consequently, 
overweight and obesity have risen and become major health challenges in many developing 
countries  (B. M. Popkin 1999; B. Popkin and Ng 2007). In China, the diet has been shifting away 
from high-carbohydrate food towards high-energy density food (Batis et al. 2014; Du et al. 2004), 
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which is an important cause of overweight. One study by Tafreschi (2015) shows that 
approximately 30% of individuals in China are overweight or obese in recent years. 
In a transition economy like China the relationship between the consequences of unhealthy food 
consumption and income might be a situation in-between developing and developed societies. The 
effect of income on body weight might change from positive to negative with economic 
development and income increase. However, to the best of our knowledge, there are only a few 
studies that investigate this transition (Deuchert et al. 2014; Hruschka and Brewis 2013; Pampel et 
al. 2012); they use cross-sectional data from various developing countries and provide substantial 
evidence for the reversal hypothesis. Tafreschi (2015), using the data from the China Health 
Nutrition Survey (CHNS), provides further evidence to support the reversal of the income gradient 
in China, but without consideration of an individuals’ life-course utility. 
The Body Mass Index (BMI) as a health outcome of food consumption has an important 
complicating factor compared to many other health issues (Jolliffe 2011). An individual’s BMI can 
be used to determine whether an individual is overweight or obese. In this study, overweight is 
used to examine individuals’ unhealthy food consumption behaviors. The major goal is to extend 
Binkley’s (2010) life-course utility model for unhealthy food consumption by considering an 
income constraint. We attempt to shed light on the relationship between income and overweight in 
the transition economy of China through estimating overweight initiation, cessation, and 
participation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical framework 
of the life-course utility model. Section 3 presents the empirical model and estimation strategy. 
Section 4 introduces the data and main variables. Section 5 reports the empirical estimation results. 
The last section concludes. 
6.2 Theoretical framework 
A rational consumer relies on his/her utility function to decide what to consume. A life-course 
utility model as proposed by Binkley (2010) considers the dynamic effect of unhealthy 
consumption over time. We apply this model to the case of unhealthy food consumption behavior 
and extend it by allowing an income constraint in unhealthy food consumption decision making. 
The basic model is shown in equation 1. 
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𝑈𝐿 = 𝑈1(𝑋(𝑀), 𝑌(𝑀)) + 𝜃(𝑡)𝑃(𝑋(𝑀))𝑈2(𝑔(𝑀))                                         (1) 
where UL is the expected “lifetime” utility over two periods; U1 and U2 are the utilities for period 
1 (present) and period 2 (future), respectively. X stands for the consumed quantity of unhealthy 
food at present and has a negative influence on the future utility. Y is the consumed amount of all 
other food items in the present. X and Y are both subject to a budget constraint of income M. Based 
on the underlying utility function, the present utility increases with consumption of X or Y. 𝜃(𝑡) is 
the discount rate at time t within the first period; it is assumed to be identical for all consumers and 
0< 𝜃(𝑡) <1. Following (Binkley 2010), P(X(M)) denotes the probability of survival until the second 
period with consuming any nonzero quantity of an unhealthy food item X during period 1. An 
individual who consumes an unhealthy food item X is less likely to survive than an individual who 
does not consume X, implying that P(X(M))<P(0) for any X>0. U2 is the expected utility in the 
second period. In this study, we are primarily interested in analyzing a consumer's present 
consumption choice; therefore, U2 is assumed to be simply a function of expected future income 
g(M). In general, we assume that higher current income will lead to higher expected future income; 
thus,   0 MMg . Prices and tastes are assumed to be unchanged in the model. 
We focus on investigating the decision of whether to consume or not to consume an unhealthy food 
item, which is a binary choice. The difference in life-course utility with (X>0) and without (X=0) 
consuming unhealthy food is: 
𝐷 = [𝑈1(𝑋(𝑀), 𝑌(𝑀)) + 𝜃(𝑡)𝑃(𝑋(𝑀))𝑈2(𝑔(𝑀))] − [𝑈1(0, 𝑌(𝑀)) + 𝜃(𝑡)𝑃(0)𝑈2(𝑔(𝑀))] 
 = [𝑈1(𝑋(𝑀), 𝑌(𝑀)) − 𝑈1(0, 𝑌(𝑀))] + [𝜃(𝑡)𝑃(𝑋(𝑀))𝑈2(𝑔(𝑀)) − 𝜃(𝑡)𝑃(0)𝑈2(𝑔(𝑀))]     (2) 
Then we define: 
𝐷1 = 𝑈1(𝑋(𝑀), 𝑌(𝑀)) − 𝑈1(0, 𝑌(𝑀))                                                      (3) 
𝐷2 =  𝜃(𝑡)[𝑃(𝑋(𝑀)) − 𝑃(0)] 𝑈2(𝑔(𝑀)) .                                                   (4) 
Thus,                                                           D=D1+D2   ,  (5) 
where D1 is the difference in direct utility between consumption of a goods bundle containing X 
and one not containing X in period 1; D2 is the difference in expected health utility from future life-
expectancy when X is or is not consumed, respectively, in period 1. Therefore, the overall effect D 
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is the sum of D1 and D2. Since 𝑈1(𝑋(𝑀), 𝑌(𝑀))  ≥ 𝑈1(0, 𝑌(𝑀)), so 𝐷1 ≥ 0; and 𝑃(𝑋(𝑀)) −
𝑃(0) ≤ 0 , therefore, 𝐷2 ≤ 0 . With D1 being positive but decreasing (according to assumed 
decreasing marginal utility of unhealthy food) and D2 being negative to an increasing extent 
(according to assumed utility increasing with income), we expect a switch from increasing to 
decreasing overall lifetime utility at a certain income level. The optimization maximum holds when 
X=0. 
The consumption decision of whether to consume X or not is deterd by the sign of D. Specifically, 
if there is no unhealthy consequence, the value of D will be solely decided by D1, because D2=0; 
then, we can follow the standard utility maximization theory, which determines whether a good is 
consumed or not. Marginal utility of good X is defined as MUX; when MUX/px>λ, the good X will 
be consumed, where λ is the marginal utility of income. Since λ will decline with income, we can 
conclude that the probability of consuming an unhealthy good X in the optimal consumption bundle 
will increase with income, except if X is inferior.  
If X and Y are normal goods and consumption of the food groups X and Y, respectively, does not 
negatively affect the utility derived from the other group since 
𝜕𝑈/𝜕𝑋(𝑀)
𝜕𝑋(𝑀)
 and 
𝜕𝑈/𝜕𝑌(𝑀)
𝜕𝑌(𝑀)
 are non-
negative, then the direct utility D1 increases with income 
𝜕𝐷1
𝜕𝑀
> 0, which suggests that the direct 
utility D1 increases with income.  
If X has an adverse effect on an individual’s health, the second portion of the health utility in the 
life-course utility function should be taken into consideration. By taking the first derivative of D2 
over M, we obtain 
𝜕𝐷2
𝜕𝑀
= 𝜃(𝑡)[𝑃(𝑋(𝑀)) − 𝑃(0)]
𝜕𝑈2(𝑔(𝑀))
𝜕𝑔(𝑀)
𝜕𝑔(𝑀)
𝜕𝑀
+ 𝜃(𝑡)
𝜕𝑃(𝑋(𝑀))
𝜕𝑋
𝜕𝑋(𝑀)
𝜕𝑀
𝑈2(𝑔(𝑀)).           (6) 
As aforementioned, P(X(M)) is decreasing with consumption of unhealthy food X and 𝑃(𝑋(𝑀)) −
𝑃(0) ≤ 0, then it is clear to obtain  
𝜕𝐷2
𝜕𝑀
< 0; this implies that the negative health utility from 
consuming unhealthy food X  declines with income; thus, low-income individuals have lower future 
health utility of longevity. 
The overall effect of income on life-course utility D is 
𝜕𝐷
𝜕𝑀
=
𝜕𝐷1
𝜕𝑀
+
𝜕𝐷2
𝜕𝑀
 .                                                     (7) 
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An increase in the pleasure from consuming X in the present will endure a potential loss of expected 
health utility in the future. A rational consumer, therefore, has to consider a trade-off between these 
two effects. From the theoretical framework, it can be argued that due to the income constraint 
low-income individuals are less likely to consume unhealthy food only when income increases, as 
unhealthy food is normally non-necessity food.  
Initially, the consumed quantity of unhealthy food X is relatively low, as a result the direct utility 
from consuming X in the present exceeds the negative health utility in the future. Low-income 
individuals have limited resources available for excess food consumption, while higher-income 
individuals have more access to food. It suggests that the probability of consuming unhealthy food 
X tends to have a positive relationship with income. Low-income individuals, therefore, have lower 
probability of consuming X. A positive relationship between the probability of consuming 
unhealthy food X and income holds until the budget constraint sets in. At this point the future health 
utility exactly counteracts the direct utility from consuming X, and the health utility in the future 
dominates the life-course utility D, which indicates that the likelihood to consume X will decrease 
monotonously with income. At this stage, low-income individuals have a higher probability of 
consuming X. Binkley (2010) suggests that the probability of starting to consume unhealthy food 
X either decreases throughout the whole relevant range with an accelerating rate or first rises and 
then falls as income increases, which suggests that there is an inverted U-shape relationship 
between them. 
Moreover, for a current unhealthy food consumer the hurdle posed by the budget constraint has 
been overcome, that is to say, it has no further role to play when price and income are unchanged. 
Therefore, the cessation decision of unhealthy food X consumption is solely determined by D2, 
which is initially smaller in absolute value than D1 and then becomes increasingly important. This 
indicates that the relationship between income and the likelihood of stopping unhealthy food 
consumption has a U-shape or an increasing slope. In the initial portion of the U-shape curve, low-
income individuals seem to have a higher probability to stop consuming X, just because they can 
hardly maintain their previous consumption level of X when temporarily overcoming the budget 
constraint. However, negative health utility will eventually play the dominant role in the life-course 
utility function as income increases, which implies that cessation is more likely for high-income 
individuals. Thus, we argue that the probability of ‘quitting’ overweight (of the outcome or “type” 
of unhealthy consumption analyzed in this article) has a negative relationship with income at low 
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income levels but changes to a positive relationship at high income levels. Following Kenkel 's et 
al. (2009) strategy that consumption participation can be regarded as the result of a decision to start 
and a series of past decisions to not stop, we also estimate the effect of income on unhealthy food 
consumption participation, which is a consequence of an individuals’ previous decisions. 
6.3 Empirical methodology  
6.3.1 The econometric model for the relationship between income and BMI 
To investigate the relationship between income and unhealthy food consumption behaviors, we 
first examine the relationship between income and BMI, which can largely be considered a health 
outcome from food consumption. How the BMI is calculated will be explained in section 4.2. 
Unlike other studies (Ettner 1996; Fichera and Savage 2015; Goode et al. 2014), our focus is not 
to estimate the causal effect of income on the outcome of food consumption due to the high attrition 
rate when using panel estimation (Tafreschi 2015) and unavailability of suitable instrumental 
variables for income (Goode et al. 2014). These difficulties are quite common in the health 
economics literature when estimating the correlation between income and health (Apouey and 
Geoffard 2013; Goode et al. 2014; Reinhold and Jürges 2012). In this study, we estimate a non-
linear model to detect an expected inverted U-shape between income and BMI, which is simply 
defined as  
𝐵𝑀𝐼𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽2(𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)
2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐷𝑘𝑖𝐾 + 𝜀𝑖,                          (8) 
where BMIi presents ith individual’s BMI; Income is per capita household income. To address the 
non-linear relationship between income and BMI, we introduce the squared term of income. From 
our theoretical framework, 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are expected to be positive and negative, respectively. Dki 
includes a set of individuals’ demographic variables and household characteristics, as well as other 
control variables. 𝜀𝑖 is the disturbance term. 
With the estimated parameters from this model, we can calculate the critical value (threshold value) 
of income after which the reverse effect play the dominant role, using the following formula: 
𝐶𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 = 𝛽1/2𝛽2                                                               (9) 
6.3.2 The econometric models for overweight initiation, cessation, and participation 
We assume that overweight is related to unhealthy food consumption and estimate three binary 
choice models: overweight initiation, cessation, and participation. Our principal concern is how 
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income affects the probability of starting and stopping consuming unhealthy food X, or the 
probability of starting and stopping having an outcome from unhealthy food consumption, which 
in our case is overweight and measured with the BMI (section 4.2). The models for overweight 
initiation, cessation, and participation are defined as follows: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑌 = 1) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽2(𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)
2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐷𝑘𝑖𝐾 + 𝜀𝑖                           (10) 
where Y presents an individual’s status of overweight initiation, cessation, and participation in the 
years considered. We estimate Probit models for each situation. In the first model, the dependent 
variable Overweight initiation is defined by a binary indicator which equals to 1 if an individual 
was not overweight in the previous year but is overweight in the present year, and equals to 0 
otherwise. In the second model, the dependent variable Overweight cessation is defined by a binary 
indicator which is 1 if an individual is overweight in the previous year but is not overweight in the 
present year, and equals to 0 otherwise. In this way, the entire sample is used in the first model of 
Overweight initiation, while the model for Overweight cessation is restricted only to those for 
whom Overweight initiation equals 1. The model for Overweight participation is defined by a 
binary indicator which is 1 if an individual is overweight based on the individual’s current BMI 
value, and equals to 0 otherwise. All additional independent variables are the same as in model (8), 
and the same strategy is used as in equation (9) to obtain the critical value of income. 
6.4.  Data  
6.4.1 The sample 
To test our theoretical model, we use the CHNS data. By using a multistage, random cluster process 
to draw a sample of roughly 4,400 households with a total of 26,000 individuals, the CHNS is 
designed to investigate health and nutrition related issues in China, and is conducted in nine 
provinces: Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning, and 
Shandong, which are substantially different in geography, economic development, and public 
resources, as well as in health indicators. The CHNS began in 1989 and has been conducted for 
nine waves until now: 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011. In 2011 three 
additional municipal cities, Beijing, Chongqing, and Shanghai, were included (Figure 6.1). The 
CHNS data is an unbalanced panel database; therefore, we treat the data as pooled cross-sectional 
data. We use the data from 1991 to 2011, as the questionnaires and sampling procedure in the first 
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wave are not consistent with those applied in the following waves (Goode et al. 2014; Tafreschi 
2015).  
 
Figure 6. 1 Map of Survey Regions 
The darker shaded regions in this map are the provinces in which the survey has been conducted. 
Source: http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china/about/proj_desc/chinamap 
6.4.2 Dependent variables 
The indicator for overweight is defined by an individual’s BMI. We restrict our sample to adults 
who are 18 years old and above. All adults who participate in the CHNS are required to take 
physical measurements, including height and weight. After obtaining a respondents’ height and 
weight, the BMI can be calculated by dividing weight (in kilogram) by height squared (in meters). 
By conventional standards, an individual is regarded as overweight when the BMI is between 25 
and 29.9 (WHO 2015). 12  Wu (2006) argues that the classification from the World Health 
Organization (WHO) is commonly used for Western countries but is not applicable to China; 
therefore, we use the standard defined by Zhou (2002) in which a BMI of 24.0 to 27.9 is classified 
as overweight, and 28.0 and above as obese (see also Xie and Mo, 2014). The summary of BMI is 
shown in Table 6.1 with a mean value of approximately 22.81; its distribution is presented in Figure 
6.2. Approximately 32.3% of the individuals considered in our sample are overweight or obese. 
The portion of 32.3% is relatively high compared to previous studies (Tafreschi 2015; Xie and Mo 
                                                 
12 It defines four different BMI categories: 1) obese (BMI above 30); 2) overweight (BMI between 25.0 and 29.9); 3) 
healthy weight (BMI between 18.5 and 24.9); and 4) underweight (BMI below 18.5) 
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2014). Our sample, moreover, shows that 16.4% of the individuals considered have started being 
overweight, and 34.2% have stopped being overweight over time.  
 
Figure 6. 2 The distribution of Body-Mass-Index (BMI) for the pooled CHNS sample 
Resource: Authors’ estimations based on CHNS samples  
6.4.3 Independent variables 
The key independent variables in our study are income and income squared. We use per capita 
household income rather than individual income since food consumption and nutrition related 
decisions are commonly made at the household level (Tafreschi, 2015). The per capita household 
income is adjusted by the consumer price index using 2011 as the reference year (Table 6.1). In the 
following, we refer to per capita household income simply as household income. The average 
annual household income is approximately 7,430 CNY. The CHNS also includes a range of 
individual demographic variables: gender, age, marital status, education, ethnic status, occupation, 
as well as household characteristics such as household size, and rural or urban residence. Table 6.1 
also provides summary statistics for these demographic variables.  
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Table 6. 1  Definition and descriptive statistics of key variables 
Variable Definition Mean Std.Dev. 
Dependent variables    
BMI Weight/height2  22.81 3.393 
Start Overweight 1 if individual starts being overweight 0.164 0.371 
Quit Overweight 1 if individual quits being overweight 0.342 0.474 
Overweight 1 if individual is overweight 0.323 0.468 
Income     
Income Per capita household income adjusted to 2011 price index (10000 Yuan) 0.743 0.806 
Income squared Squared Per capita household income (10000 Yuan) 1.202 3.057 
Control variables    
Male Male=1; Female=0 0.486 0.500 
Age 18-29 Age 18-29 0.199 0.399 
Age 30-39 Age 30-39 0.179 0.384 
Age 40-49 Age 40-49 0.195 0.396 
Age 50-59 Age 50-59 0.239 0.427 
Age 60+ Age above 60 0.135 0.342 
Never married Never married 0.125 0.331 
Married Married (0/1) 0.826 0.379 
Widowed Widowed (0/1) 0.011 0.105 
Separated Separated (0/1) 0.048 0.213 
Below primary school 1 if highest level of education is below primary school, 0 if otherwise 0.247 0.431 
Primary school 1 if highest level of education is primary school, 0 if otherwise 0.203 0.402 
Middle school 1 if highest level of education is middle school, 0 if otherwise 0.499 0.500 
College 1 if highest level of education is college, 0 if otherwise 0.050 0.218 
Household size Household size 3.965 1.578 
Ethnic Minority 1 if individual is ethnic minority, 0 if not 0.129 0.335 
Presently working 1 if individual is presently working, 0 if not 0.681 0.466 
Urban 1 if individual lives in urban area, 0 if not 0.340 0.474 
Notes: Authors’ estimations based on CHNS samples. 
6.5. Estimation results 
To test our theoretical model, the relationship between income and BMI is estimated by first using 
OLS estimations; then, the relationship between income and overweight initiation, cessation, and 
participation are estimated by using maximum likelihood estimations. As mentioned in Pampel et 
al. (2012), males and females may differ in socially constructed body weight norms and ideas; thus, 
it is more reliable to estimate these relationships for the male and female samples separately, as 
well as for urban and rural residents. 
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6.5.1 The relationship between income and BMI 
The OLS estimation results for the relationship between income and BMI (equation 8) are 
presented in Table 6.2. The positive coefficient of income and the negative coefficient of income 
squared are both significant at the 1% level in all sample specifications. The results suggest that 
individuals’ BMI increases with household income but at a decreasing rate; this finding is in line 
with previous studies ( Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2009; Philipson and Posner, 2003). Specifically, 
the critical point of the BMI-income quadratic curve is approximately 25,595 CNY for the pooled 
sample; approximately 95.8% of the individuals are below this threshold. This indicates that the 
household income of most individuals considered in our sample lies in the upward part of the 
inverted U-shape curve, where direct utility from consumption plays the dominant role in 
consumers’ life-course utility. In addition, the marginal effect of income on individual BMI is 
approximately 0.483 when controlling for other variables at the mean values. The marginal effect 
shows that on average a 10,000 CNY increase in household income will lead to a rise in an 
individual’s BMI of approximately 0.483.  
The estimation results for the male and female as well as for the urban and rural subsamples are 
also shown in Table 6.2. In general, the coefficients of the key variables, which are income and 
income squared, are consistent with the estimation results of the pooled sample. Interestingly, the 
critical value of the BMI-income quadratic curve for females (approximately 24,708 CNY) is 
relatively lower than the value of 28,659 CNY for males, which suggests that females tend to 
decrease their BMI at a relatively lower income level compared with males. In the view of the 
urban and rural samples, we find that the critical value for the urban sample is approximately 
26,045 CNY and for the rural sample it is approximately 33,967 CNY. The results indicate that 
urban residents are more likely to decrease their BMI at a lower income level than are rural 
residents.  
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Table 6. 2  OLS estimation of the relationship between income and BMI 
Variables Dependent variable: BMI 
 Male Female Rural Urban Pooled  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Marginal effect 
Income 0.791*** 0.509*** 0.625*** 0.573*** 0.671*** 0.483*** 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.10) (0.06) 
Income squared  -0.138*** -0.103*** -0.092** -0.110** -0.126***  
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)  
Male   -0.270*** 0.073 -0.140** -0.140** 
   (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) 
Age 30-39 0.521*** 0.378*** 0.442*** 0.484*** 0.456*** 0.456*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) 
Age 40-49 0.685*** 1.114*** 0.875*** 1.067*** 0.933*** 0.933*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) 
Age 50-59 0.504*** 1.122*** 0.738*** 1.075*** 0.829*** 0.829*** 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) 
Age 60+ 0.127 0.555*** 0.151 0.611*** 0.291*** 0.291*** 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) 
Married 0.948*** 0.999*** 0.827*** 1.133*** 0.971*** 0.971*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07) 
Widowed 0.538** 0.690** 0.695*** 0.512* 0.591*** 0.591*** 
 (0.22) (0.29) (0.22) (0.28) (0.18) (0.18) 
Separated 0.172 0.169 0.095 0.575*** 0.289** 0.289** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.20) (0.12) (0.12) 
Primary school 0.249** 0.247*** 0.121 0.041 0.092 0.092 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.15) (0.07) (0.07) 
Middle school 0.552*** -0.226** 0.164* -0.268** 0.034 0.034 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) 
College 0.694*** -1.184*** 0.067 -0.500*** -0.274** -0.274** 
 (0.16) (0.20) (0.19) (0.18) (0.13) (0.13) 
Household size -0.042** -0.044* -0.054*** -0.031 -0.043** -0.043** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Ethnic Minority -0.168 -0.089 -0.365** 0.487** -0.126 -0.126 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.14) (0.19) (0.13) (0.13) 
Presently working -0.353*** -0.573*** -0.480*** -0.426*** -0.501*** -0.501*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) 
Urban 0.271** 0.256**   0.253*** 0.253*** 
 (0.11) (0.11)   (0.09) (0.09) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES  
Regional dummies YES YES YES YES YES  
Constant 20.866*** 21.854*** 21.884*** 21.569*** 21.599***  
 (0.23) (0.25) (0.25) (0.29) (0.20)  
N 23378 25670 32066 16982 49048 49048 
R2 0.169 0.124 0.140 0.127 0.126  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. 
Robust standard errors (clustered on community id) are in parentheses. Regional controls include dummies for 
Chongqing, Beijing, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou. 
Time controls include year dummies for 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011. 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on CHNS samples. 
 
6.5.2 The relationship between income and overweight initiation 
The estimation results for the relationship between income and overweight initiation are shown in 
Table 6.3. As our findings suggest the positive coefficient of income and the negative coefficient 
of income squared are both statistically significant at the conventional levels for all samples except 
for the female sample. The results indicate that there is an inverted U-shape relationship between 
‘starting’ overweight and household income. This means that the probability of ‘starting’ 
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overweight increases with income at low income levels and then declines after the critical point at 
high income levels. We find that individuals will be less likely to start being overweight when their 
income exceeds the critical point of 20,416 CNY; however, 91.5% of the individuals considered in 
the pooled sample are still below this threshold, which implies that a majority of the individuals 
considered might still be at risk of becoming overweight. The marginal effect of income shows that 
the probability of starting to be overweight increases by approximately 2.3 percentage points if 
income rises by 10,000 CNY, controlling for all other variables at mean values.  
The results for the different subsamples are largely consistent with the results from the pooled 
sample (Table 6.3). However, the insignificant coefficient of income and the negatively significant 
coefficient of income squared in the female subsample indicate that high-income females are less 
likely to start being overweight; similar results by Deuchert et al. (2014) also indicate a 
significantly negative correlation between overweight and obesity and per capita GDP for females, 
using the data from 52 different countries. Furthermore, we find that individuals living in urban 
areas have a lower threshold value (20,400 CNY), after which individuals are less likely to start 
being overweight with increasing income.  
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Table 6. 3  Probit estimation results for overweight initiation 
Variables Dependent variable: Overweight initiation 
 Male Female Rural Urban Pooled  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) Marginal effect 
Income 0.221*** 0.061 0.163*** 0.102* 0.147*** 0.023*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.01) 
Income squared -0.041*** -0.028* -0.033** -0.025* -0.036***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
Male   -0.057** -0.002 -0.036* -0.009* 
   (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) 
Age 30-39 0.186*** 0.079** 0.139*** 0.107** 0.131*** 0.033*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01) 
Age 40-49 0.228*** 0.312*** 0.270*** 0.279*** 0.274*** 0.068*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.01) 
Age 50-59 0.126** 0.247*** 0.171*** 0.198*** 0.183*** 0.045*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.01) 
Age 60+ 0.031 0.117** 0.015 0.138** 0.064* 0.016* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.01) 
Married 0.360*** 0.368*** 0.294*** 0.442*** 0.357*** 0.088*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.01) 
Widowed 0.317*** 0.258** 0.241** 0.338*** 0.281*** 0.070*** 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.02) 
Separated 0.186* 0.150** 0.149** 0.213** 0.184*** 0.046*** 
 (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.01) 
Primary school 0.047 0.095** 0.035 -0.016 0.025 0.006 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.01) 
Middle school 0.190*** -0.027 0.057 -0.011 0.043 0.011 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01) 
College 0.218*** -0.330*** -0.040 -0.062 -0.048 -0.012 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.01) 
Household size -0.018* -0.010 -0.013* -0.014 -0.013** -0.003** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Ethnic Minority -0.080 0.028 -0.056 0.093 -0.020 -0.005 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.01) 
Presently working -0.163*** -0.160*** -0.164*** -0.141*** -0.160*** -0.040*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) 
Urban 0.111*** 0.174***   0.140*** 0.035*** 
 (0.04) (0.04)   (0.03) (0.01) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES  
Province dummies YES YES YES YES YES  
Constant -1.351*** -1.031*** -1.118*** -0.930*** -1.119***  
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.08)  
N 16343 16743 22365 10721 33086 33086 
Chi2 864 797 1044 663 1285  
Pseudo R-squared 0.083 0.053 0.055 0.064 0.059  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. 
Robust standard errors (clustered on community id) are in parentheses. Regional controls include dummies for 
Chongqing, Beijing, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou. 
Time controls include year dummies for 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011. 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on CHNS samples. 
 
6.5.3 The relationship between income and overweight cessation 
Table 6.4 presents the estimation results for the relationship between income and overweight 
cessation. The negative coefficient of income and positive coefficient of income squared are both 
statistically significant as expected; thus, the probability of ‘quitting’ overweight declines with 
income but at a decreasing rate. This indicates that there is a U-shape relationship between income 
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and overweight cessation with the critical point of 22,307 CNY; however, approximately 91% of 
the individuals considered in the pooled sample are below this threshold. Moreover, the marginal 
effect of income on overweight cessation indicates that a 10,000 CNY increase in household 
income will lead to a decline in the probability of overweight cessation of approximately 4.7%, 
when keeping all other control variables at the mean values. The likelihood of stopping overweight 
will consistently increase after the household income exceeds the critical point of 22,307 CNY; 
however, there are no more than 10% of individuals who have incomes above this level. 
Similar to the pooled sample, the estimations from subsamples suggest that the probability of 
overweight cessation first decreases and then after reaching a bottom value increases with income. 
The results also indicate that females and urban residents have lower critical values of 20,952 CNY 
and 23,000 CNY, respectively. This suggests that females and urban residents are more likely to 
‘quit’ overweight at lower income levels. 
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Table 6. 4  Probit estimation results for overweight cessation 
Variables Dependent variable: Overweight cessation 
 Male Female Rural Urban Pooled  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) Marginal effect 
Income -0.276*** -0.176*** -0.241*** -0.161*** -0.232*** -0.047*** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) 
Income squared 0.060*** 0.042*** 0.050** 0.035** 0.052***  
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)  
Male   0.014 -0.134*** -0.046 -0.015 
   (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) 
Age 30-39 -0.366*** -0.286*** -0.358*** -0.290*** -0.324*** -0.105*** 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.01) 
Age 40-49 -0.382*** -0.610*** -0.583*** -0.430*** -0.519*** -0.168*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.01) 
Age 50-59 -0.433*** -0.633*** -0.566*** -0.554*** -0.550*** -0.179*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.01) 
Age 60+ -0.287*** -0.418*** -0.369*** -0.322*** -0.340*** -0.110*** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.01) 
Married -0.463*** -0.485*** -0.467*** -0.464*** -0.468*** -0.152*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.02) 
Widowed -0.269* -0.389** -0.169 -0.553*** -0.328*** -0.107*** 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.11) (0.04) 
Separated -0.118 -0.346*** -0.331*** -0.320*** -0.317*** -0.103*** 
 (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) (0.02) 
Primary school 0.002 -0.016 0.055 0.006 0.054 0.017 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.01) 
Middle school -0.064 0.254*** 0.110** 0.221*** 0.160*** 0.052*** 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.01) 
College -0.065 0.625*** 0.232** 0.327*** 0.293*** 0.095*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.02) 
Household size 0.022 -0.007 0.017 -0.014 0.005 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
Ethnic Minority -0.060 0.042 0.092 -0.203** -0.007 -0.002 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.02) 
Presently working 0.034 0.129*** 0.080** 0.108** 0.095*** 0.031*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01) 
Urban -0.009 0.035   0.017 0.006 
 (0.05) (0.04)   (0.03) (0.01) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES  
Province dummies YES YES YES YES YES  
Constant 1.506*** 1.023*** 1.176*** 1.237*** 1.214***  
 (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09)  
N 7041 8919 9698 6262 15960 15960 
Chi2 1063 1289 1600 968 2012  
Pseudo R-squared 0.155 0.138 0.160 0.112 0.135  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. 
Robust standard errors (clustered on community id) are in parentheses. Regional controls include dummies for 
Chongqing, Beijing, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou. 
Time controls include year dummies for 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011. 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on CHNS samples. 
 
6.5.4 The relationship between income and overweight participation 
The estimation results of overweight participation are shown in Table 6.5. Although the probability 
of overweight cessation tends to increase with income at high income levels, overweight initiation 
has been prevalent in a transition economy like China. Hence, in general, the relationship between 
income and overweight participation shows a similar pattern as overweight initiation (Deuchert et 
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al. 2014; Hruschka and Brewis 2013; Pampel et al. 2012). Our results support this finding. The 
relationship between income and the probability of overweight participation changes the sign from 
positive to negative as income increases, indicating an inverted U-shape relationship between 
income and overweight participation. For the pooled sample, the peak of this U-shape curve occurs 
at the point where income is approaching 22,727 CNY; however, 91.8% of the individuals 
considered in the pooled sample are below this level. From the marginal effect of income on 
overweight participation, we find that an increase of 10,000 CNY in household income decreases 
the probability of overweight participation of approximately 5.3%, when controlling all other 
variables at mean values.  
Table 6.5 also shows that the estimation results for the subsamples are consistent with the pooled 
sample. However, the critical point of the inverted U-shape curve between income and overweight 
participation is lower for females and for urban residents than it is for males and rural residents, 
which indicates that females and urban residents tend to decrease the likelihood of being 
overweight earlier compared with males and rural residents (see also Tafreschi, 2015).   
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Table 6. 5  Probit estimation results for overweight participation 
Variables Dependent variable: Overweight participation 
 Male Female Rural Urban Pooled  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) Marginal effect 
Income 0.325*** 0.168*** 0.270*** 0.168*** 0.250*** 0.053*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) 
Income squared -0.063*** -0.044*** -0.051*** -0.036*** -0.055***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
Male   -0.099*** 0.003 -0.058*** -0.019*** 
   (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
Age 30-39 0.223*** 0.122*** 0.179*** 0.156*** 0.170*** 0.056*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) 
Age 40-49 0.290*** 0.403*** 0.360*** 0.356*** 0.356*** 0.116*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) 
Age 50-59 0.257*** 0.428*** 0.342*** 0.382*** 0.347*** 0.114*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) 
Age 60+ 0.149*** 0.232*** 0.147*** 0.249*** 0.175*** 0.057*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01) 
Married 0.395*** 0.429*** 0.368*** 0.445*** 0.407*** 0.133*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.01) 
Widowed 0.316*** 0.248** 0.251*** 0.321*** 0.278*** 0.091*** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) (0.02) 
Separated 0.126 0.201*** 0.181*** 0.246*** 0.214*** 0.070*** 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.02) 
Primary school 0.080* 0.068** 0.023 -0.005 0.010 0.003 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01) 
Middle school 0.231*** -0.104*** 0.043 -0.069 0.004 0.001 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) 
College 0.286*** -0.468*** -0.003 -0.130** -0.088* -0.029* 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02) 
Household size -0.025*** -0.010 -0.022*** -0.006 -0.016*** -0.005*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Ethnic Minority -0.075 -0.026 -0.117** 0.116* -0.045 -0.015 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.01) 
Presently working -0.169*** -0.216*** -0.202*** -0.175*** -0.199*** -0.065*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
Urban 0.098** 0.132***   0.111*** 0.036*** 
 (0.04) (0.04)   (0.03) (0.01) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES  
Province dummies YES YES YES YES YES  
Constant -1.363*** -0.929*** -0.980*** -0.981*** -1.041***  
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07)  
N 23378 25670 32066 16982 49048 49048 
Chi2 1572 1557 1861 1079 2399  
Pseudo R-squared 0.113 0.078 0.093 0.073 0.086  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. 
Robust standard errors (clustered on community id) are in parentheses. Regional controls include dummies for 
Chongqing, Beijing, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou. 
Time controls include year dummies for 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011. 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on CHNS samples. 
6.6 Conclusion 
From a life-course utility model in which income serves as a budget constraint and as a source of 
future utility, our hypothesis is that individuals with unhealthy food consumption patterns are at a 
higher risk of having a lower expected future health utility due to reduced longevity. Since health 
utility is a decreasing function of income in our theoretial model, low-income individuals tend to 
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have lower cost of future health utility. They are more likely to consume unhealthy food and have 
unhealthy consumption behaviors when their income constraint is overcome. Evidence for this 
theoretical consideration is given by increased incidences of overweight in developed countries. 
However, in a transition economy like China the income constraint still plays a significant role in 
individuals’ food consumption behaviors; therefore, overweight as a consequence of unhealthy 
food consumption is investigated in our empirical estimations by using the data from the CHNS. 
Our estimation results suggest that BMI and overweight initiation have an inverted U-shape 
relationship with household income, indicating that BMI and the probability of overweight 
initiation increase with income but at a decreasing rate. With income increases, overweight 
individuals are less likely to ‘stop’ overweight at low income levels and more likely to ‘stop’ it at 
high income levels. This result also suggests that low-income individuals have a higher probability 
to ‘stop’ overweight when their income lies in the left side of the U-shape curve. However, we 
argue that it is not because the absolute value of health utility exceeds the direct utility from 
consumption that plays the dominant role in lifetime utility, but because overweight individuals 
with low incomes can hardly maintain their previous food consumption and easily lose their weight. 
Based on our findings, it is plausible that low-income individuals in China tend to have a more 
healthy diet. However, we argue that the reason is not because low-income individuals make more 
rational and knowledgeable food consumption choices, but because of an income constraint that 
denies them to consume food with higher calories and nutrition. Low income limits the availability 
for excess food consumption and increases physically demanding labor, while high income gives 
rise not only to excess food but also to avoidance of physically demanding labor (Pampel et al. 
2012). Therefore, with income increases low-income individuals in a transition economy like China 
might increasingly consume more unhealthy food, which might lead to a higher overweight rate 
and nutrition related incidents until a certain income threshold is reached. 
Another interesting finding is that urban residents tend to reach the threshold value of the 
relationship between income and body weight, as well as between income and overweight initiation, 
cessation, and participation earlier than do rural residents. Given the ongoing changes of the 
relationship between income and overweight participation from positive in developing regions to 
negative in developed regions (Carlos A. Monteiro et al. 2004; Sobal and Stunkard 1989; Tafreschi 
2015), urban residents are more likely to reach the threshold value earlier, possibly because urban 
areas are more developed than are rural areas in China.  
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We also find the reversal of the relationship between income and BMI, as well as overweight 
initiation, cessation, and participation earlier for females than for males. One reason could be that 
females tend to understate their true body weight while the opposite is more likely true for males 
(Cawley 2004), and another reason might be that females are more likely to follow physician’s 
suggestions to consume less unhealthy food with high calories once they become overweight 
(Loureiro and Nayga Jr 2006). 
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusion 
 
This dissertation consists of five contributions that empirically examine food consumption, income 
inequality and health-related issues in China. These studies not only contribute to the existing 
research, but also entail economic implications and recommendations for consumers and policy 
makers. Since there is a specific research question in each study and the interpretation of the results 
are also subject to some limitations, therefore, a final conclusion is drawn in this chapter and each 
contribution is concluded separately. 
Heterogeneity in food consumption among income classes in rural China 
The demand for eight major food groups is estimated by income class using a household data set 
drawn from the CHNS in rural China. The Working-Leser model is employed in the first step to 
investigate the responsiveness of demand for the total studied food expenditure to the changes in 
income. The quadratic almost ideal demand system is then estimated for the eight food groups 
using a non-linear seemingly unrelated regression technique in the second step. After obtaining the 
estimated income elasticities of studied food groups for various income classes, we examine the 
responsiveness of food demand to the changes in income distribution. 
The results suggest that there are significant differences in food demand across various income 
classes. The lowest-income households are more sensitive to income and price changes than the 
highest-income households for most of the food groups. We conclude that effective policies 
directed to lowering food prices or increasing household incomes will result in substantially higher 
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demand for food in rural China, especially for the lowest-income households since they have the 
highest own-price and income elasticities for most of the food groups. 
According to the projected increase in demand for the studied food groups under four scenarios, 
we can draw several conclusions. Firstly, we can conclude that a small change in income 
distribution will drive considerable variation in food consumption. Secondly, any policies designed 
to increase incomes that favor lower-income households will give stronger rise to food demand 
than policies that favor higher-income classes. Thirdly, policies intended to redistribute income 
from higher-income classes to lower-income classes will drive higher demand for food as well, 
although there is no growth in average income for the whole population. Fourthly, a uniform 
increase in income would also boost food demand by a larger amount than if the income growth 
was solely received by higher-income classes. Finally, keeping the current income distribution and 
growth, the projected food consumption in rural China would increase consistently in the next 
decades, especially for aquatic and dairy products. 
In conclusion, income elasticities for rural households are still relatively large, and there exists 
substantial inequality in food consumption. Consequently, policies designed to increase household 
income in rural areas would be helpful to increase their food consumption, especially to improve 
the welfare of the lowest-income class. As the estimation results indicate, quite different food 
demand patterns are shown in various income classes, and hence income distribution should be 
taken into account instead of an average estimation for the population as a whole. 
The impact of education on income inequality between ethnic minorities and Han in China 
In this article, we examine the impact of education on income inequality between ethnic minorities 
and Han in China by using CHNS data over the period 1993-2011. Based on several OLS and IV 
estimations, this article enhances our understanding of the specific returns to education for ethnic 
minorities.  
The results suggest that there exists significant income inequality to the disadvantage of ethnic 
minorities for the full, female, and urban samples when either the Law or the Provisions are used 
as an instrument for education and for the rural sample when the Provisions are used as an 
instrument for education. We find that for the full sample one additional year of education will 
increase earned incomes of ethnic minorities by 26.3-28%. In particular, one additional year of 
education will increase earned incomes by 13.5-14.4% for women from an ethnic minority group, 
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by 10.4-14% for ethnic minorities with urban household registration, and by 10.8% for ethnic 
minorities with rural household registration. 
The returns to education from IV estimations show that an additional year of education can increase 
earned incomes by 17.7-19.9% for all individuals. In particular, an additional year of education can 
increase earned incomes by 15.1-18.2% for women, by 11.2-12.1% for individuals with urban 
household registration, and by 28.7-31.1% for individuals with rural household registration. The 
higher returns to education from IV estimations in comparison to OLS estimations are a common 
phenomenon in the literature (Card 1999). 
The following limitation of our study should be noted. The CHNS sample over the period 1993-
2011 includes only nine provinces so that our findings cannot be generalized for overall China 
(Gustafsson and Li 2002). The TAR and XUAR are not included in our study; yet income 
inequalities between ethnic minorities and Han in these two regions are particularly pronounced 
(Gilley 2001, Hannum and Xie 1998, Yee 2003); therefore, further regional specific studies are 
required. 
Drink and smoke; drink or smoke? – The interdependence between alcohol and cigarette 
consumption for men in China 
Due to insufficient price variation, the approach starting with a structural equation model that was 
introduced by Tauchmann et al. (2013) is used in this study to better understand the relation 
between alcohol and cigarettes consumption in China. A structural Tobit model is employed to 
address the censoring of the data and to account for the potential endogeneity of alcohol and 
cigarette consumption in the structural estimation, parental consumption behaviors are used as 
instruments for the sons’ alcohol and cigarette consumption, respectively.  
The main finding of our research is that alcohol and cigarettes are complementary goods for men 
in China. When the demand for alcohol (cigarettes) increases, the demand for cigarettes (alcohol) 
will also increase, ceteris paribus. This implies that a positive health effect could be achieved if 
only one of the two commodities is targeted with health measures, for example through a tax. This 
kind of positive health effect is often referred to as a double dividend health effect, or in a more 
popular vernacular it is a health measure that could “kill two birds with one stone”.  
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The results also indicate that parental alcohol and cigarette consumption has a significantly positive 
influence on a son’s alcohol and cigarette consumption, respectively. This suggests that the parental 
consumption behavior serves as a valid instrument for filial alcohol and cigarette consumption if 
endogeneity is observed. Another interesting finding is that maternal education has a statistically 
significant effect on filial cigarette consumption. Any policy that seeks to improve women’s 
education in China might, thus, reduce filial cigarette consumption in China. 
Finally, it can be concluded that the structural model serves as an excellent alternative if only 
consumption data are available. A limitation of this study is the comparatively small sample size, 
especially for conditional linear estimation; this stems from the fact that individual and parental 
data are merged. Further studies with other data sources are required to verify our results. To 
provide more elaborate policy recommendations, it might be fruitful in future studies to better 
understand the relationship between socio-economic factors and harmful health behavior, 
particularly due to China’s rapid economic shift over the last decades and the respective change in 
consumption behavior.  
Unhealthy consumption behaviors and their intergenerational persistence: the role of 
education 
This paper investigates the impact of education on unhealthy consumption behaviors and their 
intergenerational persistence. Due to the presence of potential endogeneity of education in health 
behaviors estimations, it requires more rigorous estimation to obtain reliable results. Since the 9-
year Compulsory Education Law and the Provisions on the Prohibition of Using Child Labor as 
quasi-experiments having significant influence on the education attainment, we employ an 
instrumental estimation by using these two institutional changes as instruments for education in 
unhealthy consumption equations. Through introducing an interaction term between parental 
unhealthy consumption and filial education, we further clarify the impact of education on the 
intergeneration persistence of unhealthy consumption.  
The empirical estimation results indicate that there exists significant intergenerational persistence 
of unhealthy consumption behaviors in China. In particular, the probability of intergenerational 
persistence of smoking is approximately 2.6% and 4.9% from mother and father, respectively, 
while that of binge drinking is approximately 13.3% and 14.8% from mother and father, 
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respectively. Drinking behavior has the largest probability of intergenerational persistence which 
is approximately 20.4% and 17.5% from mother and father, respectively. 
We also find that an additional year of education has a statistically significant negative impact on 
smoking, drinking, and binge drinking. One additional year of education decreases the probability 
to be smoking, drinking, and binge drinking by 3.4%, 2.8%, and 1.8%, respectively. Another 
interesting finding is that an additional year of education can counteract intergenerational 
persistence of smoking and binge drinking from the father, but it has no impact on intergenerational 
persistence from the mother. Since drinking behavior is ambiguous to be considered as an 
unhealthy consumption behavior, we find that there is no impact of education on the 
intergenerational persistence of drinking. 
Hence, our results suggest that policies oriented to control smoking and binge drinking should take 
parents’ consumption behaviors into consideration; education is expected to be an efficient way to 
control unhealthy consumption behaviors in China; however, education may not be an efficient 
way to prevent intergenerational persistence of unhealthy consumption from the mother.  
There are some limitations of our study: First, due to the absence of data on consumers’ daily 
alcohol consumption, the definition of binge drinking in our study is different from other studies 
(see, Li et al., 2011), which may induce higher probability of binge drinking for our sample. Second, 
the primary goal of this study is to investigate the causal relationship between education and 
unhealthy consumption as well as its intergenerational persistence, further research needs to be 
conducted to shed light on the mechanism or channel through which these unhealthy consumption 
behaviors transmit to the next generation. Thus, the findings from our results should be cautiously 
interpreted and implemented. 
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Low-income and Overweight in the Transition Economy of China? 
Evidence from a Life-course Utility Model 
From a life-course utility model in which income serves as a budget constraint and as a source of 
future utility, our hypothesis is that individuals with unhealthy food consumption are at a higher 
risk of  having a lower expected future health utiltiy due to reduced longevity. In the transition 
economy of China income constraint still plays significant role in individuals’ food consumption 
behaviors, overweight as a consequence of unhealthy food consumption is investigated in our 
empirical estimations. 
The results suggest that BMI and overweight initiation have an inverted U-shape relationship with 
household income, indicating that BMI and the probability of overweight initiation increase with 
income but at a decreasing rate. With income increases, overweight individuals are less likely to 
stop overweight at low income level and more likely to stop it at high income level. This result also 
suggests that low-income individuals have a higher probability to stop overweight when their 
income lies in the left side of the U-shape curve. However, it is not because the absolute value of 
health utility exceeds the direct utility from consumption playing dominant role in lifetime utility, 
but because that for these overweight individuals with low income they can hardly maintain their 
previous food consumption and easily lose their weight. 
Our finding implies that it is plausible that low-income individuals tend to have a more healthy diet 
in the transition economy of China. However, we argue that the reason is not because low-income 
individuals make more rational and knowledgeable food consumption choices, but because of an 
income constraint that denies them to consume food with higher calories and nutrition. Therefore, 
with income increases low-income individuals in a transition economy like China might 
increasingly consume more unhealthy food, which might lead to a higher overweight rate and 
nutrition related incidents until a certain income threshold is reached. 
Another interesting finding is that urban residents tend to change the sign of the relation between 
income and body weight, as well as the relation between income and overweight initiation, 
cessation, and cessation earlier compared with rural residents. As known that the ongoing changes 
of the relationship between income and overweight participation from positive in developing 
regions to negative in developed regions (Sobal and Stunkard, 1989; Monteiro et al., 2004b; 
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Tafreschi, 2015), urban residents are more likely to have the reverse sign earlier since urban areas 
are mostly developed than rural areas in China.  
We also find the earlier reversal of the relation between income and body weight, as well as 
overweight initiation, cessation, and cessation for females than that for males, one reason could be 
that females tend to understate their true body weight while the opposite is more likely true for 
males (Cawley, 2004), and another reason is that females are more likely to follow physician’s 
suggestions to consume less unhealthy food with high calories once they become overweight 
(Loureiro and Nayga, 2006). 
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